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For many years, the reigning view among scholars was that the Fourteenth
Amendment was never understood-except by a few "eccentric" or
"confused"figures-to nationalize (or incorporate) the entire Bill of Rights
so as to apply it to the states. That modern, conventional, anti-
incorporation view was developed primarily by Charles Fairman and
Stanley Morrison starting in 1949, and defended by Raoul Berger from
1977 to 1997. The pro-incorporation view had been asserted in 1947 by
Justice Hugo Black in his famous dissent in Adamson v. California.
Scholars taking a revisionist, pro-incorporation position, in response to
Fairman and Morrison, included William Winslow Crosskey in the 1950s
and Alfred Avins in the 1960s. The pro-incorporation view was given
powerful scholarly support by Michael Kent Curtis starting in 1980, joined
by Akhil Reed Amar, Richard Aynes, Earl Maltz, and Stephen Halbrook,
among others, in the 1990s.
Some scholars and judges still question, or reject outright, the legitimacy of
the selective incorporation doctrine by which the Supreme Court, in
practical effect, by 1969, applied most of the Bill of Rights to the states.
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They have also questioned the total incorporation doctrine espoused by
Justice Black and others. But this Article demonstrates the truly shocking
and inexcusable extent to which Fairman, Morrison, and especially Berger,
mishandled the evidence and profoundly misunderstood the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The extent of their scholarly malpractice has not
been fully explored until now. Yet their works remain amazingly influential.
Fairman 's 1949 article has been viewed as a classic for more than half a
century. It is one of the most-cited law review articles of all time. Berger's
books remain widely cited and admired, especially in conservative circles.
The research presented in this Article shows, surprisingly, that there is still
a great deal new to say about the original understanding of the Amendment.
Part I briefly reviews the doctrine of Barron v. Baltimore, the 1833
Supreme Court decision holding that the Bill of Rights did not originally
apply to the states. Parts I to VI review in great depth the congressional
debates over the Amendment, focusing on the crucial speeches of Rep. John
A. Bingham (R-Ohio) and Sen. Jacob M Howard (R-Mich.), the reactions
of their colleagues in Congress, the contemporary press coverage, and the
analysis of later generations of scholars. Part VII then reviews crucial
aspects of the debates throughout the country during the state ratification
process. The Article analyzes primary source materials never fully
discussed before-indeed, barely quoted or mentioned in earlier
scholarship. These include, most notably, a New York Times editorial
published two days after the Amendment was introduced in the Senate
(discussed in Part VI) and an essay by Samuel Smith Nicholas, a Kentucky
state judge (discussed in Part VII.B). These materials, together with other
evidence, suggest that nationalizing the Bill of Rights may have been widely
understood during the ratification period as a key purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In addition to providing a descriptive reevaluation of the evidence, the
Article offers several theoretical and analytical arguments and insights. The
Introduction grounds the Article in the modern scholarly approach focusing
on the original public meaning of constitutional provisions. Part VI1B,
among other points, applies to the debates over the Amendment the insights
of linguist George Lakoff on the framing of political issues. Part VII. C
develops an argument about how we should weigh and evaluate the
available record-and its silences-in seeking to illuminate the original
understanding. Parts VIII and IX suggest how we might construe the text of
the Amendment in light of the historical evidence. The Article concludes
that the evidence is sufficient to support the inference that the Amendment
was understood to nationalize the Bill of Rights. But it concedes the uneven
and incomplete nature of the surviving evidence from 1866-67, and that
more work is required to explore the early understanding of the Amendment
in the years after 1867, and to analyze the ultimate significance of all the
evidence.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is part of a larger project on the history and meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, begun in two articles published in 2000 in the Ohio
State Law Journal. The first of those articles focused mainly on the evidence
regarding the Amendment's "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights' to be
I The constitutional debate that is the focus of this project is commonly called the
"incorporation debate," and the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment was and is
properly understood to apply the Bill of Rights to the states is commonly called the
"incorporation" theory or doctrine. It has, of course, nothing to do with business
corporations. As my title indicates, I have come to prefer "nationalization" to describe
what the Amendment is thought to accomplish in this regard, though I use both terms
interchangeably. For the relevant text, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
See also id. § 5: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article."
For the sake of convenience, I use the following acronyms: AMERICAN NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 24 vols., 1999)
[hereinafter ANB] (differently formatted online version available at http://www.anb.org);
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774-2005 (H.R. Doc.
108-222, U.S.G.P.O., 2005) [hereinafter BDC] (differently formatted online version
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found in and surrounding the Slaughter-House Cases and some other
Supreme Court decisions of the 1870s. 2 The second focused mainly on the
incorporation debate in the Supreme Court from 1880 to 1908, especially the
crucial role of the elder Justice John Marshall Harlan. 3 The entire project,
which I plan to publish eventually in book form, will present a
comprehensive study of the incorporation theory over the past 140-plus
years. 4
This Article focuses on a subject only briefly addressed in my earlier
work: the evidence on incorporation in and surrounding the debates over the
Fourteenth Amendment as proposed in 1866.5 Many readers, especially
available at http://bioguide.congress.gov); CONG. GLOBE (1833-73), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwcg.html [hereinafter CG] (citations followed by
Congress and Session, then page number; e.g., "CG (39:1) 1090" for 39th Congress, 1st
Session, p. 1090); DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY (Allen Johnson & Dumas
Malone eds., Scribners, originally published in 20 vols., 1928-36, republished in 10 vols.,
1946) [hereinafter DAB] (citations preceded by 1946 volume number and followed by
part and page number; for example, "4 DAB, supra note 1, at pt. 1, 347" for vol. 4, 1946
ed., part 1, p. 347). The Congressional Globe does not provide adequate information on
the full names, states, and party affiliations of members of Congress. To the extent such
information (along with dates of service) is not provided in sources otherwise cited, I
have relied on BDC, supra, and GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS (CQ Press, 2 vols., 5th ed.
2005) [hereinafter ELECTIONS].
2 Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding
in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051 (2000) [hereinafter Wildenthal, Lost Compromise
(2000)]; see also, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Bryan
H. Wildenthal, How ILearned to Stop Worrying and Love the Slaughter-House Cases: An
Essay in Constitutional-Historical Revisionism, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 241 (2001)
[hereinafter Wildenthal, How I Learned (2001)].
3 Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation of
the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457 (2000) [hereinafter Wildenthal, Road to Twining
(2000)].
4 For a working draft of the Introduction and Chapters One and Two, of what is
planned as a twenty-chapter book, see http://ssm.com/abstract=-90562 1. Chapter Two will
be revised to correspond to parts of this Article.
5 The Amendment was ratified in July 1868. See 15 Stat. 708-11 (July 28, 1868)
(statement of Secretary of State William H. Seward, certifying ratification). But evidence
(even pre-ratification) dating from 1868-even, arguably, most evidence dating from
1867-has little direct bearing on the original understanding (strictly speaking), since it
postdates Congress's 1866 debates on proposing the Amendment, the 1866 elections
largely fought over the Amendment, and the early ratifications by many states. It is thus
more appropriate to consider most material from 1867 and 1868 together with all of the
early post-ratification evidence up to 1873. I will do so in forthcoming articles. But it is
appropriate-indeed, unavoidable-to consider some evidence from 1867 (and later) in
any coherent discussion of the original understanding. See, e.g., infra Parts VIII-IX
(discussing some evidence from the 1870s). George Thomas, in his thoughtful response
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professors of constitutional law, will immediately groan. They may well ask
what more there could possibly be to say at this late date. But as this Article
seeks to demonstrate, there is a great deal more that needs to be said.
True, the incorporation debate is, to put it mildly, well-worn scholarly
ground. This Article will not try to survey it in detail. Suffice it to say that
from 1949 to the 1980s, the reigning, though hotly contested, view among
scholars was that the Fourteenth Amendment had never been understood-
except by a few "eccentric" or "confused" figures 6-to apply the entire Bill
of Rights to the states. This modem, conventional view was developed
primarily by Charles Fairman, Stanley Morrison, and Raoul Berger. 7 A
revisionist, pro-incorporation view began to take hold in the 1980s, thanks
largely to the work of Michael Kent Curtis. The revisionist view is rooted in
the historical research of Justice Hugo L. Black. His 1947 dissenting opinion
in Adamson v. California triggered the counterattack of the modem
conventional scholars, most notably Fairman and Morrison in articles
to this Article, understandably chooses to delve into some post-1867 material. See George
C. Thomas II, The Riddle of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor
Wildenthal, 68 OHIo ST. L.J. 1627, 1649-56 (2007) [hereinafter Thomas, Riddle (2007)];
see also Bryan H. Wildenthal, A Reply to Professor Thomas, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1659
(2007) [hereinafter Wildenthal, Reply (2007)]. While I respond in this Article and my
Reply to some of Thomas's post-1867 points, I generally leave that to future articles. See
also infra note 57.
6 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (dismissing the elder Justice Harlan, who repeatedly urged the
incorporationist view of the Amendment, as "an eccentric exception"). "Confused" refers
to the various pejorative labels repeatedly hurled at Rep. John A. Bingham (R-Ohio) and
Sen. Jacob M. Howard (R-Mich.). See infra Parts II, VI.
7 See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) [hereinafter Fairman,
Original (1949)]; CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, PART
ONE, at 1260-1388 (Macmillan 1971) (vol. 6 of the OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES) [hereinafter FAIRMAN,
RECONSTRUCTION (1971)]; CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-
88, PART Two, at 132-289 (Macmillan 1987) (vol. 7 of the HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY);
Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140 (1949); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (Harv. Univ. Press
1977) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1977)]; id. (Liberty Fund, 2d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997)]; RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Univ. Okla. Press 1989) [hereinafter BERGER,
FOURTEENTH (1989)]; Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981) [hereinafter Berger, Nine-
Lived Cat (1981)].
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published in 1949.8 Black's view was defended during the 1950s by William
Winslow Crosskey and by Alfred Avins in the 1960s,9 and then attacked
vociferously by Berger starting in 1977. But it was not until the work of
Curtis starting in 1980, joined later and most notably by Akhil Reed Amar,
Richard Aynes, Earl Maltz, and Stephen Halbrook, 10 that the revisionist view
began to hold its own.
8 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., joined by Douglas,
J., dissenting); see also id. at 123 (Murphy, J., joined by Rutledge, J., dissenting)
("substantial[ly] agree[ing]" with Black); Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7;
Morrison (1949), supra note 7.
9 See 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1083-1175, 1381 n.l 1 (Univ. Chicago Press, 2 vols.,
1953) [hereinafter CROSSKEY, POLITICS (1953)]; William Winslow Crosskey, Charles
Fairman, "Legislative History, " and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority,
22 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2-119 (1954) [hereinafter Crosskey, Fairman (1954)]; Alfred
Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968) [hereinafter Avins, Incorporation (1968)].
10 See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Duke Univ. Press 1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, No
STATE (1986)]; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING
PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 357-83
(Duke Univ. Press 2000) [hereinafter CURTIS, FREE SPEECH (2000)]; Michael Kent Curtis,
The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980) [hereinafter Curtis, Bill of Rights (1980)]; Michael Kent
Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 43 OIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982) [hereinafter Curtis,
Further Adventures (1982)]; Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner:
Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REv. 1 (1996) [hereinafter
Curtis, Resurrecting (1996)]; Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and
Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C.
L. REv. 1071 (2000) [hereinafter Curtis, Historical Linguistics (2000)]; AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 135-307 (Yale Univ.
Press 1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998)]; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 385-92 (Random House 2005) [hereinafter AMAR,
AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION (2005)]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, Bill of Rights
(1992)]; Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993) [hereinafter Aynes, Bingham (1993)]; Richard L.
Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHIL-KENT L. REv. 627 (1994) [hereinafter Aynes,
Constricting (1994)]; Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1197 (1995) [hereinafter Aynes, Fairman
(1995)]; Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment
[hereinafter Aynes, Unintended (2000)], in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 110 (David E. Kyvig ed., Univ. Ga. Press 2000); Richard
L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell
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Few scholars would dispute today that the modem conventional account
has, at the very least, been severely challenged. Many have been persuaded
that Black, and the "eccentric" Justice Harlan the elder, were right all along.
But it seems that some people, both scholars and others, continue to doubt
the legitimacy of the decisions by which the Supreme Court has, in practical
effect, applied almost all of the Bill of Rights to the states.11 It seems they
have not yet appreciated the extent to which the conventional view has been
undermined.
One also worries that the Supreme Court Justices themselves-not
always known for carefully following the twists and turns of legal
scholarship, and never having fully embraced the incorporation theory in any
majority opinion-may not realize how thorough and convincing the
revisionist scholarship has been. Justice Clarence Thomas, on the other hand,
has shown that he does pay attention to legal scholarship. He has cited some
revisionist works on the Fourteenth Amendment. He is also, however, the
only current member of the Court to openly question a significant aspect of
the incorporation doctrine. Adopting a position promoted by some scholars in
recent years, Justice Thomas has argued that "it makes little sense to
incorporate the Establishment [of Religion] Clause" of the First
Amendment. 12
Us About Its Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 289 (2006) [hereinafter Aynes,
Unintended (2006)] (revising and updating Aynes, Unintended (2000), supra); EARL M.
MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTrrUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 113-18 (Univ.
Press Kan. 1990) [hereinafter MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS (1990)]; STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,
THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 107-53
(Independent Institute, rev. 2d ed. 2000; orig. pub. Univ. New Mexico Press, 1984)
[hereinafter HALBROOK, ARMED (1984)]; STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (Praeger 1998)
[hereinafter HALBROOK, FREEDMEN (1998)].
11 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000), supra note 2, at 1077 n.91 (collecting
decisions so holding).
12 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 49-51; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,
728 n.3 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 677-
80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). Incorporating the Establishment Clause does raise
unique difficulties. See, e.g., Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000), supra note 2, at
1125-30 (touching on the issue); Wildenthal, Road to Twining (2000), supra note 3, at
1511-12 (same). I will address the issue in more depth in a future article. On Justice
Thomas's attention to incorporation scholarship, see, for example, Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489, 522 n. 1 (1999) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing, e.g.,
CROSSKEY, POLITICS (1953), supra note 9; CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10;
BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7); Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 50 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citing, e.g., AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10).
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Justice Thomas is not the only currently serving federal judge who has
questioned at least some aspects of the incorporation doctrine. Judge Janice
Rogers Brown-controversially appointed by President Bush in 2005 to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit--criticized the
doctrine in a 1999 speech while serving on the California Supreme Court.
She described the historical support for the theory as "sketchy" and the
arguments against it "overwhelming.' 13 She backtracked somewhat at her
Senate confirmation hearing, suggesting that her later reading on the
Reconstruction debates had caused her to rethink her views and accept that
there may be "argument[s] on both sides."'14
What really surprised me, when I took a careful look at the evidence and
scholarship on the original and early understandings between 1866 and 1873,
was how much more remained to be said. Even after publishing my articles
in 2000-which, as noted, focused mainly on the period from 1873 to
1908-1 remained for some time under the impression that the revisionist
scholars, building on the conventional studies, had pretty thoroughly raked
over all the earlier evidence. I had intended the early chapters of my book
13 David G. Savage, Bush Appeals Court Choice Under Fire, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2003, at A13; see also Richard B. Schmitt & Nick Anderson, Bush to Revive Failed
Judicial Nominations, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004, at Al; David D. Kirkpatrick, Seeing
Slavery in Liberalism: Janice Rogers Brown, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at Al; Roll-Call
Vote on Justice Brown, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at A25 (56-43 confirmation vote).
14 Kenneth Katkin, "Incorporation" of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The
View from the States, 84 NEB. L. REv. 397, 398 n.5 (2005) (quoting colloquy between
Brown and Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., at 2003 Judiciary Committee hearing). Another
controversial Bush appointee, Judge Jay S. Bybee of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, also questioned the incorporation doctrine before joining the federal bench.
See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties With the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1545-46, 1577-1616
(1995). Bybee is more famous as the author of the most infamous Bush Administration
"torture memo," written in 2002 in his capacity as head of the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel, but not disclosed until after his judicial confirmation in 2003.
See Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re:
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002),
reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172, 172-73, 213-14
(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua Dratel eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (advising the
White House, inter alia, that "torture" should be narrowly defined to include only certain
"extreme acts" such as those inflicting pain "equivalent in intensity to . . . organ
failure... or even death," and that federal laws forbidding torture might be
unconstitutional to the extent they allegedly infringed on "the President's authority to
conduct war"); see also, e.g., Kathleen Clark & Julie Mertus, Editorial, Torturing the
Law: The Justice Department's Legal Contortions on Interrogation, WASH. POST, June
20, 2004, at B3; Gail Gibson, Smooth Sailing Into Judgeship, BALTIMORE SUN, June 26,
2004, at 4A; Henry Weinstein, Conservative Confirmed as 9th Circuit Judge, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2003, Part 2 (California Metro), at 6.
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project, including what is covered by this Article, to be fairly brief syntheses
of what other scholars had written, to be gotten out of the way so I could
move on to the main story.
But the more I studied the 1866-73 period, the more I realized I was
going to have to add to-not merely synthesize-the prior scholarship. I
found original source materials that have never previously been adequately
analyzed in published scholarship-notably, for example, a New York Times
editorial published two days after the Fourteenth Amendment was introduced
in the Senate and an essay published during 1866-67 by Samuel S. Nicholas,
a Kentucky jurist. Both of those have been briefly cited before, but neither
has yet been fully quoted or sufficiently discussed. 15 I found, on point after
point, that even where the revisionists had done a commendable job (as far as
they went) in criticizing the conventional scholarship, they had not fully
deconstructed it. Lest I sound one-sided, I should note that I have also found
points on which the revisionist scholars themselves erred or overstated their
position. Despite my deep respect for their work-and my personal
friendship with some of them, including Curtis and Aynes-I do not hesitate
to disagree and criticize and follow the evidence wherever it leads. But the
flaws of the revisionist scholarship are very minor compared to those of the
conventional studies.
Every scholar has normative beliefs and commitments. Readers are
entitled to know mine. My studies of law and history strongly incline me to
sympathize with the most progressive goals of the Reconstruction
Republicans. Their goals centered on overcoming the monstrous legacy of
slavery, enhancing equal rights and liberty under law, and reuniting a nation
torn to bloody shreds by civil war. But they did not favor reunion at any
cost--only reunion of a nation that would finally, in the words of a later
prophet, "rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed."' 16 My studies
15 See infra Parts VI, VII.B.
16 The quotation is from Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech at the
March on Washington, August 28, 1963, available at http://www.presidentialacademy.
org/dream.htmi-arguably the greatest speech in American history since President
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address a century before. Both speeches dealt with the same basic
problem: uniting, in freedom, a nation torn asunder by slavery and its legacy. I hasten to
add that I do not (at least I try not to) unrealistically idealize the Republicans of the 1860s
and 70s. I am fully aware that only a minority of them-most of the many Black
Republicans who entered politics in that era, and perhaps a handful of White
Republicans-fully embraced complete racial equality. But I think they adopted, in a
grand and noble exercise of cognitive dissonance, constitutional amendments that require
full racial equality. And I am painfully aware that most Republicans did eventually accept
national reunion on far less than ideal terms. But many of them fought as long and as
hard as they could against the pervasively racist and reactionary views of too many
Americans of that time, both in the North and the South. As many scholars have
chronicled, Reconstruction was largely a failure-but a noble failure, and also a partial
15172007]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
have persuaded me that their goals included, as both a means and an end, the
idea of nationalizing the Bill of Rights. How well or widely this idea was
shared and understood-and the extent to which it should be part of
legitimate modem interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment-are,
however, different, complex, and more difficult questions. But I candidly say
that I think it is a morally and intellectually beautiful idea, and represents a
profoundly important achievement of justice and human rights. I think it
should be viewed as a central theme of American history. But I have tried to
clearly separate my normative views and arguments from my objective
presentation and analysis of the evidence. Readers and critics will judge
whether I have succeeded.
This Article covers, for the most part, only 1866-67. There is much more
to be said about the 1867-73 period. Both the conventional and the
revisionist scholars were less thorough in exploring the latter period than
they were in rehashing the 1866-67 debates. I will present my studies of
1867-73 in forthcoming articles.' 7
My studies, in any event, demonstrate the truly shocking and inexcusable
extent to which Fairman, Morrison, and especially Berger mishandled the
evidence and profoundly misunderstood the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment-and clouded the understanding of innumerable readers of their
works. This makes it especially disturbing that their works remain amazingly
influential, even decades after they were largely debunked by other scholars.
Fairman's 1949 article, in particular, has been viewed as a "classic," even
"legendary," for more than half a century now--one of the most-cited law
review articles of at least two generations.' 8 But, as this Article will
demonstrate, the full extent of their scholarly malpractice has not yet been
adequately explored.
success in many ways. For example, it wrote some things into the Constitution that turned
out to have enduring value.
I should note here that I capitalize "Black," "White," and other terms used to
designate human social groups according to racial, ethnic, religious, political, cultural, or
geographic criteria for reasons suggested by Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw in Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988). Most "Whites" are not literally white, of
course, nor most "Blacks" black. While such terms may have some physically visible
basis, they are primarily social and cultural constructs, much like such terms as
"African," "Hispanic," "Asian," or, for that matter, "American" or "Republican."
17 See supra note 5.
18 See, e.g., Aynes, Fairman (1995), supra note 10, at 1229 (noting that, as of 1985,
it had received among the most citations of any law review article of the previous forty
years); Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, 7 ANB, supra note 1, at 689 [hereinafter
Aynes, Fairman (ANB)] (same); BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 141
(praising the article). For the earlier scholarship debunking Fairman, Morrison, and
Berger, see generally the works cited supra note 10.
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Berger, like Fairman, was a liberal New Dealer in his earlier career19
Yet Berger has emerged as an unlikely scholarly icon for many right-wing
writers. He has been described as "one of the great intellectual heroes of
American conservatism." 20
William Graves, an Oklahoma state legislator and avowedly conservative
Christian, sternly rejected the incorporation doctrine in a 2001 law review
article as "turning the Bill of Rights on its head."'2 1 Citing Fairman and
Berger with approval, 22 Graves falsely asserted that, during the congressional
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, "no
mention was made of the Bill of Rights."23 Ironically, John A. Bingham-the
19 On Berger, see Forrest McDonald, Foreword [hereinafter McDonald, Foreword
(1997)] to BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at xv, xvi-xvii (noting that some
of Berger's earlier scholarly work pleased liberals, and describing Berger as a "liberal"
who worked for the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Truman administrations); BERGER,
GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 336 (Berger describing his "political principles" as
those of "the moderate left of the Democratic party"); Douglas Martin, Obituary: Raoul
Berger, 99, an Expert on Constitution in 2nd Career, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 28, 2000, at C27
[hereinafter Martin, Berger Obituary (2000)] (generally same). On Fairman, see
MICHAEL A. Ross, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE
SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA, at xv (La. St. Univ. Press 2003)
(describing Fairman as "an ardent supporter of the New Deal"); Aynes, Fairman (ANB),
supra note 18, at 689 (noting Fairman's "lifetime friendship" with Felix Frankfurter); id
at 690 (describing Frankfurter as Fairman's "mentor" and noting that Fairman supported
constitutional doctrines enabling "the New Deal Supreme Court" to uphold government
regulations of business); Michael E. Parrish, Felix Frankfurter, 8 ANB, supra note 1, at
375-77 [hereinafter Parrish, Frankfurter (ANB)] (discussing Frankfurter's deep ties to
Roosevelt's New Deal policies).
20 Gary McDowell, The True Constitutionalist, TIMES LITERARY SUPP., May 25,
2001, at 15, quoted in MARK KOZLOWSKI, THE MYTH OF THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: WHY
THE RIGHT IS WRONG ABOUT THE COURTS 31, 229 n.98 (New York Univ. Press 2003).
21 William D. (Bill) Graves, Evolution, the Supreme Court, and the Destruction of
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 513, 544 (2001); see also id. at 513
n.* (describing the author as "an advocate of the pro-life and homeschool causes" and of
"allowing voluntary prayer ... in public schools"); id at 562 (criticizing certain Supreme
Court decisions for waging an "all-out assault on Christianity and morality" and on
"Christian sexual mores"). He also asserted that the incorporation theory, among other
problems he identified in American jurisprudence, reflects what he viewed as the malign
influence of Charles Darwin's theory of biological evolution, and that the Fourteenth
Amendment "was not legally enacted" in any event. See id. at 514-22, 541 n.210, 567-
68.
22 Id. at 543-44 & nn.220-23, 226, 230 & 234.
23 Id. at 543 & n.223; see generally id. at 541-44. Though he erroneously cited
BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1977), supra note 7, at 23, for this false claim, neither Berger
nor Fairman-nor any responsible scholar to my knowledge-has ever made such a
claim.
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father of the Fourteenth Amendment and a key original advocate of
nationalizing the Bill of Rights-was himself a devout Christian whose
religious beliefs deeply influenced his political and legal views. But, as
Graves-and Justice Thomas-might want to consider, Bingham expressly
included the First Amendment's prohibition of any "establishment of
religion" among the Bill of Rights guarantees applicable to the states.24
In 1999, an editor of the Texas Law Review, citing Fairman and Morrison
with approval,25 similarly dismissed the doctrine. He offered the different
(but equally false) assertion that "no one recognize[d] th[e] fact [of possible
incorporation via the Amendment] until Justice Black described it in ...
Adamson."26
Among serious academic scholars today, the incorporation theory
continues to draw skepticism-in some cases outright rejection-from across
the philosophical spectrum. A detailed survey would be tedious, but
following are a few highlights.
Stephen Presser, who holds a chair at Northwestern University Law
School endowed by and named for Berger, made it clear in a 2002 article that
he embraces Berger's anti-incorporation views. Presser thinks "the Supreme
Court's opinions that incorporate the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment are judicial usurpations." 27
Charles Rice, professor emeritus at Notre Dame Law School, likewise
rejected the doctrine in a 2003 article, citing Berger and Fairman.28
Donald Dripps, a scholar of constitutional and criminal law now at the
University of San Diego Law School, set forth in a 1996 article his reasons
for rejecting incorporation, especially the version propounded by Amar. 29 On
24 CG (42:1) app. 84 (Mar. 31, 1871) (Rep. Bingham, R-Ohio); see also supra p.
1515 & n. 12; see generally infra Parts II-III.
25 David DeGroot, Book Review: "Freedom" and the First Amendment, 3 TEx. REv.
L. & POL. 323, 341 & nn.63-65 (1999) (reviewing DAVID LOWENTHAL, No LIBERTY FOR
LICENSE: THE FORGOTrEN LOGIC OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Spence Publishing 1997));
see also id. at 323 n.* (identifying DeGroot as an Articles Editor of the Texas Law
Review, J.D. expected in 2000).
26 Id. at 340 (citing LOWENTHAL (1997), supra note 25, at 228, and referring to
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)). DeGroot did not
cite Fairman, Morrison, or any other authority for this false claim, which no responsible
scholar (to my knowledge) has ever made.
27 Stephen B. Presser, Some Alarming Aspects of the Legacies of Judicial Review
and ofJohn Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1495, 1497 (2002).
28 Charles E. Rice, A Cultural Tour of the Legal Landscape: Reflections on Cardinal
George's Law and Culture, 1 AvE MARIA L. REv. 81, 89 & n.43 (2003).
29 Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law:
"Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REv. 1559, 1564, 1571-92
(1996).
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at least one point, Dripps fell prey to a key error about the original
understanding propagated by Fairman and Berger.
30
In 2001, George Thomas, a scholar of constitutional and criminal law at
the Rutgers (Newark) Center for Law and Justice, published one of the most
thoughtful and interesting articles in recent years on the incorporation
problem-and, of course, he graciously and thoughtfully responds to my
current Article in this Issue of the Ohio State Law Journal.3 1 Thomas's 2001
article did not call for overruling the effective substance of Supreme Court
decisions applying most Bill of Rights guarantees to the states. Indeed, his
main point was to argue that enforcement of the Bill of Rights againstfederal
government abuses has been unduly weakened, and to urge steps to remedy
that problem. 32 But as an essential part of his argument, Thomas broadly
rejected the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment substantively
nationalized the Bill of Rights.
33
In 2002, Richard Uviller and William Merkel published a book
reexamining the Second Amendment. They generally argued that its
guarantee of the right "to keep and bear arms" cannot be divorced, in
historical context, from its reference to a "well regulated militia," thus
undermining any modem interpretation of that Amendment as protecting an
individual right to bear arms. 34 Their work has been criticized by scholars
and gun-rights activists who favor the individual-right view of the Second
Amendment. 3 5 They also rejected the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment
applied to the states any individual right to bear arms, relying heavily
(indeed, exclusively) on Berger's scholarship to support that position. They
discussed the incorporationist views of Amar, Halbrook, and a few other
30 See id. at 1577 n.107 (mistakenly asserting that Rep. John A. Bingham, R-Ohio,
misunderstood Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)); see also infra Part III
(pp. 1540-43 & n. 115) (discussing the origins of that fallacy and a related problem in
Dripps's argument).
31 George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REv. 145 (2001)
[hereinafter Thomas, When (2001)]; Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5.
32 See Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 145-80, 216-31.
33 See id. at 180-216. Thomas now openmindedly reconsiders several significant
aspects of his arguments in 2001. See Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1631-32,
1656-57.
3 4 H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO
ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (Duke Univ. Press 2002)
[hereinafter UVILLER & MERKEL, MILITIA (2002)].
35 For one critical scholarly response, see Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEx. L. REv. 237
(2004) [hereinafter Barnett, Was the Right (2004)] (reviewing UVILLER & MERKEL,
MILITIA (2002), supra note 34).
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scholars (only in regard to the Second Amendment, for the most part). But
they otherwise completely ignored the extensive scholarship rebutting
Berger's views and generally refuting the anti-incorporation thesis. 36
Uviller and Merkel were criticized for their inadequate treatment of the
revisionist scholarship on incorporation. 37 They conceded in a 2004 response
that "the theme.., perhaps most weakly argued in... [their 2002 book was]
the effect of the Reconstruction Amendments-and in particular, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth on the meaning of the
Second Amendment. ' 38 But they persisted in strongly questioning the theory
of incorporation via that clause, again citing Berger as their only authority. 39
In 2006, Merkel-now a professor at Washburn University Law School,
writing by himself-strongly rejected what he termed "sub silentio total
incorporation via the Privileges and Immunities Clause. '40 "The problem
with this argument," he declared, "as Charles Fairman showed nearly sixty
years ago, and as Raoul Berger demonstrated again and again until his 95th
year, is that it simply cannot accommodate a floodtide of countervailing
evidence .... ,,41 By this time Merkel did at least cite (in addition to Amar)
36 See UVILLER & MERKEL, MILITIA (2002), supra note 34, at 14-18, 197-209. For
their reliance on Berger (the only anti-incorporationist scholar they cited), see id. at 200,
205-06, 235 n.14, 313-15 nn.120, 122-23, 129 & 131 (citing primarily BERGER,
GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7). They did not refer, for example, to the work of
Fairman, Crosskey, Curtis, Aynes, or Maltz. While criticizing Amar's views on
incorporation of the Second Amendment specifically, and giving ample space to Berger's
criticisms of Amar, they essentially ignored the thorough refutations by Amar and other
scholars of Berger's and Fairman's work on incorporation generally. See id. at 202-06,
314 n.129; see also id. at 202, 314 nn.124 & 126 (citing, in addition to Amar and
Haibrook, William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to
Arms, 43 DuKE L.J. 1236 (1994); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second
Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991)).
37 See, e.g., Barnett, Was the Right (2004), supra note 35, at 266-69; Sanford
Levinson, Superb History, Dubious Constitutional and Political Theory: Comments on
Uviller and Merkel, The Militia and the Right to Arms, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
315, 325-30 (2004). Uviller and Merkel also relied, in regard to the separate issue of
early American gun ownership, on the now-discredited work of historian Michael
Bellesiles. See Barnett, Was the Right (2004), supra note 35, at 267-68 n.166.
38 H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Authors' Reply to Commentaries
on, and Criticisms of The Militia and the Right to Arms, or, How the Second Amendment
Fell Silent, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 357 (2004).
39 See id. at 361-62 & n.22 (citing BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7).
40 William G. Merkel, A Cultural Turn: Reflections on Recent Historical and Legal
Writing on the Second Amendment, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 671, 691 (2006)
[hereinafter Merkel, Cultural (2006)]; see also id. at 689-92.
41 Id. at 691; see also id. at 691 nn.87-90 (citing, inter alia, Fairman, Original
(1949), supra note 7; BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7).
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incorporationist works by Crosskey, Curtis, and Aynes, as well as Justice
Black's Adamson dissent.42 How carefully he studied any of their writings is,
however, another question. For example, he cited Berger's discussion (in a
1981 article) of the 1876 debate on the so-called "Blaine Amendment"
(copying Berger's misdating of it to 1875), without even mentioning the later
discussions by Curtis and Amar (and two other scholars he did not cite)
disputing the significance of that debate.43
Merkel unwisely relied on that same Berger article to erroneously assert
that none of the opinions in Slaughter-House-not even Justice Joseph P.
Bradley's dissent, which Merkel specifically referenced-"took up any claim
that the Bill of Rights applied against the states."'44 In fact, as discussed by
42 Id. at 691 & n.89 (citing, inter alia, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9; CURTIS, No
STATE (1986), supra note 10; Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10); see also id. at
689-90 (citing and discussing AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10).
43 Id. at 692 (citing Berger, Nine-Lived Cat (1981), supra note 7, at 464). The Blaine
Amendment debate occurred in August 1876, toward the end of Reconstruction, more
than ten years after the Fourteenth Amendment emerged from Congress. It is thus, at face
value, doubtful what weight it deserves in construing the original understanding of the
Amendment, though it certainly tends to cut against the incorporation theory. For
discussions suggesting it deserves little weight, see, for example, CURTIS, No STATE
(1986), supra note 10, at 169-70; Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the
Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1085, 1145-50 (1995); AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 254-55 n.*;
Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000), supra note 2, at 1125-30, 1134-35.
Another "principal problem" Merkel identified with the incorporation theory was
that some states in 1866-68 were not in compliance with all Bill of Rights guarantees,
most notably with regard to grand jury indictment. While citing Fairman for this
argument-which does raise interesting problems, see infra Part VII.B (pp. 1590 & note
265, pp. 1606-07)-Merkel did not refer to the discussions of it by (among others) three
of the scholars he cited. See Merkel, Cultural (2006), supra note 40, at 691 & n.90 (citing
Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7). But see, e.g., Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra
note 9, at 84-88, 111-16; CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 155-56, 185;
AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 198-206; Wildenthal, Road to Twining
(2000), supra note 3, at 1475-80.
44 Merkel, Cultural (2006), supra note 40, at 691; see also id at 691-92 & n.91
(citing Berger, Nine-Lived Cat (1981), supra note 7, at 441); The Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Berger cannot bear full blame for Merkel's error. While
Berger's discussion on the cited page was incomplete and misleading, he (unlike Merkel)
did not deny the incorporationist character of Bradley's Supreme Court dissent. Berger
simply did not mention Bradley's dissent. He only discussed Justice Stephen J. Field's
dissent and Bradley's 1870 opinion in a related case. See Live-Stock Dealers' and
Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 15 F.
Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408) (Bradley, Circuit Justice). Bradley's 1870
opinion, as Berger and Merkel correctly noted, did not clearly embrace incorporation-
although, contrary to their implication, he did not reject it either. One cannot be too
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Black in Adamson-and by many scholars, including Curtis and Amar-
Bradley, joined by Justice Noah H. Swayne, clearly embraced in Slaughter-
House the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of
Rights against the states.45
Concluding his 2006 discussion, Merkel wondered whether "anyone
besides myself is interested in revisiting the ... Fairman/W.W. Crosskey
debates" and suggested that "[p]erhaps I should content myself with
declaring victory on behalf of Fairman and Frankfurter and leaving the field
in the hands of the routed but numerous, committed, and undaunted forces of
the total incorporationists. ''46 This Article doubtless answers his first
question. As for which academic army will emerge victorious on the field of
scholarly battle, he may want-as the Scots conveyed to proud King Edward
in 1314--"tae think again." 47
In 1997, the Liberty Fund republished Berger's landmark 1977 book,
Government by Judiciary (originally issued by Harvard University Press),
"liberally sprinkled with fresh addenda"48 in which Berger responded to his
critics on various points. Forrest McDonald, an historian now retired from
the University of Alabama, wrote a laudatory foreword to the new edition,
reiterating his view that "Berger defeated his critics 'at every turn."1 4 9
careful when relying on Berger. He once referred to Justice Black's "solitary dissent" in
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill
of Rights: A Response to Michael Zuckert, 26 GA. L. REv. 1, 17 & n.113 (1991)
[hereinafter Berger, Response to Zuckert (1991)]. And Berger claimed once that Bradley
"stood alone" in his Slaughter-House dissent. See BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra
note 7, at 67. But see supra note 8 (Black joined in Adamson, in relevant substance, by
three other justices); infra note 45 (Bradley joined unreservedly by Swayne in Slaughter-
House).
45 See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 75 n.6, 120-21 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting and
discussing Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 118-19, 124 (Bradley, J., joined by
Swayne, J., dissenting)); see also, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 174-
77; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 176, 209-14, 226-27; Wildenthal,
Lost Compromise (2000), supra note 2, at 1102-05. Merkel also stated that "it does not
appear from the published opinions [in Slaughter-House] that plaintiffs' briefs made such
a [pro-incorporation] claim." Merkel, Cultural (2006), supra note 40, at 691. In fact they
did, at several points, even though the issue Was not germane. See Wildenthal, Lost
Compromise (2000), supra note 2, at 1106-11.
46 Merkel, Cultural (2006), supra note 40, at 692.
4 7 See MAGNUS MAGNUSSON, SCOTLAND: THE STORY OF A NATION 184-86 (Grove
2001) (originally published, HarperCollins 2000) (discussing King Robert the Bruce's
victory over the English at Bannockburn). The quoted phrase appears in the popular song,
The Flower of Scotland, available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/flowerof
scotland.html.
48 McDonald, Foreword (1997), supra note 19, at xv, xviii.
49 Id. at xviii (citation omitted).
1524 [Vol. 68:1509
NATIONALIZING THE BILL OF RIGHTS
McDonald also endorsed the view of the late Philip B. Kurland, a
constitutional scholar at the University of Chicago Law School, that "in the
rare instances when [Berger] misinterpret[ed] his evidence, [he]
courageously and candidly acknowledge[d] his error." 50 Berger himself
quoted McDonald's somewhat less diplomatic assertion that Berger had
"devastated" the critiques of his work by Curtis-indeed, that Berger had
"engaged in 'overkill, roughly comparable to shooting rabbits with a
cannon."' 51 Readers can judge for themselves the accuracy of those
statements, and all the foregoing views, in light of the evidence and
arguments set forth in this Article.
What can account for the tangled and contradictory politics, academic
and otherwise, of the incorporation theory? Curiously, the crucial role of
Black and other famously "liberal" judges in reviving the doctrine seems to
have led many "conservative" judges and scholars to side with the modem
conventionalists. Conservatives seem to view the theory with suspicion, as
just another piece of newfangled "liberal activism."
Yet the Supreme Court has never adopted Black's theory of
incorporation, even though it has applied most of the Bill of Rights to the
states in practical effect. And the theory seems far from popular among many
liberals today. It has little to say about a wide range of rights-notably
abortion and other "privacy" interests-which are deeply important to most
liberals but lack obvious textual roots in the Bill of Rights. Gun rights
advocates, by contrast, are one constituency-usually viewed as
"conservative," though that is a somewhat inaccurate generalization-who
seem generally to have become strong supporters of the doctrine. That is
doubtless because the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is
rooted in the text of the Bill of Rights. The incorporation theory suggests that
this right-if it is, in fact, an individual right-may properly be applied to the
states, though the Supreme Court has never so held.52 Yet, attesting to the
downright weird politics of the issue, some extremist "militia movement"
fanatics, who are certainly very enthusiastic about the right to bear arms,
50 Id. at xvi n.2 (citation omitted).
51 BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 186 (citation omitted).
52 See generally, e.g., HALBROOK, ARMED (1984), supra note 10, at 107-53;
HALBROOK, FREEDMEN (1998), supra note 10; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note
10, at 46-63, 257-66; Barnett, Was the Right (2004), supra note 35. But see, e.g.,
UVILLER & MERKEL, MILITIA (2002), supra note 34, at 14-18, 197-209. The Court's
long silence on the Second Amendment will soon be broken, though in a case not raising
the incorporation angle. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 2007 WL 2508615 (U.S.
Nov. 20, 2007) (granting certiorari). For a recent and thoughtful study of the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments and their bearing on the gun-rights issue, see SAUL CORNELL, A
WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL
IN AMERICA (Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
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view it as an article of faith that the Fourteenth Amendment is a tyrannical
usurpation that must be repealed.53
Likewise rooted in the text of the Bill of Rights is the Fifth
Amendment's protection of private property against improper takings by the
government. That protection has aroused new interest in recent years across
the political spectrum, as shown by the storm of hostile reaction to the
Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. New London, which refused, as
many saw it, to fully enforce the Court's application of that protection to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 54
The incorporation doctrine is, in truth, the furthest thing from a "liberal
activist" innovation. It is as old as the hills. As a constitutional theory it is
profoundly textualist and originalist, methodologies usually associated with
"conservatives." Justice Black, a rare "liberal" exponent of textualism,
merely awakened it from a long slumber.
One last introductory note of explanation is required. Because this
Article focuses on the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment,
I should say something about my general views on "originalism" as a theory
and method of constitutional interpretation. Yet, I am reluctant to say too
much. First, the Article is too long already. Second, my broader views on
originalism and constitutional theory are still in a state of flux and
development. Third, my intention is for this Article, and my broader book
project, to be agnostic about originalism and constitutional theory.
The ultimate relevance of my originalist discussion may be contingent
for many readers. It is still contingent for me to some extent, since I myself
remain agnostic about many aspects of originalism. But now seems as good a
time as any to "come out of the closet" and declare in print that I am indeed,
in some sense, an "originalist. ' '55 In any event, this originalist discussion
53 See, e.g., DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 201-02,
206-07 (Yale Univ. Press 2003).
54 See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see also Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (the decision commonly cited as
establishing, in effect, that the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation or "Takings" Clause
applies to the states). On the national reaction to Kelo, see, for example, Kenneth Harney,
Justices' Ruling on Property Seizure Ignites Revolt, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 24, 2005:
"To call it a backlash would hardly do it justice. Calling it an unprecedented uprising to
nullify a decision of the highest court of the land would be more accurate... [A]
firestorm has broken out. .. ." For critical scholarly analysis, see, for example, Charles
E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning
Economic Development Takings, 29 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491 (2006).
55 My mother and father, and the few other close readers of all my published
scholarship, may note that my coming out as an originalist is no big shock. "Originalism"
and "textualism" are, of course, closely allied approaches, and three years before I came
out as gay, I came out in print as a "true (if troubled)" textualist. Bryan H. Wildenthal,
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should be of wide interest, if only because many important judicial and
political decisionmakers claim to place great value on the originalist
approach. This Article is, in part, about what light may be shed by originalist
methods on the Fourteenth Amendment and the issue of nationalizing the Bill
of Rights. Whether, in turn, this discussion sheds light on the value and
nature of originalist theory is an issue I leave to readers and critics, and to
future work.
I should at least define "originalism" at this point. Keith Whittington
offered a good summary in his landmark 1999 book, Constitutional
Interpretation:
The critical originalist directive is that the Constitution should be
interpreted according to the understandings made public at the time of the
drafting and ratification. The primary source of those understandings is the
text of the Constitution itself, including both its wording and structure. The
text is supplemented by a variety of secondary sources of information,
however. Historical sources are to be used to elucidate the understanding of
the terms involved and to indicate the principles that were supposed to be
embodied in them. The guiding principle is that the judge should be seeking
to make plain the "meaning understood at the time of the law's
enactment. '' 56
Whittington offered several additional clarifications, one of which is
especially important to the Fourteenth Amendment: "[T]he intentions
supporting later amendments are independent of the intentions of those who
drafted the original Constitution." 57
The Right of Confrontation, Justice Scalia, and the Power and Limits of Textualism, 48
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1323, 1392 (1991). Neither has turned out to be, as they say, "just
a phase."
56 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35 (Univ. Press Kan. 1999) [hereinafter
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999)] (quoting ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (Free Press
1990)).
57 Id. This Article, especially infra Part VII.C, generally indicates how I think we
should weigh evidence relating to the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Since this Article discusses some post-ratification evidence, see supra note
5, it is also appropriate to preview how that type of evidence should be weighed. Post-
ratification evidence, by definition, could not have influenced the understanding of the
members of Congress who proposed the Amendment or the state legislators who ratified
it. Thus, strictly speaking, it is not direct evidence of the original understanding at all. But
early post-ratification materials can be useful indirect evidence. They tend to illustrate
prevailing views. Evidence that politicians, lawyers, or commentators believed, soon after
ratification, that the Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights would corroborate
evidence that it was originally understood to do so-or vice versa. Of course, the further
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As constitutional scholars are well aware, though many outside the field
seem not to be, the variant of originalism captured by the simple notion of
divining the subjective "intent of the Framers" is no longer much in vogue.
Berger was an old-style originalist of that sort, for whom the intention of the
drafters literally was the law, even to the point of contradicting the plain text
on occasion. He could cite authority for that view, quoting, for example, the
opening words of the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in an 1874 case:
"A thing may be within the letter of a statute and not within its meaning, and
within its meaning, though not within its letter. The intention of the
lawmaker is the law." 58 Interestingly, the author of that 1874 opinion was
after 1866-68 we get, the less value such evidence has, one way or the other. Scholars
may well debate the exact date at which the value of such evidence becomes insignificant
for purposes of analyzing the original understanding. At the outside, the views of anyone
active in public life during 1866-68 might have some probative value, even if expressed
years or even decades later. I think views expressed before 1876 have a very substantial
bearing, given the general continuity of party ideologies, legal theories, and overall
public attitudes during the Reconstruction era. Historians generally identify the disputed
1876 presidential election and resulting "Compromise of 1877" as the crucial turning
point that marked the end of Reconstruction. Furthermore, the Supreme Court-with
essentially no explanation-appeared to reject the incorporation theory in two decisions
handed down in the spring of 1876. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (Apr. 24, 1876);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (Mar. 27, 1876); Wildenthal, Lost Compromise
(2000), supra note 2, at 1134-69. Whether or not these decisions were correct, they
probably influenced subsequent views. Thus, I think the proper weight and value of
views expressed after the spring of 1876-and especially after 1877-falls off sharply.
It is also appropriate to weigh evidence differently depending on its source. For
example, the views of Democrats or others known to have opposed the Fourteenth
Amendment should carry much less weight, to the extent they expressed narrow readings
of the Amendment. Their natural motive and tendency, which we must be careful to
discount, was to minimize and undercut the Amendment, even render it a nullity as much
as possible. On the other hand, pro-incorporation views (or other broad readings)
expressed by Democrats or their sympathizers would be especially strong and intriguing
evidence. Presumably, they would no longer be exaggerating the Amendment's scope in
hopes of preventing its passage. But we would (again) have to consider carefully
whatever tactical motives might be at work. By the same token, anti-incorporation views
expressed by Republicans or their sympathizers would be especially damaging to the
theory. Scholars may well debate how much weight to give pro-incorporation views
expressed by Republicans after ratification. One might argue such Republicans would
have a motive or tendency to exaggerate the scope of the Amendment once it was safely
ratified. That possibility must be carefully considered, especially if a particular view goes
beyond those prominently expressed during 1866-68. But I think such post-ratification
Republican views, if consistent with views expressed before ratification, are entitled to
substantial weight.
58 Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 374, 380 (1874) (footnote omitted), quoted in
BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 8 n.24; see also Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190
U.S. 197, 212 (1903) (also quoting this statement in Smythe); BERGER, GOVERNMENT
(1997), supra note 7, at 18-29, 402-27.
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Justice Swayne, one of the Court's earliest supporters of the incorporation
doctrine that Berger so emphatically rejected.59
By contrast, Justice Antonin Scalia, that most notorious modern
originalist, has rightly admonished: "It is the law that governs, not the intent
of the lawgiver. '60 "Original intent" has thus generally been replaced by the
concept summarized by Whittington and widely described as "original public
meaning." In any event, that is what I mean by "originalism" or the "original
understanding."
Randy Barnett's appealingly titled 1999 article, An Originalism for
Nonoriginalists, may offer the most accessible introduction to the theoretical
debate. Barnett demonstrated, among other things, that even many of the
original critics of originalism have yielded over the years, at least implicitly,
to its frame of reference.61 It was once said in the field of economics that "we
are all Keynesians now."'62 Barnett seemed to suggest that "we are all
originalists now" 63-or at least that many of us are. In any event, an inquiry
using originalist methods is at least likely to interest most people concerned
with the meaning of the Constitution.
Whittington commented that "[t]he justification for an interpretive
method is a task for political and constitutional theory. The application of
59 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000), supra note 2, at 1102-05.
60 ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton
Univ. Press 1997) [book cited hereinafter as SCALIA-GUTMANN (1997)] (emphasis in
original), quoted in Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LoY. L.
REV. 611, 621 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, Originalism (1999)]. See also the helpful
surveys of originalist approaches and related issues in EARL M. MALTZ, RETHINKING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ORIGINALISM, INTERVENTIONISM, AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (Univ. Press Kan. 1994), and Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 915-67 (1998).
61 See Barnett, Originalism (1999), supra note 60, at 611-20.
62 Many sources credit President Nixon with coining this phrase in 1971. But Nixon
was apparently quoting economist Milton Friedman, who said it in 1965. See U.S.
Business in 1965-The Economy: "We Are All Keynesians Now," TIME, Dec. 31, 1965, at
64,65.
63 Bamett has not (to my knowledge) used this exact phrase. I think it entered my
mind from reading Tribe's essay in the marvelous Scalia-Gutmann collection. See
Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA-GUTMANN (1997), supra note 60, at 65, 67.
Tribe himself did not assert the truth of this phrase; he was paraphrasing what he took to
be the thrust of Dworkin's essay in the same collection. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment,
in SCALIA-GUTMANN (1997), supra note 60, at 115.
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that method is a matter for legal practice and detailed historical work."'64 Let
that work now continue.
I. MADISON'S AMENDMENT AND THE BARRON DOCTRINE
The first effort to nationalize the Bill of Rights, at least in part, was
proposed by James Madison in the First Congress of 1789. With eerie
numerological foresight, the House of Representatives passed, at Madison's
urging, a version of the original Bill of Rights that included a proposed
"fourteenth" amendment, providing: "No state shall infringe the right of trial
by jury in criminal cases, nor the rights of conscience, nor the freedom of
speech, or of the press." In Madison's view, this was "the most valuable"
part of the package. He foresaw that "the State Governments are as liable to
attack these invaluable privileges as the General Government is, and
therefore ought to be as cautiously guarded against." This ancestral
"Fourteenth Amendment" failed to pass the Senate, however, so it never
went to the states for ratification. 65
64 WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999), supra note 56, at xii.
Kurt Lash has suggested that despite my above rejection of the original intent approach,
and my embrace of original public meaning, I eventually work my way back around, in
effect, to a focus on framers' intent. This is a very enlightening comment, one of several
that Lash thoughtfully offered in reviewing this Article. It alerts me to what may well be
a certain tension in my argument. I attempt to resolve the tension, or at least avoid any
outright self-contradiction, as discussed infra Part VII.C (especially note 342). There is
doubtless more to ponder here.
65See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (June 8, 1789) (1st Congress, 1st Session)
(Madison's original proposal, not the version passed by the House and quoted in the
text); id at 458 (June 8, 1789) (the second and third quotations in the text, quoting
Madison's views that this was "the most valuable part" of his overall proposed Bill of
Rights, and that the states would be "as liable to attack" such key rights as would the
federal government); id. at 784 (Aug. 17, 1789) (the first quotation in the text, quoting
the proposed amendment as passed by the House); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 40 (Yale Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter LEVY, ORIGINS (1999)] (brief
discussion); id. at 289 (the version passed by the House, as set forth in the text). Compare
Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP.
CT. REv. 301, 303-04 (1991) [hereinafter Finkelman, Madison (1991)] (arguing that
"[s]uch an amendment would have radically altered the federal structure of the new
government"), with Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment: A Second
American Revolution or the Logical Culmination of the Tradition?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
1159, 1165-67 (1992) (arguing that it was not such a radical alteration and that, upon
later adoption of the actual Fourteenth Amendment, "the Constitution assumed its
complete Madisonian form"). For other brief discussions, see, for example, William J.
Brennan, Jr., Landmarks of Legal Liberty, in THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
CENTENNIAL VOLUME 1 (Bernard Schwartz ed., New York Univ. Press 1970) (papers
delivered at the Centennial Conference on the Fourteenth Amendment held at New York
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This episode is one of several compelling reasons why Chief Justice John
Marshall, in Barron v. Baltimore, almost certainly got it right in 1833 in
holding that the Bill of Rights, by itself, was never properly understood to
apply to the states. 66 Another is that the primary concern of Americans over
potential abuses of power was then directed towards the federal government,
not the states. The states all had constitutions of their own, most including a
state "bill of rights" or similar guarantees. It was not obvious to the founding
generation why a national Bill of Rights would be any more useful as a limit
on state power.67 Madison himself recognized this argument, though he
noted a lack of protection in some state constitutions and said he could not
"see any reason against obtaining even a double security on those points." 68
A textual basis for the Barron doctrine, as Marshall noted, is that Article
I, Section 9, in the original Constitution "enumerated, in the nature of a bill
of rights, the limitations.., imposed on the powers of the general
government," while Article I, Section 10, "enumerate[d] those
which ... operate ... by express words applied to the states." 69 It is difficult
to see why limitations without such express language should also apply to the
states.
Madison's original Bill of Rights was not proposed as a unified
supplement to the Constitution. Rather, Madison urged that the amendments
be inserted at various appropriate points throughout the original text.
Tellingly, the substance of all provisions of the eventual Bill of Rights was to
be inserted into Article I, Section 9, which, for the most part, clearly limited
only federal power. Only Madison's ill-fated "Fourteenth Amendment" was
to be inserted into Article I, Section 10, along with other express limits on
state power.70
University School of Law, Oct. 1968); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503-04 (1977) (noting the
"prophetic" nature of Madison's proposal); Curtis, Resurrecting (1996), supra note 10, at
10, 23; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789-1801, at 114-15 (Univ. Chicago Press 1997) [hereinafter CURRIE, CONGRESS:
FEDERALIST (1997)]; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 22-23; AMAR,
AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION (2005), supra note 10, at 320, 386.
66 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); see also AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS
(1998), supra note 10, at 143-44.
67 See LEVY, ORIGINS (1999), supra note 65, at 12-35; CURRIE, CONGRESS:
FEDERALIST (1997), supra note 65, at 110-15; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note
10, at 144.
68 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 458 (June 8, 1789) (1st Congress, 1st Session).
69 Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 248.
70 See LEVY, ORIGINS (1999), supra note 65, at 37-38, 281-83; see also DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-
1888, at 191 (Univ. Chicago Press 1985) [hereinafter CURRIE, SUPREME COURT: FIRST
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For all these reasons, despite the strenuous efforts of Barron-contrarian
scholars, there is little doubt that Barron was correctly decided. Nevertheless,
it is important to recognize the contrarian view, because Some versions of it
became influential among many Reconstruction Republicans. 71
II. BINGHAM'S AMENDMENT
Any discussion of the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment properly centers on two key proponents in the 39th Congress in
1866: Representative John A. Bingham, Republican of Ohio, and Senator
Jacob M. Howard, Republican of Michigan. They were both members of the
powerful Joint Committee on Reconstruction primarily responsible for
crafting Reconstruction laws and policies. 72 Bingham drafted Section 1 of the
Amendment, except for the Citizenship Clause, which was added by the
Senate at Howard's instigation. Howard was the floor manager of the
Amendment in the Senate, formally introducing it on behalf of the Joint
Committee. 7
3
It is important to keep in mind, in any study of this sort, the limits of
proper reliance on historical evidence. Peter Low and John Jeffries said it
well:
[T]he uncertainty of historical reconstruction increases with remoteness in
time. The legislators who spoke and voted [during the Reconstruction era]
did so against a background of political experience and constitutional
HUNDRED (1985)]; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 142-43; Finkelman,
Madison (1991), supra note 65, at 303, 340-41; Edward A. Hartnett, A "Uniform and
Entire" Constitution: Or, What If Madison Had Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251 (1998).
71 Compare 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS (1953), supra note 9, at 1049-82 (taking a
Barron-contrarian view), and Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 119-43 (same),
with AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 140-62 (ultimately siding with the
orthodox pro-Barron view, though of course Amar, like Crosskey, concluded that the
Fourteenth Amendment reversed Barron in any event). See also infra note 99; Part VI (p.
1569 & n.199).
72 See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL
REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1869 143-44 (Norton 1974) [hereinafter
BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974)]; KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION,
1865-1877 110 & n.7 (Vintage 1967) (originally published, Knopf 1965). See generally
BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONGRESS, 1865-1867 (Colum. Univ. Press 1914).
73 See, e.g., CG (39:1) 1033-34 (Feb. 26, 1866) (Bingham introducing an early
version of Section 1); id. at 2764-67 (May 23, 1866) (Howard introducing the
Amendment in the Senate); id. at 2890 (May 30, 1866) (Howard proposing the opening
sentence defining U.S. and state citizenship); infr-a Parts V-VI (generally discussing
Howard's role).
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interpretation vastly different from what we know today. Projecting their
views forward in time inevitably invites distortion. Ultimately, what [we
are] asking is not merely what the [Reconstruction] Congress thought with
respect to the kinds of problems then before it, but also what it would have
thought if confronted with the issues now at hand. The more radical the
change between that day and this, the less likely that the question is
susceptible to meaningful answer.74
A more specific limitation relates to "speechmaking procedures in the
Congress" of that time.75 One scholar has commented that relatively few
members of the House
spoke directly to the final passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and ...
their speeches were limited to one half hour, [thus making it] apparent that
reading those debates alone will not adequately convey the attitudes of the
members. Not everyone could speak every day, nor necessarily speak at all.
Those who did speak during the direct debates often simply assumed that
their positions on highly related and important subjects were understood by
their fellow members. 76
The latter limit may cut both ways on the Bill of Rights incorporation
issue. It suggests some caution in relying on incorporationist statements such
as those by Bingham and Howard. But it also helps put into context the
common argument by anti-incorporationists that such statements were not
sufficiently repeated or corroborated by other speakers. 77 It suggests that
public statements by such recognized leaders may be entitled to especially
great weight.
In any event, much clarity and understanding may still be gleaned from
these old debates. After all these years, they still bum with remarkably vivid
passion. The issues at stake during Reconstruction remain central to
America's struggles over liberty, power, race, and justice. All Americans
should read and ponder these debates. They should be taught in the schools.
Shame on us if we forget them.
Bingham's central role as the "James Madison of the Fourteenth
Amendment" has often been recounted.78 He was influential in the 39th
74 PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 1133 (Foundation, 5th ed. 2004).
75 George P. Smith, Republican Reconstruction and Section Two of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 23 W. POL. Q. 829, 831 (1970) [hereinafter G. Smith, Republican (1970)].
7 6 Id. at 831-32.
77 See infra Parts VII-VII.A (pp. 1583-89).
78 Justice Black gave Bingham the "Madison" honorific. Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 73-74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Discussions of Bingham's role include,
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Congress for several reasons. His views were squarely in the moderate
mainstream of the dominant Republican Party. Historian Michael Les
Benedict rated Bingham a "conservative" who "led the Republican
nonradicals in the House" and had "greater influence on the course of
Reconstruction" than "radical leaders" like the more famous Representative
Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania. 79
"Conservative" in this context means closer to the Democratic Party of
that time and less supportive of equal rights for Blacks, a stronger federal
government, or stem measures to reform the defeated South. The Democrats,
on the constitutional issues of concern here, were the more "conservative"
for example, AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 181-97; IRVING BRANT,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 318-43 (Bobbs-Merrill 1965); CURTIS,
NO.STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 26-130; FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra
note 7, at 1260-90; HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 30-33, 55-83 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1908) (facsimile reprint, Peter
Smith, 1965); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 81-
131, 182-202 (U. Illinois Press 1965) (originally published, ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES, vol. 37, 1956) [hereinafter JAMES, FRAMING (1956)]; KENDRICK
(1914), supra note 72, at 183-85, 214-20; Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance
of Congressman John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV.
589 (2003) [hereinafter Aynes, Continuing (2003)]; Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note
10; Erving E. Beauregard, John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 50
HISTORIAN 67 (1987) [hereinafter Beauregard, Bingham and the Fourteenth (1987)];
Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 10-72; Fairman, Original (1949), supra note
7, at 19-54; Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the Background to the Fourteenth
Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 671 (2003) [hereinafter Finkelman, Bingham (2003)];
William L. Royall, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughter-House Cases, 4 S. L. REV.
(NEW SERIES) 558, 568-71 (1878).
79 BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974), supra note 72, at 31 ("conservative," one of
eleven House members "with pre-eminent influence" in the 38th through 40th
Congresses); id. at 36 (other quotations in the text); see also id. at 57, 143, 162-87. One
of the pervasive flaws of Jay Bybee's analysis was his apparent belief--deeply
mistaken-that Bingham and other supporters of incorporation were generally "Radical
Republicans, holding idiosyncratic views of the Constitution." Bybee (1995), supra note
14, at 1545 (characterizing as "Radical" and "idiosyncratic" the view that the First
Amendment protected personal rights and privileges eligible for incorporation, in
supposed contrast to what "Democrats and more moderate Republicans maintained"); see
also id. at 1581-82, 1589 (correctly associating Bingham with the views Bybee
mistakenly categorized as radical and idiosyncratic). Rather bizarrely, Bybee seemed to
accord more respect and weight to the views of diehard minority Democrats opposed to
the Fourteenth Amendment than to those of leaders like Bingham who were squarely in
the mainstream of the dominant Republican supermajority of the time. See id. at 1581-
83, 1587-89. Senator Howard was, of course, a radical Republican. But as we will see,
infra Part VI (pp. 1572-78), there is simply no basis to treat incorporationist views-
whether expressed by Howard or anyone else-as reflecting a radical outlook.
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party during the postwar 19th century, with overwhelming support among
Southern Whites. 80
Bingham was a fearless, aggressive lawyer and politician. His politically
marginal congressional district near the Ohio River was invaded by rebel
forces during the Civil War, threatening his home town of Cadiz.81 First
elected to Congress in 1854, he was defeated in 1862, and his later victories
were all dramatically close. 82 Bingham was widely respected for his intellect,
chairing the House Judiciary Committee from 1869 to 1873. His Republican
colleague James G. Blaine of Maine-who later became House speaker,
senator, and presidential nominee-described him as "an effective debater,
well informed, ready, and versatile. A man of high principle, of strong faith,
of zeal, enthusiasm, and eloquence, he could always command the attention
of the House.' '83 A modem biographer concurred, describing Bingham as
"the Cicero of the House."'84
Some anti-incorporationist scholars, however, have subjected
Bingham-along with Howard, as we will see later-to a tendentious
campaign of denigration, disparagement, and outright derision. Because they
found Bingham's ideas surprising and unorthodox, they became convinced
80 See supra note 16 (comment on terminology); see also BENEDICT, COMPROMISE
(1974), supra note 72, at 21-24; ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 216-39 (Harper & Row 1988) [hereinafter FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION (1988)]; LEwIS L. GOULD, GRAND OLD PARTY: A HISTORY OF THE
REPUBLICANS 42-77 (Random House 2003); JULES WITCOVER, PARTY OF THE PEOPLE: A
HISTORY OF THE DEMOCRATS 224-36 (Random House 2003).
81 See ERVING E. BEAUREGARD, BINGHAM OF THE HILLS: POLITICIAN AND DIPLOMAT
EXTRAORDINARY 93-94 (Peter Lang 1989) [hereinafter BEAUREGARD, BINGHAM OF THE
HILLS (1989)] (describing raids by General John Hunt Morgan in July 1863).
82 See BDC, supra note 1, at 657; Richard L. Aynes, John Armor Bingham, 2 ANB,
supra note 1, at 792 [hereinafter Aynes, Bingham (ANB)]; BEAUREGARD, BINGHAM OF
THE HILLS (1989), supra note 81, at 115-16 (describing the 1866 campaign, fought
mainly over the Fourteenth Amendment); 2 ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 938 (defeated in
1862, in new District 16, 55.2-44.8%); id at 941 (winning in 1864, 52.7-47.3%); id at
944 (same, 1866, 52.8-47.2%); id. at 947 (same, 1868, 50.8-49.2%); id. at 951 (same,
1870, 51.0-49.0%).
83 1 JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS: FROM LINCOLN TO GARFIELD
328 (Henry Bill; vol. 1, 1884; vol. 2, 1886); see also Allan Burton Spetter, James
Gillespie Blaine, 2 ANB, supra note 1, at 902; BDC, supra note 1, at 657 (Bingham
chairing the Judiciary Committee).
84 BEAUREGARD, BINGHAM OF THE HILLS (1989), supra note 81, at 111; see also
Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 66 n.54 (providing more evidence of strong
contemporary praise for Bingham's leadership and legal abilities); Aynes, Continuing
(2003), supra note 78, at 590-91 (same). For biographical overviews, see generally
BEAUREGARD, BINGHAM OF THE HILLS (1989), supra note 81; Aynes, Bingham (ANB),
supra note 82; Aynes, Continuing (2003), supra note 78.
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his colleagues could not have taken him seriously either. Fairman, for
example, called Bingham "befuddled," "careless," and "confused" (albeit
"sincere"), a man of "peculiar conceptions" that "cannot be accepted as
serious propositions. '85 Fairman's Stanford Law School colleague Morrison
agreed, dismissing Bingham's views as "so confused and so conflicting as to
be of little weight."'86 As Crosskey dryly observed:
Fairman's method was to let drop, here and there, throughout his
discussion, derogatory hints and comments which gave the impression that
the framers of the amendment, and Bingham in particular, were not very
bright; that they held the strangest ideas about the Constitution; knew little
about it, or about the decisions of the Supreme Court under it; that they
were poor draftsmen; and that it was not to be expected anything intelligible
could come from their hands. 87
Berger, the leading anti-incorporationist scholar after Fairman-and
seemingly always eager to take a more extreme stance-blasted Bingham as
"muddled" and "inaccurate," a man who "veered as crazily as a rudderless
ship," made remarks "rife with contradictions," and produced the Fourteenth
Amendment by "inept midwifery." 88 Such denigration has had a persistent,
corrosive influence over the years. It has been echoed by scholars like
Alexander Bickel, Leonard Levy, Wallace Mendelson, John Harrison, and
others.89
85 See FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 461 ("peculiar
conceptions"); id. at 1289 ("cannot be accepted"); Fairman, Original (1949), supra note
7, at 26 ("befuddled"); id. at 31 ("careless"); id. at 54 ("show[ed] great confusion"); id. at
137 ("confused" but "sincere"). But see CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 109,
120-21 (disputing such views); Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 65-66 (same).
86 Morrison (1949), supra note 7, at 161.
87 Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 11; see also Aynes, Fairman (1995),
supra note 10, at 1231-33.
88 See BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 164 ("muddled"); id. at 182
("careless, inaccurate, stump speaker" who made "confused, contradictory utterances");
id. at 243 ("inept midwifery"); BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 131
("rife"); Berger, Nine-Lived Cat (1981), supra note 7, at 450 ("veered").
89 See BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 128 (quoting statements by
Bickel, Levy, and Mendelson); LEONARD W. LEVY, The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Bill of Rights (1970), in JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
64, 77 (Quadrangle 1972); Wallace Mendelson, Mr. Justice Black's Fourteenth
Amendment, 53 MINN. L. REv. 711, 716-19 (1969) [hereinafter Mendelson, Black
(1969)]; John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
L.J. 1385, 1404 n.61 (1992) [hereinafter Harrison, Reconstructing (1992)] (opining that
"either Bingham's analytical powers were mediocre or he was too lazy to use them"); see
also, e.g., Boyce (1998), supra note 60, at 980-81, 1005-06.
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But Bingham, far from befuddled, was intensely focused. He was
perhaps, like Shakespeare's Mercutio, too fond of hearing himself talk.
Benedict described him as "[i]nflexible," "quick to anger," with a demeanor
"like a steel scythe." 90 Fairman, taking a somewhat more balanced view in
his 1971 book, quoted praise for Bingham by several colleagues, including
Blaine (as noted above) and Bingham's fellow Ohio Republican, Senator
John Sherman. Sherman called Bingham "eloquent," "a favorite with his
colleagues," though "rather too much given to flights of oratory." 91
Avins nicknamed Bingham "Mr. Windbag. '92 Berger ridiculed his
"florid, windy rhetoric.., liberally interspersed with invocations to the
Deity. '93 But that was the typical style of the day, which emphasized lofty
discourse heavy with religious imagery. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address is a
famous example, albeit more concise.
Bingham, a devout Christian, believed that a "Divine Plan" predestined
America to greatness and that "worldly institutions must be perfected to
display God's greater glory." 94 Nationalizing the Bill of Rights was part of
Bingham's plan for worldly perfection, and he pursued it tenaciously. He was
deeply influenced by antislavery legal theories, which dominated Republican
ideology. He also embraced the Republican goal of "completing the
Constitution" by infusing it with the principles-both libertarian and
90 BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974), supra note 72, at 36 (duplicate quotation marks
omitted).
91 FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 1270 (quoting Sherman's
memoirs and the Blaine comment quoted above). But see Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra
note 10, at 66 n.54 (noting Fairman's more positive treatment in 1971, but criticizing him
for artificially distinguishing between Bingham's oratorical and analytical abilities);
Richard L. Aynes, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Seven Deadly
Sins of Legal Scholarship, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 423-29 (2000) (reviewing
AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10) (Aynes elaborating on this criticism of
Fairman, and noting additional positive comments on Bingham, and a few negative ones,
by Bingham's contemporaries).
92 Avins, Incorporation (1968), supra note 9, at 16.
93 BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 164.
94 Beauregard, Bingham and the Fourteenth (1987), supra note 78, at 70; see
generally id. at 67-76; see also AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 190-91;
GARRETT EPPs, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT
FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 96-99 (Henry Holt 2006) [hereinafter
Epps, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006)]; Richard L. Aynes, The Antislavery and Abolitionist
Background of John A. Bingham, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 881, 886-914 (1988) [hereinafter
Aynes, Antislavery (1988)]. Epps has provided a vividly readable account of the
Amendment's proposal, adoption, and legacy, offering many striking and thoughtful
insights. He suggested agreement with the incorporation theory, but did not explore the
issue in great depth. See EPps, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006), supra, at 95-98, 166-71,
232.
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egalitarian-of the Declaration of Independence. Those principles had been
stunted and marginalized during the first ninety years of the republic by the
malign influence of slavery. 95
95 On the relevance of the Declaration, see generally, for example, JACOBUS
TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 14-15, 20-21, 85 n.20 (Collier, rev. ed. 1965) (originally
published as THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (U. Cal.
Press 1951)) [hereinafter TENBROEK, EQUAL (1965)]; Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the
Constitution: The Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth
Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361 (1993). Regarding antislavery influences on Bingham,
see generally CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 26-56; Aynes, Antislavery
(1988), supra note 94; Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 74-78; Aynes,
Continuing (2003), supra note 78; Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 10-21;
Finkelman, Bingham (2003), supra note 78.
On Republican ideology generally, see first of all the foundational work of Howard
Jay Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950
Wis. L. REV. 479, 610 (reprinted in HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION:
HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY,"
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 152 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1968)
[hereinafter GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION (1968)]); see also Howard Jay
Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1954)
(reprinted in GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION (1968), supra, at 295).
Following Graham came the studies of tenBroek, Foner, Hyman, Wiecek, Benedict,
and Kaczorowski. See, e.g., TENBROEK, EQUAL (1965), supra; ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL,
FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL
WAR (Oxford Univ. Press, rev. ed. 1995, originally published 1970); ERIC FONER,
POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR (Oxford Univ. Press 1980);
HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION (Knopf 1973) [hereinafter HYMAN, MORE
PERFECT (1973)]; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (Comell Univ. Press 1977); HAROLD M.
HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 (Harper & Row 1982); BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974),
supra note 72; Michael Les Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative
Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. AM. HIST. 65 (1974) [hereinafter Benedict,
Preserving (1974)]; Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era
of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 871-99 (1986) [hereinafter
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary (1986)]; Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew:
Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45 (1987)
[hereinafter Kaczorowski, To Begin (1987)].
For additional discussions by modem scholars, see, for example, JUDITH A. BAER,
EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 57-
104 (Cornell Univ. Press 1983); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE
CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS
21-148 (Princeton Univ. Press 1993); Garrett Epps, The Antebellum Political
Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175 (2004);
Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment, I CONST. COMMENT. 235 (1984); Paul Finkelman, The Historical Context of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 389 (2004); David A.J.
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As Crosskey, Curtis, Amar, Aynes, Maltz, and others have demonstrated,
careful study of Bingham's speeches, with sympathetic understanding of his
premises, produces a fairly clear picture of his constitutional vision.96
Fairman and Berger never gained a clear grasp of that vision because they
disdained the visionary. As Michael Zuckert put it: "Important historical
actors... make sense to those around them; that is why they are important
actors. The historian's task is to bring out their sense, not to denounce them
as fools."'9
7
Bingham presented to the House of Representatives an early version of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment on February 26, 1866. This proposal
would have granted Congress the power to protect "all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States" and to guarantee "all persons in
the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property. '98 As Bingham explained, he believed the states were already
bound, in principle, to respect these rights, but that, by established judicial
"construction of the Constitution," Congress lacked power to enforce them.
Bingham wanted to give Congress that power, to enforce "this immortal bill
of rights embodied in the Constitution." 99
This early proposal aroused opposition because some viewed it as
granting Congress too much direct power over matters traditionally handled
by the states, rather than simply prohibiting state abuses. Bingham later
revised the Amendment, so that in the final version Section 1 stated a direct,
judicially enforceable prohibition on the states, with a grant of enforcement
Richards, Abolitionist Political and Constitutional Theory and the Reconstruction
Amendments, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1187 (1992). See also infra note 351.
96 See, e.g., AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 181-97; CURTIS, No
STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 58-71; MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS (1990), supra note 10, at
115; Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 66-74; Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra
note 9, at 10-21.
97 Michael Zuckert, Book Review, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 161 (1991)
[hereinafter Zuckert, Review (1991)] (reviewing ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (Oceana 1985) [hereinafter KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS (1985)]);
CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, and BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note
7) (criticizing Berger's treatment of Bingham and Howard).
98 CG (39:1) 1033-34 (Feb. 26, 1866).
99 Id. at 1034. Bingham and other Republicans relied, at least in part, on the old
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause to support their Barron-contrarian views.
See, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 59-61; Aynes, Bingham (1993),
supra note 10, at 66-85. I will explore further in a forthcoming article the relationship
between the Amendment and Article IV, along with the related "equal rights only"
reading of the Amendment that some have advocated. See infra note 223; Part VII.A (pp.
1588 & n.260).
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power to Congress in Section 5.100 The debates over the original proposal
remain a useful guide to understanding the Amendment, however, because
both versions shared the key language regarding "privileges" and
"immunities."
III. BINGHAM, HALE, AND THE SCHOLARS
Representative Robert S. Hale, a very conservative New York
Republican, took up the theme of excessive federal power on February 27,
criticizing Bingham's proposed Amendment on that ground. Though Hale
ended up voting for the later, revised version of the Amendment, he also
argued, in February, that Bingham's proposal was unnecessary. That was
because, in Hale's view, the Bill of Rights already "limit[ed] the power of
Federal and State legislation," thus "provid[ing] safeguards to be enforced by
the courts."101 Hale's statement indicates he shared with Bingham, and
apparently many other Republicans, the unorthodox Barron-contrarian view
that the states were already bound, at least in principle, to respect the Bill of
Rights. But Hale, unlike Bingham, was not aware of Barron.
Bingham interrupted Hale several times and offered to cite a case
proving the need for the Amendment. But Hale refused to yield, blustering
that he "never claim[ed] to be a very learned constitutional lawyer" and
admitting that he did "not know of a case" protecting "the liberties of the
citizen" against state abuse. "But still I have, somehow or other, gone along
with the impression that there is that sort of protection thrown over us in
100 Bingham's revision apparently relied, at least in part, on a suggestion by Rep.
Giles W. Hotchkiss (R-N.Y.). See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 98-99 (1947)
(appendix to opinion of Black, J., dissenting) (citing CG (39:1) 1095 (Feb. 28, 1866)
(Hotchkiss)); CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 128-29 (same). Bingham also
relied, as he recalled later, on a review of Barron and the phrasing of Article I, Section 10
of the Constitution. See CG (42:1) app. 84 (Mar. 31, 1871). I disagree with Thomas's
suggestion that Hotchkiss was concerned only with equal rights. See Thomas, Riddle
(2007), supra note 5, at 1645. The Hotchkiss statement that Thomas quotes in support of
this suggestion is perfectly consistent with the strong incorporationist implication of the
preceding Hotchkiss statement that Thomas quotes. Hotchkiss seems simply to have
expressed the concern for equal rights running heavily through most Republican
statements (including those of Bingham himself) about the various proposed versions of
the Amendment. Nationalizing the Bill of Rights was one very effective means to achieve
the goal of requiring states to respect equal rights for all. I will discuss the "equal rights
only" reading of the Amendment that Thomas and others have suggested in a
forthcoming article. See infra note 223; Part VII.A (p. 1588 & n.260).
101 CG (39:1) 1064 (Feb. 27, 1866); see also id. at 3149 (June 13, 1866) (Hale
voting for the Amendment on final passage).
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some way, whether with or without the sanction of a judicial decision that we
are so protected. Of course, I may be entirely mistaken . ,,102
Hale was indeed mistaken. Bingham obtained the floor the next day,
February 28. This time it was he who rebuffed interruptions by Hale.
Bingham triumphantly cited Barron and another Supreme Court decision
rejecting application of the Bill of Rights to the states, introducing them as
"exactly what makes plain the necessity of adopting this amendment."'103
This Bingham-Hale episode has been raked over many times by scholars
and is crucial to understanding Bingham's design. It also says much about
the modem conventional scholarship on incorporation, because Fairman
badly misconstrued it in his influential 1949 article. Surprisingly, multiple
previous critiques have not yet fully explored the troubling distortion in the
treatments by Fairman and some other scholars. It merits yet another look.
Fairman discussed in detail Bingham's remarks on February 26 and
various other Bingham-Hale colloquies on February 27, but omitted any
mention of Hale's Barron-contrarian views or Bingham's February 27
attempt to cite Barron.10 4 Fairman praised Hale as "formerly a judge" in
New York, "a discriminating lawyer" who "subjected to a tough lawyer-like
examination the 'extremely vague, loose, and indefinite provisions' of
[Bingham's] proposed amendment."' 1 5 Such puffery verges on laughable in
light of Hale's self-confessed befuddlement and ignorance of major Supreme
Court precedents in the passage Fairman omitted. It took remarkable nerve
for Fairman to suggest Bingham was "befuddled" and un-"lawyer-like." It
was, in fact, Bingham who conducted a "tough, lawyer-like," and
devastatingly effective cross-examination of Hale. 10 6
102 Id. at 1064 (Feb. 27, 1866); see also id. at 1064-65.
103 Id. at 1089-90 (Feb. 28, 1866) (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243
(1833); Livingston's Lessee v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833)). Barron dealt with the
Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause, and Livingston's Lessee dealt with the
Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trial. See Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 247;
Livingston 's Lessee, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 552. Bybee noted Hale's mistake in believing that
the Bill of Rights was already secured against state violation. But Bybee missed the
significance of the fact that even an ultraconservative like Hale-who, contrary to
Bybee's view, was a more "idiosyncratic" Republican than Bingham, cf supra note 79-
embraced such Barron-contrarian and incorporation-friendly views. See Bybee (1995),
supra note 14, at 1582-83 & n.203. Apparently, in Bybee's mistaken perspective-
clearly influenced by Fairman-Hale was a mainstream moderate while Bingham was a
cranky outlier. But the irony is that even if Bybee's view of Bingham and Hale were
accurate, he (like Fairman) failed to grasp how that cut on the underlying issue.
104 Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 24-26, 29-32.
105 Id. at 29 (first and third quotations) (quoting CG (39:1) 1063-64 (Feb. 27, 1866)
(Hale)); FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 1277 (second quotation).
106 See CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 109.
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Fairman did acknowledge Bingham's February 28 citation of Barron, but
without identifying Hale as the one to whom Bingham responded. 10 7 Then,
instead of conceding the obvious import of the Barron citation to the relevant
issue, Fairman falsely (and irrelevantly) accused Bingham of
misunderstanding Barron. "How did [Bingham] extricate himself?" Fairman
asked. "He hailed Barron... as though it were a vindication of his position,
and plunged on to worse confusion.. . ." 108
But Barron did vindicate Bingham's position. It was Fairman who was
hopelessly confused. Fairman charged that Bingham misread Barron as
holding that "the first eight Amendments really extended to the states, but
that Congress was without power to make the requirements effective."',0 9 But
Bingham never suggested any such reading of Barron. He was presenting his
own theory, in conflict with Barron. Even if he had misunderstood the
rationale of Barron, that was totally beside the point." 0
Bingham studied the Barron decision further after February 1866, gained
a clearer and more respectful understanding of its rationale, and even
modified the final version of the Amendment in light of that understanding.
But he never wavered in his desire to effectively overturn it.111 And he
107 Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 34.
108 Id. at 35.
109 Id. at 34.
11OSee Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 39 (criticizing Fairman's
misstatement but not explaining why Fairman was wrong); Wildenthal, Lost Compromise
(2000), supra note 2, at 1072 nn.71 & 74 (exonerating Bingham and noting that even if
he had misunderstood Barron, that was irrelevant) (quoting BRANT (1965), supra note
78, at 326-27).
111 See CG (42:1) app. 84 (Mar. 31, 1871) (Bingham). On March 9, 1866, Bingham
noted that "the bill of rights ... has been solemnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the
United States ... not [to] limit the powers of States." CG (39:1) 1292. On January 28,
1867, during debate on an anti-whipping bill sponsored by Rep. John A. Kasson (R-
Iowa), Bingham corrected Kasson's Barron-contraian view:
[Ilt has always been decided that [Bill of Rights guarantees] are... not such
limitations upon the States as can be enforced by Congress and the judgments of the
United States courts. On the contrary, the Supreme Court, when presided over by
men who never were suspected of mere partisan judgments, whose ability and
integrity were acknowledged by all and challenged by none, ruled invariably as I
have stated.
Bingham then noted that the Amendment pending before the states would reverse such
rulings. CG (39:2) 811, cited in, e.g., Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 70 n.72;
AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 183; see also CG (39:2) 810-12 (Jan.
28, 1867); 14 Stat. 485, 487 (§ 5) (Mar. 2, 1867) (enacting a limited ban on whipping).
For an especially enlightening discussion of this 1867 debate, see HALBROOK, FREEDMEN
(1998), supra note 10, at 62-64. See also infra Part VII.B (pp. 1599-1600); Part VIII (pp.
1618-19).
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correctly grasped its basic import all along. As he said on February 28,
Barron "involv[ed] the question whether [the Fifth Amendment is] binding
upon the State of Maryland and to be enforced in the Federal courts."
Barron, Bingham noted, held that "the existing amendments are not
applicable to and do not bind the States .... ." As part of a somewhat
convoluted sentence, Bingham then stated his own view, "in answer to"
Barron (my emphases):
I stand relieved to-day [sic] from entering into any extended argument in
answer to these decisions of your courts, that although as ruled [i.e., in
Barron and the other cited case] the existing amendments are not applicable
to and do not bind the States, they are nevertheless [i.e., under Bingham's
preferred approach] to be enforced and observed in [the] States ....
To support his view, Bingham then invoked the dubious authority of a speech
by Daniel Webster. 112
Berger parroted Fairman's charge that Bingham misunderstood
Barron,11 3 and ridiculed Bingham's Webster argument."14 But that was all
totally irrelevant. Few would dispute that the Barron-contrarian view was
and remains unorthodox and incorrect. What counts is that Bingham and
some of his colleagues held that view, Bingham understood perfectly well
how Barron was in conflict with it, and Bingham made perfectly clear his
desire, therefore, to overturn Barron in practical result.
Fairman's and Berger's treatments obscured the relevant issues and
unjustly tarnished Bingham's reputation. The canard that Bingham
misunderstood Barron has, regrettably, propagated down through the years-
embraced, for example, by the second Justice John Marshall Harlan, Justice
Potter Stewart, and scholars Wallace Mendelson and Donald Dripps."15
112 CG (39:1) 1089-90 (Feb. 28, 1866).
113 See, e.g., BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 129-33. Berger's
discussion made painfully clear that it was he who misunderstood Bingham's views.
Berger could be almost comically obtuse. In response to Curtis's objection to his
blatantly misleading editing of a Bingham comment, Berger reproduced the original
alongside his edited version. Apparently not grasping that he had just confirmed Curtis's
point, Berger feistily dismissed the problem as "a figment of Curtis'[s] imagination." Id.
at 132 (quoting and discussing CuRTIs, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 122-23); see
also infra note 180.
114 See BERGER, GovERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 164-65 n.54, 183; see also
Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 35.
115 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174-75 n.9 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
joined by Stewart, J., dissenting); Mendelson, Black (1969), supra note 89, at 716-17;
Dripps (1996), supra note 29, at 1577 n.107. Dripps, in his aptly titled article (there he
went "down that wrong road again"), argued that under Bingham's theory, the courts
could only find that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states if
2007] 1543
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Straining to be charitable to Fairman, one might conclude at this point
that he honestly overlooked Hale's Barron-contrarian views and Bingham's,
February 27 offer to cite Barron, did not really grasp the Barron-contrarian
view in any event, and thus simply did not understand why Bingham waved.
Barron in Hale's face. Of course, by omitting Hale's statement of Barron-
contrarian views, Fairman (perhaps unintentionally) obscured a strong piece
of evidence that Bingham's underlying goal-application of the Bill of
Rights to the states-was perfectly in line with prevailing sentiments.
Crosskey elegantly disentangled what we have seen so far of this episode
in his brilliant 1954 rebuttal to Fairman's article-a rebuttal that has mostly
been unjustly ignored for more than half a century."16 He called Fairman's
treatment "misleading" and "not untypical of his handling of the evidence all
through his discussion of the debates in Congress."' 1 7 Digging past the
critiques by Crosskey and other scholars, I can only confirm and amplify that
judgment.
Fairman did, for example, quote Bingham's February 27 reply to Hale
stating that his proposal would "protect" many "thousands" of citizens
"whose property, by State legislation, has been wrested from them under
they agreed with Bingham's view that Barron was wrongly decided to begin with. One
"who believed (or believes) that Barron was rightly decided" should conclude that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause "imposes no new limits on the states; it would only
empower Congress to enforce such things as the antebellum Constitution's ban on state
ex post facto laws." Id. at 1578 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 1577-79. But that
cannot be squared with the facts set forth in the text. As Irving Brant well noted: "[lt is
utterly irrelevant whether [Bingham] thought his amendment was needed to overcome
wrongful or rightful decisions of the Supreme Court. The point that counts is that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to overcome those decisions." BRANT (1965), supra
note 78, at 326-27 (emphases in original).
116 Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 30-41; see generally id. at 2-119;
see also, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 69-71, 94-96, 100-02, 109
(discussing what we have seen so far); AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at
182-83 (brief discussion); PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 110-11 (Duke Univ.
Press 1999) (same); MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS (1990), supra note 10, at 115 (same). Cf
BRANDWEIN (1999), supra, at 108-16 (discussing how Fairman was locked into his
orthodox understanding of Barron and hobbled by then-prevailing views of
Reconstruction). Curtis, Amar, and Aynes are certainly exceptions to the general
tendency to disregard Crosskey. They have paid careful attention to Crosskey's insights,
greatly enhancing their own work on the incorporation issue. See, most notably, Curtis's
gracious acknowledgment of Crosskey at the outset of his own landmark book. CURTIS,
No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 8. It must be conceded, of course, that Crosskey's
scholarship did suffer from significant flaws. For a discussion of that, and why Crosskey
has been so disrespected in the scholarly world, see infra note 147.
117 Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 32-33.
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confiscation."11 8 This was an obvious reference to the Fifth Amendment Just
Compensation Clause, the very Bill of Rights provision that Barron had
found inapplicable to the states. But Fairman never pointed that out, though
he slammed Bingham just three pages later with the false charge of
misreading Barron. 119 Instead, after quoting a few other statements, Fairman
said, "Let us focus upon this episode."'120 If only! Fairman referred'again to
Bingham's confiscation comment, then veered off into a ridiculous and
irrelevant quibble over Bingham's word choice in another statement.
The latter digression sheds still more light on Fairman's pervasive tone-
deafness to the relevant lessons of the congressional history. Bingham,
challenged by Hale on whether his proposal would apply only to former rebel
states, said it would apply to any states with laws "in direct violation of every
principle of our Constitution."' 12 1 Fairman quibbled that "a state law could
hardly violate every principle of the Constitution."'122 Bingham's live floor
comment may have been imprecise; he probably meant "any" rather than
"every." But either way, this is still more evidence that he meant to apply-
to all the states, not just some-every (or any) right guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Fairman summed up in terms that were (again) better suited to himself:
"Bingham's answers simply did not meet the issue. Maybe he was
intentionally evasive. It seems far more likely, however, that he was
exercised over the bad things he wanted to hit, without ever having thought
out ... the import of the words he had chosen."'1 23
An especially risible aspect of Fairman's article is the often arrogant,
supercilious, and just plain disrespectful tone he took toward Bingham and
some other members of the 1866 Congress-who, after all, wrote and
118 CG (39:1) 1065 (Feb. 27, 1866), quoted in Fairman, Original (1949), supra note
7, at 31; see also CuRTIs, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 69 (paraphrasing Bingham
as "insist[ing] that the amendment would apply to loyal whites as well as blacks," and not
discussing Fairman's treatment); Curtis, Bill of Rights (1980), supra note 10, at 71 (same,
paraphrasing Bingham as stating that his proposal "was also intended to protect loyal
whites from confiscation of their property and banishment"); BERGER, GOVERNMENT
(1997), supra note 7, at 242 (quoting the Bingham statement in a context not relating to
incorporation).
119 See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 34.
120 Id. at 32.
121 CG (39:1) 1065 (Feb. 27, 1866).
122 Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 32 (Fairman's emphasis); see also
CURTIs, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 95 (quoting Bingham's statement and
Fairman's comment, without further discussion).
123 Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 32.
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adopted the Amendment Fairman was analyzing. 124 Yet Fairman was often
very respectful, as we have seen, towards speakers like Hale-who, Fairman
thought, supported his argument-even when they plainly made fools of
themselves. Fairman's professorial scolding was sometimes laughably
anachronistic. At one point he rebuked Bingham-challenged on how his
Amendment would affect married women's property rights-for not framing
his response in terms of the "rational basis" test not crafted until the next
century, nor applied to sex discrimination until the year before Fairman's
article was published. 125
It gets worse. Recall that Fairman's entire article was devoted to
responding to the historical evidence famously presented by Justice Black's
dissent in Adamson v. California. 126 Fairman's colleague Morrison joined the
attack in a companion article: "Professor Fairman's work demonstrates that
the similar research of Mr. Justice Black was both inadequate and
misleading."' 127 Morrison suggested that Black might have some excuses for
shoddy research:
Perhaps it is not surprising that in his historical study [Black] did not get an
accurate picture. Obviously a Justice of the Supreme Court, even with the
aid of a capable secretary, does not have the time for exhaustive historical
research. But if such great weight is to be given to history, surely the
Supreme Court should be vigilant in seeing to it that its actions are based on
research which is adequate.
124 It is difficult to choose among the wealth of examples. Ever the stern professor,
Fairman noted at one point that "[w]e are not examining Bingham on the law of property
or on conflict of laws, but are pushing him on his constitutional law." Id. at 30. It is
diverting to imagine a time-traveling Bingham response (especially given that he was
"quick to anger," BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974), supra note 72, at 36): "Sir, I wrote that
part of the Constitution!" Fairman ridiculed a speech by Rep. William Higby (R-Cal.)
that suggested Higby endorsed Bingham's theory-as shown by Crosskey, Fairman
(1954), supra note 9, at 29-though Fairman missed that. Wasting more than a page of
his article without advancing anyone's understanding of the incorporation issue
(including his own) one iota, and mocking Higby's suggestions that the Amendment
would give "life and vitality" to the Constitution, Fairman snidely snorted: "Evidently a
sort of elixir calculated to give a general toning-up to the Constitution." Fairman,
Original (1949), supra note 7, at 28; see also id. at 27-28. Never was Fairman in greater
need of Zuckert's caution. See supra Part II (p. 1539 & n.97).
125 See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 30 (quoting CG (39:1) 1089 (Feb.
28, 1866)); see also Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (applying "rational basis"
analysis to uphold partial exclusion of women from work as bartenders); AMAR, BILL OF
RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 191 (noting other examples of Fairman's
"anachronistic" approach and his general lack of patience or empathy in trying to
understand the 1866 debates).
126 332 U.S. 46, 92-123 (1947) (appendix to opinion of Black, J., dissenting).
127 Morrison (1949), supra note 7, at 161.
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Morrison found it "disturbing ... that such inadequate research should be
made the pretext for one of the most far-reaching changes in constitutional
interpretation... in our... history." He condemned Black and his dissenting
colleagues-Justices William 0. Douglas, Frank Murphy, and Wiley B.
Rutledge-as "willing to distort history ... in order to read into the
Constitution provisions which they think ought to be there. It is particularly
regrettable that the great talents of Mr. Justice Black should be so
misdirected."' 128
Morrison and Fairman might better have recalled the saying about people
in glass houses. One might fairly expect scholars at prestigious law
schools-presumably, as Morrison suggested, with far more research
assistance and time on their hands than Black-to at least study carefully
what Black actually wrote in 1947, along with the pages of congressional
history he specifically cited.129 But it appears that neither of the Stanford law
professors did so.
Black twice cited the very pages on which the Bingham-Hale episode
appears. He first stated that "[s]ome [opposition speakers] took the position
that the Amendment was unnecessary because the Bill of Rights [was]
already secured against state violation." Just three pages later, he identified
Hale as the speaker who took that view, which Black then discussed at more
length. 130 One of the other pages Black cited contained comments by
128 Id. at 162.
129 See Aynes, Fairman (ANB), supra note 18, at 689 (Fairman receiving his Ph.D.
and S.J.D. from Harvard, and teaching at Stanford and Harvard); see also Aynes,
Fairman (1995), supra note 10, at 1229-36 (discussing Fairman's and Morrison's articles
and anticipating some of my criticisms here). One of the truly depressing things about the
mess Fairman and Morrison made of the incorporation issue is that they were truly the
cr~me de la crkme of the legal academic establishment of their day. Consider also that
Fairman and Morrison were defending the anti-incorporation argument of Justice Felix
Frankfurter, one of the greatest professors in the history of Harvard Law School. And this
was the best they could do? As noted in the preface to the issue where their 1949 articles
appeared, Fairman was a highly regarded "judicial historian and biographer" and
Morrison was a "constitutional law scholar" who had clerked for Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. See President's Page, 2 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1949); see also Aynes, Fairman
(1995), supra note 10 (generally discussing the connection between Frankfurter and
Fairman); Parrish, Frankfurter (ANB), supra note 19, at 375-77 (discussing
Frankfurter's academic career); Adamson, 332 U.S. at 59-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(rejecting the incorporation theory). Morrison was such a respected figure at Stanford
(my alma mater) that an endowed chair is named for him, currently held by former Dean
(and renowned constitutional scholar in her own right) Kathleen M. Sullivan. See
http://www.law.stanford.edu/directory/57.
130 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 95 (quotation in the text) (citing CG (39:1) 1063-65 (Feb.
27, 1866) (containing the relevant Bingham-Hale debate); id. at 1054, 1057, 1059, 1066
(Feb. 27, 1866); id. at 1082-83, 1085-88 (Feb. 28, 1866)); see also Adamson, 332 U.S. at
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Representative Hiram Price, Republican of Iowa, supporting the Amendment
in part, it seems, to protect freedom of speech from state suppression. As
Crosskey complained, Fairman omitted any mention of Price. 131 Black then
98 (citing CG (39:1) 1064-65 (Feb. 27, 1866)) (specifically identifying and discussing
Hale and his views). Black's comment quoted in the text was followed by a citation only
to pages 1059, 1066, and 1088. With slight imprecision, he cited pages 1063-65 after a
related and immediately preceding comment about the "opposition speakers." But just
three pages later, as noted in the text and cited above, Black correctly cited pages 1064-
65 in discussing Hale's views.
Black was inconsistent in first referring to "opposition speakers" while stating three
pages later that only Hale thought the Bill of Rights was already enforceable against the
states. Black's first reference may, in fact, be correct, thus strengthening his argument. At
least one other opponent, Rep. Charles A. Eldredge (D-Wis.), arguably suggested that he
agreed with Hale's view (on a page twice cited by Black). During the Bingham-Hale
debate, Eldredge broke in right after Hale's statement that the Constitution was already
"sufficient for the protection of the liberties of the citizen" against state violation, to ask
if Bingham could cite "a case in which the Constitution... [was found] insufficient?"
Bingham said he could, but as we saw earlier, Hale refused to let him, and Bingham had
to wait until the next day to cite Barron. CG (39:1) 1064 (Feb. 27, 1866) (quoted and
discussed in Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 32, where Crosskey noted that
Fairman omitted any mention of Eldredge, along with most relevant aspects of the
Bingham-Hale episode); see also CG (39:1) 3149 (June 13, 1866) (Eldredge voting
against the Amendment on final House passage). Eldredge's name is misspelled
"Eldridge" in the Congressional Globe, and thus, not surprisingly, by Crosskey, who also
mistakenly gave him the middle initial "H." See BDC, supra note 1, at 1009
(biographical entry on Eldredge in an authoritative source).
I do not see the relevance of page 1059 as cited by Black, where speakers other than
Hale discussed congressional power over elections. On page 1066, Hale concluded his
remarks, though not reiterating his Barron-contrarian views or continuing his colloquies
with Bingham, followed by Price (discussed in the text and infra note 131). On page
1088, Rep. Frederick E. Woodbridge (R-Vt.) spoke in support of the proposal, expressing
what seem to have been Barron-contrarian views. See Fairman, Original (1949), supra
note 7, at 32-33; Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 34. In any event, there is no
excuse for Fairman's failure to carefully review all the pages cited by Black-nor,
indeed, for his failure to simply read carefully and respectfully these few pages by Black
himself.
131 See CG (39:1) 1066 (Feb. 27, 1866) (Price); Adamson, 332 U.S. at 95; Crosskey,
Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 33-34. To be sure, Price also seemed to refer in part to
the interstate-equality protection of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause,
which I will discuss in a forthcoming article that will also address the "equal rights only"
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that Thomas and others have advocated. See infra
note 223; Part VII.A (p. 1588 & n.260); Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 180-
216; Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1640; see also id at 1643, 1646 (discussing
Price). But Price clearly indicated his concern for an out-of-state visitor's substantive
right to speak freely upon visiting any other state, not merely to enjoy the same speech
rights as the locals, which might already be severely limited. He cited antebellum
antislavery advocates who "dared not express [an] opinion on the subject of slavery in a
slave State." CG (39:1) 1066. Article IV was construed before the Civil War to allow
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proceeded to quote at length from Bingham's crucial February 28 speech
citing Barron. 132
What took Fairman seven pages to obscure and confuse in 1949, and
Crosskey twelve pages to untangle in 1954, Black had briskly and lucidly
conveyed in just four in 1947. Perhaps the largely self-taught justice from
Alabama had a thing or two to teach members of the cream of American
legal academia such as Fairman, Morrison, and Justice Felix Frankfurter.1 33
They were slow to learn. Mendelson, one of the best political scientists
of his generation, writing fifteen years after Crosskey, accused Black of
being "confusing" in this very same passage. Mendelson asserted, incredibly,
that "[o]ne finds in [Black's] page references no evidence that any
Congressman took th[e] position" that "Bill of Rights provisions already
appli[ed] to the states." 134 But it was Mendelson, like Fairman, who was, at
best, confused. It is difficult to take seriously Mendelson's complaint, since
he promptly conceded that "Hale... thought the Bill of Rights was judicially
enforceable against the states," citing the very same pages cited by Black-in
the same passage Mendelson quoted and criticized-that supported Black's
suppression of antislavery speech by visitors and locals alike, see, e.g., CURTIS, No
STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 30-exactly the problem Price wanted to overcome. See
also Curtis, Resurrecting (1996), supra note 10, at 44-47 (noting that the equal-rights-
only reading of the Amendment would not meet deeply held Republican concerns about
freedom of speech). Price's comments were, concededly, somewhat unclear. He indicated
that "it was not until the last fifteen minutes that [he] had the least intention of saying one
syllable on this subject." A businessman with a common-school education, he twice
noted that he was "not a constitutional lawyer." CG (39:1) 1066; see also BDC, supra
note 1, at 1764.
132 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 95-98 (quoting CG (39:1) 1089-91, 1093).
133 Compare Adamson, 332 U.S. at 95-98, with Fairman, Original (1949), supra
note 7, at 29-35, and Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 30-41. See also supra
note 129 (discussing the academic credentials of Fairman, Morrison, and Frankfurter);
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 3-22 (Pantheon 1994) (Black's
humble origins and schooling in Alabama); id at 67, 125-26, 200-01, 300-01, 445-56
(his voracious reading of classical, historical, and other books).
134 Mendelson, Black (1969), supra note 89, at 720 (quoting and discussing
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 95). Mendelson conceded that if"some congressmen thought the
proposed.., amendment was surplusage because it embraced Bill of Rights provisions
already applicable to the states" (precisely Hale's argument, as Black had clearly
explained 22 years before), then that "would support the incorporation theory." Id. at 720.
My late uncle, William E. Lockhart III, a student at the University of Texas in the 1960s,
remembered Mendelson as one of his best professors. Mendelson had suggested his anti-
incorporation view in his classic textbook, citing Fairman and Morrison and asserting that
"the historical foundation for [Black's] position is highly questionable." WALLACE
MENDELSON, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 228 (Dodd, Mead, 1959);
accord id. (2d ed. 1966) at 290.
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essential point!135 One would think Mendelson, in an article devoted entirely
to criticizing Black's view of the Fourteenth Amendment, could at least have
read carefully Black's primary text on the subject.
Fairman never explicitly replied to Crosskey's critique on these points.
His brief 1954 response to Crosskey's article avoided most points of
substance. 136 Fairman's 1971 book revisited the congressional history
without even deigning to cite Crosskey. But curiously, Fairman, in 1,971-
while still discussing some of Hale's colloquies with Bingham--dropped any
mention of the crucial Bingham-Hale episode. 137 He did not seem interested
in responding to Crosskey's insights, which might have produced a helpful
synthesis.
Fairman's book also dropped almost all mention of Bingham's crucially
important February 28 discussion of Barron. He briefly referred to
Bingham's speech that day, while reasserting an oddly persistent fallacy that
Bingham, in referring to "the bill of rights," did not mean the Bill of Rights
as commonly understood. 138 But Fairman buried the only hint that Bingham
135 Mendelson, Black (1969), supra note 89, at 720-21 & nn.39-41 (citing CG
(39:1) 1063-64 (Feb. 27, 1866) (Hale)). Adding to the muddle, Mendelson claimed that
"[Hale's] objection was not that the ... amendment was surplusage [but] ... rather the
congressional enforcement problem" (i.e., that it granted too much power to Congress).
In fact--again, as Black had explained years before-Hale made both arguments. Indeed,
Mendelson quoted the very passage in which Black stated that "[o]pposition speakers"
made precisely those two arguments! Where Black, in that very passage, cited the same
Globe pages that Mendelson cited (containing Hale's relevant comments), Mendelson
actually went to the trouble (in his quotation of Black) to delete Black's relevant page
citations and replace them with "[citations omitted]"-while leaving in other page
citations by Black! Id. at 720. Mendelson never did mention Black's discussion, just three
pages later, identifying Hale by name, explaining that Hale made those two arguments,
and again citing relevant Globe pages! See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 95, 98.
136 See Charles Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 144
(1954) [hereinafter Fairman, Reply (1954)] (not mentioning the Bingham-Hale episode);
see also Aynes, Fairman (1995), supra note 10, at 1252-56 (discussing Fairman's reply).
137 See FARMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 1277-78 (discussing
Hale); see generally id. at 1260-98; see also CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at
121 (noting, without specifics, that Fairman in 1971 "did not repeat many of the
arguments that Crosskey criticized in Fairman's original article").
138 Fairman suggested that Bingham meant only a narrow understanding of the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. See FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 1280; see also id. at
1288-89; Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 26, 33-34, 134 (first floating this
theory); BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 161 (endorsing this theory);
Boyce (1998), supra note 60, at 981-82 & n.366, 1005 (also flirting with this theory). For
persuasive counterarguments showing that Bingham clearly meant to refer-and was
almost certainly understood to refer-to the Bill of Rights as traditionally understood, see
Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 27-41; CURTIs, No STATE (1986), supra note
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ever mentioned Barron in a footnote nine pages later that simply repeated the
false and irrelevant charge from his 1949 article that Bingham misunderstood
Barron. He avoided any hint of Bingham's avowed desire to overturn
Barron. 139
In another implicit response to Crosskey, Fairman did mention Price in
1971, and even quoted Price's concern about the freedom of antislavery
speech. But even then, Fairman fumbled. While a well-informed reader could
deduce the importance of Price's comment, Fairman offered no help. Instead,
he dismissed its significance.140
Berger only compounded the confusion sown by Fairman. In his 1977
book, Berger several times cited Hale to suggest that Hale and others would
have viewed imposition of the Bill of Rights on the states as intolerable, even
though Hale thought the Bill of Rights already bound the states. Berger was
obviously fully aware of Black's famous Adamson dissent, which had
discussed Hale's views thirty years earlier. Could it be that Berger never
carefully read Black's dissent? Did he just rely on Fairman's deeply flawed
account? In any event, Berger repeated such glaring misuses of Hale in his
1989 and 1997 books, even after Curtis had shown-in articles and a book to
which Berger otherwise responded at length-how grossly mistaken Berger
was in this regard.' 4 ' Frustratingly, as with the myth that Bingham
10, at 102, 110; Amar, Bill of Rights (1992), supra note 10, at 1234-35 & n.195; Aynes,
Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 66-74; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10,
at 182-83.
139See FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 1289 n.263. That
desire, along with ample additional evidence, shows plainly that Bingham referred-and
was understood to refer-to "the bill of rights" in the commonly understood sense. See
sources cited supra note 138.
140 See FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 1278-79. Fairman's
concluding comment on Price's contribution was to dismiss it as "typical of many men's
reaction to... [the] Amendment: the words sounded excellent-how could anyone
object?"
141 See BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1977), supra note 7, at 145-46, 153-54, 178 n.47,
182 n.65, 184; Curtis, Bill of Rights (1980), supra note 10, at 69-71; Curtis, Further
Adventures (1982), supra note 10, at 91; CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 69-
71, 94-96, 100-02, 109; BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 165, 172, 208
n.47, 212 n.65, 213. Berger's 1997 book included a 15-page "Supplementary Note on
Incorporation" responding to various critiques of his 1977 book, but nowhere in that
section did he correct his misuse of Hale or respond in any way to Curtis's critiques on
that score. See id. at 174-89. Berger's 1981 and 1983 articles, and his 1989 book-
responding to Curtis's 1980 and 1982 articles cited above-also ignored Curtis's
critiques on this point. See generally Berger, Nine-Lived Cat (1981), supra note 7; Raoul
Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis' Response, 44
OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Berger, Reply (1983)]; BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989),
supra note 7. On the contrary, Berger yet again misused Hale in this regard, in both his
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misunderstood Barron, such misleading discussions of Hale likewise
propagated down through the years. At least two more scholars, including
legal historian William Nelson, have slipped up in this regard, in works
published in 1988 and 1998.142
Returning to the 1866 debates, Bingham took the floor on March 9 to
indicate, regretfully, his opposition to the proposed Civil Rights Act that
would soon pass over President Andrew Johnson's veto.143 Bingham, unlike
Johnson, supported the goals of the Act, but felt that his proposed
Amendment was necessary to empower Congress to deal with the subject.
"[T]he enforcement of the bill of rights," he declared, "is the want of the
Republic."' 44 In a clear reference to Barron, Bingham acknowledged that
"the bill of rights.., has been solemnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the
United States ... not [to] limit the powers of States." He coupled that with a
suggestion that Barron also limited the power of Congress to pass legislation
like the Act. Later on the same page, he noted that he had proposed "an
1981 article and 1989 book. The latter consolidated Berger's arguments in his various
articles responding to Curtis and others on the incorporation issue. See Berger, Nine-
Lived Cat (1981), supra note 7, at 452-53; BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at
53 n.38, 58 n.57, 133.
14 2 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 115, 233 n.12 (Harv. Univ. Press 1988) (quoting a
statement in CG (39:1) 1065 (Feb. 27, 1866) (Hale), following shortly after Hale's
expression of Barron-contrarian views). Nelson overlooked Hale's Barron-contrarian
views, despite Curtis's then-recent and extensive discussion in his 1986 book-a work
which Nelson acknowledged. See id. at 2-3, 204 n.21. Instead, Nelson used the Hale
statement he quoted-about the importance of preserving "rights of the States"-to
support the argument that the Amendment may be interpreted "not [to] protect specific
fundamental rights" but only to prohibit denial of equal treatment. Id at 115; see
generally id at 115-24; see also id. at 108, 232 n.95 (quoting another Hale statement the
same day, also in CG (39:1) 1065, about the alleged danger that the Amendment would
promote excessive federal power); Michael Kent Curtis, A Blueprint for a New
Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 831, 835 (1990)
[hereinafter Curtis, Blueprint (1990)] (reviewing NELSON (1988), supra, and criticizing
his use of Hale); Curtis, Resurrecting (1996), supra note 10, at 58-59 & n.199
(reiterating that criticism). I will discuss the "equal rights only" reading promoted by
Nelson and others in a forthcoming article. See infra note 223; Part VILA (p. 1588 &
n.260); see also Curtis, Resurrecting (1996), supra note 10, at 44-65 (generally
criticizing the equal-rights-only theory).
Boyce's use of Hale was also deficient. Boyce emphasized Hale's excessive-federal-
power objection to Bingham's proposal without ever mentioning Hale's Barron-
contrarian views, despite Boyce's obvious familiarity with the work of Crosskey and
Curtis. See Boyce (1998), supra note 60, at 979-81; see also id. at 1004-14 (discussing
Crosskey and Curtis).
143 14 Stat. 27, 29-30 (Apr. 9, 1866).
144 CG (39:1) 1291 (Mar. 9, 1866).
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amendment which would arm Congress with the power to... punish all
violations by State officers of the bill of rights."145
Fairman quoted the last of these March 9 statements, but omitted any
mention of the first two, thus (again) erasing Bingham's crucially relevant
views on Barron.146 Black, in the opinion which Fairman's article was
devoted to attacking, had quoted and clearly explained all three statements,
including the obvious relevance of Barron.147
145 Id. at 1292.
146 See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 39-40; see also Crosskey,
Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 47-48 (showing that Fairman, in what he did describe,
misrepresented some of Bingham's views).
147 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 100-02 (1947) (appendix to opinion of
Black, J., dissenting). Crosskey did not point this out. He also did not mention Bingham's
March 9 acknowledgment of Barron, though he did convey well enough Bingham's view
that Congress lacked constitutional power to pass the Act. See Crosskey, Fairman (1954),
supra note 9, at 47-51. Crosskey was himself a Barron contrarian. See supra note 71. He
tended to emphasize, and perhaps exaggerate, the Barron-contrarian views of Bingham
and other Republicans. He may have been reluctant to admit the degree to which
Bingham, over time, seemed to modify his views and accept the Barron doctrine as a
valid interpretation of the antebellum Constitution. See supra p. 1542 & n. 11. Thus,
Crosskey's only two references to Barron in his discussion of the Civil Rights Act
debates were to insist that the views of Bingham and Rep. James F. Wilson (R-Iowa)
could only be understood if one kept in mind their (supposed) complete rejection of
Barron. See Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 49, 50; see generally id. at 44-
51.
Generally speaking, I agree with Thomas that Crosskey sometimes overstated the
pro-incorporation argument. See Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1632 & n.18.
We also agree, however, that "Crosskey present[ed] the evidence [on incorporation] more
objectively than Fairman and Berger." Id. It appears that Crosskey lost the respect of
many scholars because of his flawed and improbable arguments that Barron was wrongly
decided, and on other issues. See, e.g., Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000), supra note
2, at 1068-69 n.61 (also noting, however, that Crosskey's views, even if "incorrect" and
"unorthodox" on some points, "hardly deserve ridicule").
It is striking that the ANB entry on Fairman-written by Aynes, an ardent
incorporationist who has strongly criticized Fairman elsewhere-is far more respectful
and less critical of Fairman than the ANB entry on Crosskey is of Crosskey. Compare
Paul Moreno, William Winslow Crosskey, 5 ANB, supra note 1, at 792 (noting that while
much of Crosskey's "work is either neglected or rejected by scholars, his position in the
incorporation debate is more widely supported," but "[n]evertheless, Fairman got the
better of the historical argument," and noting that even many pro-incorporation writers
have "appealed to other authorities than [Crosskey]"); id. at 793 (describing Crosskey as
"a famous curmudgeon," and asserting that "[i]n the final analysis, Crosskey's work
suffered from fundamentally flawed methods" and that he "approached his work in the
style of an advocate rather than as a disinterested judge, and he wrote what is often
characterized as 'law office history"'), with Aynes, Fairman (ANB), supra note 18, at
689-90 (adhering throughout to a highly respectful and strictly objective approach); id. at
689 (noting that Fairman's "classic" 1949 article was among the most-cited law review
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On May 10, with the Amendment about to pass the House and Section 1
in its final form (except for the Citizenship Clause), Bingham spoke with
religious fervor about the need for national enforcement of constitutional
rights. Singling out one Bill of Rights guarantee as an example, from the
Eighth Amendment, he noted that "[c]ontrary to the express letter of [the]
Constitution, 'cruel and unusual punishments' have been inflicted under
State laws."' 48
Bingham made clear, as reflected in Section 1, that the revised
Amendment would no longer merely grant congressional power-that was
relegated to Section 5-but would now be self-executing as well.
That great want of the citizen and stranger, protection by national law from
unconstitutional State enactments, is supplied by the first section of this
amendment. That is the extent that it hath, no more; and let gentlemen
answer to God and their country who oppose its incorporation into the
organic law of the land. 149
articles for many years); id. at 690 (stating that Fairman's 1971 book "was widely
praised" without mentioning any criticisms of it; noting, in the most critical comment in
the entry, that "the accuracy of [Fairman's] views on the Fourteenth Amendment has
been called into question by scholars such as Alfred Avins, Michael Curtis, and Akhil
Amar"; but concluding that Fairman's "work on constitutional law and legal history
remained standard sources, relied on by scholars working in the areas"). As it happens,
Crosskey's best-known and most controversial work, see CROSSKEY, POLITICS (1953),
supra note 9, and Fairman's 1971 book (probably his leading work), both received
decidedly mixed reviews. Compare, e.g., Aynes, Fairman (1995), supra note 10, at
1243-44 (discussing the reception of Crosskey's 1953 work, which included favorable as
well as harsh reviews), with, e.g., Michael Les Benedict, Book Review, 39 U. CHI. L.
REV. 862 (1972) (reviewing FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7); Morton
Keller, Book Review, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1082 (1972) (same); John E. Semonche, Book
Review, 51 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381-86 (1972) (same); Gerhard Casper, Book Review, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 913 (1973) (same); Harry N. Scheiber & Michael E. Parrish, Book
Review, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 303 (1973) (same); see also Aynes (1995), supra note 10,
at 1269 & nn.488-89 (noting the mixed reviews of Fairman's book).
Aynes perceptively noted the underlying irony: Crosskey's weakest and most
controversial arguments (not relating to incorporation)--and Fairman's incorporation
arguments-were flawed for basically the same reasons. In each case, they handled
historical evidence in a strained and disrespectful manner. By contrast, "the enduring
portions of Fairman's and Crosskey's works" are those in which "they used traditional
sources of legislative history to create a coherent reading." Id. at 1255 n.384.
148 CG (39:1) 2542 (May 10, 1866).
149 Id. at 2543; see also supra Part II (pp. 1539-40 & n.100).
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Fairman, noting that this was "the last major speech before the House
voted on the Amendment,"' 150 quoted all of Bingham's May 10 comments
just given-indeed, he reprinted a lengthy excerpt of Bingham's speech. 151
Finally, one might be forgiven for hoping, he would live up to his name and
treat Bingham and the overall issue fairly. But no. Fairman's two pages of
analysis thoroughly mangled and misconstrued the speech. Yet again, note
Fairman's own words aimed at Bingham: "Does not this ... still show great
confusion?"152 Indeed.
One keeps thinking the light will finally dawn on Fairman. He singled
out Bingham's telling comment about "cruel and unusual punishments" and
suggested he understood Bingham's view that the Bill of Rights already
should have prohibited such state abuses.' 53 But he then lost patience and
once again dismissed Bingham's view. 154 "[W]hy," he asked, if this were
true-never mind that it was only relevant whether Bingham held such a
view, not whether it was correct---"did not the victims raise the federal
question and if need be carry it to the Supreme Court? Bingham did not
explain."155
One can only gape in astonishment. Bingham had explained-clearly
and exhaustively in February, with reminders in March-how the Court's
Barron decision blocked any such relief and how that was "exactly what
150 Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 51. There were, of course, a few more
speeches before the House finally repassed the Amendment as revised by the Senate. But
none of those directly addressed the incorporation issue. See CG (39:1) 3144-49 (June
13, 1866). As we will see, infra Parts V-VI, there is no reason to expect they would have,
since the point by then had been amply expressed in both the House and the Senate, and
seemed not to raise any controversy-in contrast to many other issues surrounding the
Amendment.
151 Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 51-53 (quoting CG (39:1) 2542-43
(May 10, 1866)).
152 Id. at 54; see also id. at 53-54. Crosskey, perhaps exhausted by his other
laborious critiques of Fairman, did not attempt to dissect Fairman's treatment here in any
detail. After quoting and discussing Bingham's speech at some length, he simply noted
that those unaware of the proper context "might very easily take Bingham's remarks as
confused, incoherent, and incomprehensible. And it was thus that Mr. Fairman presented
them." Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 69-70; see also id at 67-72.
153 "Admit, very frankly, that this necessarily implies that the first eight
Amendments were already limitations-though not enforceable by congressional
action-upon the states." Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 53.
154 "Marshall's Court [in Barron] had said they were not limitations on the states,
Bingham somehow believes that they are-but we need not go over that again." Id.
Perhaps Fairman should have.
155 Id.
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makes plain the necessity of adopting this amendment." 156 And it was not as
if Fairman missed Bingham's explanation. Fairman himself quoted an ample
portion of Bingham's speech containing the just-quoted words and
Bingham's explicit citation of Barron, and another decision, to show that the
Bill of Rights-wrongly, in Bingham's view-had been held not to be
enforceable against the states. 157
Fairman revisited Bingham's May 10 speech a generation later in his
1971 book. Time did not bring clarity. Fairman still dismissed "this confused
discourse."'1 58 He complained that Bingham's Eighth Amendment reference
"illustrates the disconcerting way in which [he] would pluck a constitutional
phrase and toss it in at some point to which it had no relevance."'1 59 It
obviously had relevance to Bingham. One can only, finally, give up on
Fairman.
Black's private reaction in 1950 to Fairman's article was understandable:
"He was greatly disappointed.., and questioned Fairman's detachment. 'I
now think of Mr. Fairman as an advocate, not a historian, and I would not
rank him at the top of [the] advocates of the world.""' 160 Aynes concluded,
rather mildly, that Fairman's article gives "considerable pause as to whether
he was then the disinterested scholar."' 161 Amar put it better in bluntly
describing it as an exercise in "Black-bashing" whose "unfair substance and
tone put almost an entire generation of lawyers, judges, and law professors
off track."1 62
Black's only public response to Fairman's article came much later in
1968 when he pointed out that it
completely failed to refute ... my Adamson dissent. Professor Fairman's
"history" relies very heavily on what was not said in the state legislatures
that passed on the ... Amendment. Instead of relying on this kind of
negative pregnant, my legislative experience has convinced me that it is far
wiser to rely on what was said, and most importantly, said by the men who
156 CG (39:1) 1089 (Feb. 28, 1866).
157 See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 34.
158 FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 1288; see also id. at 1287-
89.
159 Id. at 1289.
160 Aynes, Fairman (1995), supra note 10, at 1236 (citing NEWMAN (1994), supra
note 133, at 356) (quoting a letter from Black to his former law clerk John P. Frank) (my
brackets correct the quotation to reflect the original); see also NEWMAN (1994), supra
note 133, at 355-57 (quoting several very thoughtful and cogent criticisms by Black of
Fairman's article, in that same letter).
161 Aynes, Fairman (1995), supra note 10, at 1272.
162 AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 188 & n.*.
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actually sponsored the Amendment in the Congress. I know from my years
in the United States Senate that it is to men like Congressman Bingham,
who steered the Amendment through the House, and Senator Howard, who
introduced it in the Senate, that members of Congress look when they seek
the real meaning of what is being offered. 163
Black probably erred in waiting so long, and saying so little, to respond
to Fairman and other critics. From his perch on the Court, Black may not
have grasped how much damage Fairman's article had done to both the
incorporation theory and Black's own reputation, especially in scholarly
circles. Black himself was a partisan advocate of the theory. But as Amar
noted, Black nevertheless "proved the more faithful historian."' 164 To
paraphrase Morrison's comment on Black, it is regrettable that Fairman's
talents-and those of Morrison himself, Mendelson, and Berger-were
misdirected in this way.
IV. BINGHAM AND THE PRESS
The speeches by Bingham and others on the Amendment received ample
press coverage. The New York Times, for example, covered the debates over
Bingham's original proposal in five articles published four days in a row.
The Times, on February 27, 1866, reported Bingham's declaration that it was
essential to enforce the "immortal bill of rights." On February 28, the Times,
under its front-page "Washington News" headline, provided a subheadline,
"Debate in the House on the Constitutional Amendment," highlighting the
"Clear and Forcible Speech by Mr. Hale Against its Adoption." Readers were
certainly notified that Congress was debating a major new restriction on the
states. According to this February 28 article, "this amendment tends more
directly to the obliteration of all State rights, and the consolidation of
National authority, than any other. . . ." The phrasing of that early version of
the Amendment, as a broad grant of power to Congress, undoubtedly
accentuated such fears. A separate February 28 front-page article included a
more detailed transcript of the debate, including Bingham's stated intent to
protect citizens from unjust confiscation. The Times, on March 1, quoted
163 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 165 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). Black's
respectful tone stands in notable contrast to Fairman's and Morrison's scathing,
condescending (and thoroughly bungled) treatment of his Adamson opinion. See also
HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CoNsTrruTIONAL FAITH 34 (Knopf 1968) (obliquely
remarking, without mentioning Fairman or other critics, that "the attacks made upon my
historical beliefs ... simply have not convinced me that I am wrong").
164 AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 191. For an example of when
Black's instincts as a zealous advocate got the better of him-though with no harm to the
ultimate truth, as it turned out-see infra Part VI (p. 1579).
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Bingham indicating again his design "to enforce the Bill of Rights," and on
March 2 reprinted the entire Hale speech headlined on February 28, again
quoting Bingham's comment on confiscation.165
On March 10, the Times gave front-page coverage to Bingham's
statements that "the enforcement of the bill of rights in the Constitution [is]
the want of the Republic," that the Civil War might have been avoided "if
[the bill of rights] had been observed in good faith in every State of the
Union," and that he wanted, through his proposed Amendment, "to have the
bill of rights in the Constitution respected and enforced everywhere."' 166
Bingham's crucial February 28 speech, and his March 9 speech, were
both apparently distributed in pamphlet form during 1866. The title of the
February 28 pamphlet was "One country, one Constitution, and one people."
The subtitle referred to it as a "[s]peech ... in support of the proposed
amendment to enforce the bill of rights."'1 67
The New York Times provides an excellent window on the political views
of this era, thus providing insight into the original public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is also, admittedly, by far the easiest major
165 See Thirty-Ninth Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1866, at 8; Washington News,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1866, at 1; Thirty-Ninth Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1866, at 1;
Thirty-Ninth Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1866, at 4; Amending the Constitution-
Federal Power and State Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1866, at 2. Curiously, the Times
apparently never reported Bingham's February 28 response to Hale (citing Barron), even
though the Times twice reported Hale's February 27 speech, and included in its March 2
report Bingham's February 27 attempt to cite Barron. Bingham's February 28 response
does not appear in the March 1 article reporting the February 28 debate. Hale was a
home-state colleague of Times editor and fellow New York Republican Rep. Henry J.
Raymond, see infra pp. 1559-60 & nn.168-69, so perhaps it is not surprising that the
Times gave extra coverage to Hale and omitted an episode in which Bingham
embarrassed him by highlighting his ignorance of a major Supreme Court precedent.
166 Thirty-Ninth Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1866, at 1. The Times, however,
summarized Bingham's lengthy May 10 speech in a front-page article without reprinting
any of his remarks on incorporation. This was part of the paper's lengthy coverage
devoted mainly to that day's convoluted political maneuvering surrounding House
passage of the Amendment, especially a section (later removed by the Senate) that would
have disenfranchised until 1870 all Southern voters who had supported the rebellion. See
Thirty-Ninth Congress, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1866, at 1; Washington News, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 1866, at 1; see also Editorial, Reconstruction-The Action of Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 1866, at 4 (focusing on politics); Editorial, Reconstruction-The
Proposed Amendment to the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1866, at 4 (same).
167 Both pamphlets were published by the Congressional Globe, the official reporter
of congressional debates, and presumably distributed pursuant to the congressional
franking privilege. See Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 72 & n.84; Bingham,
John Armor, 1815-1900: Extended Bibliography (available in the online version of the
BDC, supra note 1, at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/bibdisplay.pl?index=
B000471).
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newspaper of this period to research today. Most papers had a frank partisan
slant during that time and the Times was no exception, being a Republican
paper with a conservative slant. 168 In early 1866, it was still defending
President Johnson, a Unionist Democrat, against growing Republican
criticism. The paper's founding editor and co-owner, Henry J. Raymond, was
himself a Republican elected to the Thirty-Ninth Congress. He and the Times
supported Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Times harshly
criticized Thaddeus Stevens, the radical Republican leader, and deprecated
its media rivals The Nation and Harper's Weekly as allegedly too radical. The
Nation was actually quite moderate; it and Harper's, along with the Atlantic
Monthly, also provide useful insights. The Times and Raymond both
168 See, e.g., FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1988), supra note 80, at 226, 243, 264, 266;
David T.Z. Mindich, Henry Jarvis Raymond, 18 ANB, supra note 1, at 214 [hereinafter
Mindich, Raymond (ANB)]. It must be conceded, as suggested in the text, that there is a
danger of overemphasizing the Times as a source, simply because of the current ease of
access to its online archive going back to 1851, which is fully searchable for nominal
fees. See http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/nytarchive.html. Richard Aynes has
pointed out to me that the New York Tribune, a Republican paper published by Horace
Greeley, was probably more influential. And the Democratic-leaning New York Herald
had, at the time, "the largest circulation of any newspaper in the country." FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION (1988), supra note 80, at 260-61, cited in AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS
(1998), supra note 10, at 187, 369 n.26. On the somewhat erratic politics of the Herald,
and its transition during 1866-67 from famed publisher-editor James Gordon Bennett to
his notoriously dissolute son, James Gordon Bennett, Jr., see James L. Crouthamel,
James Gordon Bennett, 2 ANB, supra note 1, at 584-85 (Bennett Sr. "opposed Abraham
Lincoln's election in 1860," took no stand on his 1864 reelection, and "supported most of
Andrew Johnson's Reconstruction policies"); Julie A. Doyle, James Gordon Bennett, Jr.,
2 ANB, supra note 1, at 586 (Bennett Jr. became editor in 1866 and assumed ownership
in 1867); see also FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1988), supra note 80, at 260-61 (noting
that the Herald "abandoned" President Johnson during 1866); Erik S. Lunde, Horace
Greeley, 9 ANB, supra note 1, at 467-70 (describing Greeley's memorable career as
publisher-editor of the Tribune, writer, antislavery activist, and 1872 presidential
nominee on the "Liberal Republican" (anti-Grant) and Democratic tickets). Researching
the Tribune, Herald, and other historical papers remains very difficult, however, and I
have not had time to do so.
For a fine recent book in this field whose author has researched the Tribune, Herald,
and other papers to some extent, see EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006), supra note 94.
Epps indicated that in addition to the Times, Tribune, and Herald, he researched the
Boston Daily Advertiser and the Richmond [Va.] Examiner. See id. at 297 (bibliography);
id at 322, 328, 330 (index entries). In addition to the Times, I have researched-as Epps
has, see id. at 297, 325, 328-two important magazines of this era, The Nation and
Harper's Weekly. I have also researched a third useful magazine, the Atlantic Monthly.
The Nation is archived and searchable online (back to 1865) at http://www.thenation.
com/archive, as is Harper's (back to 1857) at http://www.harpweek.com. The Atlantic is
available (back to 1857) at http://www.theatlantic.com and, for free, at http://library5.
library.comell.edu/moa.
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eventually supported the Fourteenth Amendment and turned against Johnson.
By 1868, the Times was praising the 1866 Act and Congress's
Reconstruction policies. 169
169 On The Nation, Harper's, and the Atlantic, see the discussion and citations
below in this note and supra note 168. Contemporary critics often labeled all but very
conservative Republicans, such as Hale and Raymond, as "radicals"---even Republicans,
like Bingham, who were in fact moderate or even somewhat conservative. Cf BENEDICT,
COMPROMISE (1974), supra note 72, at 22-23 (noting The Nation's relative moderation,
and growing conservatism, during Reconstruction); id. at 102-03, 222; Richard F.
Hixson, Edwin Lawrence Godkin, 9 ANB, supra note 1, at 152-53 (noting the prestige of
The Nation and Godkin, its founding editor from 1865 to 1900); 4 DAB, supra note 1, at
pt. 1, 347-49 (same); Mindich, Raymond (ANB), supra note 168, at 215 (describing
Raymond's general background, stating he was Johnson's "chief supporter" in the
House); EPPs, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006), supra note 94, at 112-13 (similar discussion
of Raymond); Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 47 (generally praising
Raymond's stature); FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 219 (describing
Raymond as "innately moderate" and "holding aloof from the radicals"); STAMPP (1965),
supra note 72, at 83 (Raymond "solidly committed to Johnson" at the outset of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress); id. at 115 (Raymond "mortified" by Johnson's behavior in the
1866 election campaign); supra note 165 (my speculation about Raymond's possible role
in the Times's reporting on the Bingham-Hale debate); CG (39:1) 1861 (Apr. 9, 1866)
(Raymond voting against the override of Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act); id. at
3149 (June 13, 1866) (Raymond voting in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment).
While the Times sought to brand The Nation and Harper's as radical, just a few
years later The Nation named the Times and Harper 's as among "papers which zealously
support the Republican party." Police Duty, THE NATION, Apr. 27, 1871, at 284; see also,
e.g., Washington News, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1866, at 1 (lauding a speech by Sen. John
Sherman, R-Ohio, defending President Johnson); Editorial, The Differences Between
Congress and the President-Who Is Responsible?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1866, at 4
(praising Johnson); Editorial, Mr. Stevens and the Radical Press, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
1866, at 4 (denouncing Stevens; opposing the Civil Rights Act, which at that time had
been vetoed by Johnson and faced a pending override vote; and associating The Nation
and Harper's with radical "ultraists"); Editorial, The Civil Rights Bill-The Veto, and Mr.
Trumbull's Great Argument, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1866, at 4 (praising Johnson's veto and
mocking the override argument of Sen. Lyman Trumbull, R-Ill.); Editorial, The
President's Slanderers, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1866, at 4 (protesting criticisms of
Johnson); Editorial, The Constitutional Amendment and the Action of Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 1866, at 4 [hereinafter Editorial (June 15, 1866)] (praising Congress's
passage of the Amendment); Editorial, The Fourteenth Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
1868, at 4 (celebrating the apparent ratification of the Amendment); Editorial, The
President and the Constitutional Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1868, at 4 (strongly
denouncing Johnson); Editorial, The Fortieth Congress-Its Reconstruction Record, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 1868, at 4 (praising the Civil Rights Act and the Thirty-Ninth and
Fortieth Congresses).
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V. HOWARD'S AMENDMENT
Senator Howard provided the most striking support for the incorporation
doctrine. On May 23, 1866, he formally introduced the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Senate on behalf of the Joint Committee. He declared,
first, that the "privileges" and "immunities" protected by the Amendment
would include a range of fundamental rights falling within the scope of the
old Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, citing an avowedly non-
exhaustive list in Justice Bushrod Washington's famous 1825 circuit court
opinion in Corfield v. Coryell. These included, Howard noted, "the benefit of
the writ of habeas corpus."'170 He stated that the foregoing privileges and
immunities "are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and
precise nature." 171
Howard then proceeded, however, to offer a specific list of rights-again
explicitly non-exhaustive, a point sometimes missed-that "should be added"
to the scope of the Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause (my
emphasis):
[T]he personal rights guarantied [sic] and secured by the first eight
amendments of the Constitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the
press; the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances ... ; the right to keep and to bear
arms; the right to be exempted from the quartering of soldiers in a house
without the consent of the owner; the right to be exempt from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and from any search or seizure except by virtue of a
warrant issued upon a formal oath or affidavit; the right of an accused
person to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him, and his
right to be tried by an impartial jury of the vicinage; and also the right to be
secure against excessive bail and against cruel and unusual punishments. 172
Howard noted that under prevailing court decisions, this "mass of
privileges, immunities, and rights" did "not operate in the slightest degree as
a restraint or prohibition upon State legislation," and that this was true of the
very right at issue in Barron, "the restriction... against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.' ' 173 Although he did not
170 CG (39:1) 2765 (May 23, 1866) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230)) (duplicate quotation marks omitted).
171 Id.
172 Id. (emphasis added). For my reasons for referring to the Fourteenth Amendment
"Privileges and immunities Clause," rather than the commonly rendered alternative, the
"Privileges or Immunities Clause," see Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000), supra note
2, at 1054 n.3.
173 CG (39:1) 2765 (May 23, 1866).
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cite Barron or any specific case, this obviously referred to the Barron
doctrine.
Howard's presentation goes far to refute George Thomas's suggestion
that "privileges" and "immunities," in the prevailing nineteenth-century
understanding, "had little to do with the first eight amendments."' 174 The idea
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not an apt vehicle for
nationalizing the Bill of Rights has been articulated in different forms by
various scholars. Berger embraced an especially extreme version, arguing
that the clause had a peculiarly cramped, narrow, legal term-of-art meaning,
largely restricted to common law property and contract rights. 175
But Curtis has shown that Howard's speech fits comfortably within a
long tradition of legal and political discourse in the decades leading up to
1866. The "privileges" and "immunities" of American citizens were widely
understood during this time to include many, perhaps all, of the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, the terms "rights," "liberties,"
"privileges," and "immunities" were often used synonymously and
interchangeably. As Curtis suggested, more rigid and narrow modem
conceptions of such terms may, anachronistically, reflect twentieth-century
legal theories purporting to assign highly technical, nonobvious definitions to
them.' 76
"The great object of the first section of this amendment," Howard
summed up, "is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel
them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees."' 177 His
references to habeas corpus (protected by Article I, Section 9) and most of
the Bill of Rights, as illustrative examples, strongly suggest that he regarded
174 See Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1635; see also id. at 1633 & n.24
(disagreeing with the contrary argument in Curtis, Historical Linguistics (2000), supra
note 10).
175 See, e.g., BERGER, GOvERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 44-45; see generally
id. at 30-69.
176 See, e.g., Curtis, Historical Linguistics (2000), supra note 10, at 1093 (citing
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-44 (1913), which assigned certain technical definitions,
for Hohfeld's own analytical purposes, to terms such as "right" and "privilege"); see
generally id at 1089-1136, 1145-51 (discussing the widely understood meaning of
"rights," "liberties," "privileges," and "immunities"); see also Aynes, Continuing (2003),
supra note 78, at 601-02 (making a similar argument). For a remarkably unconvincing
and anachronistic application of Hohfeldian hairsplitting, in an attempt to question the
eligibility of First Amendment rights for incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Bybee (1995), supra note 14, at 1547-48 & nn.26-30, 1552 & n.56 (citing Hohfeld
(1913), supra). Curtis did not note Bybee's analysis, but it illustrates his point perfectly.
See also infr'a note 293 (discussing Bybee's analysis of First Amendment rights).
177 CG (39:1) 2766 (May 23, 1866).
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all rights guaranteed anywhere in the original Constitution or Bill of Rights
as, by definition, "great" and "fundamental" in nature.
The foregoing dealt only with the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Howard went on to discuss "[t]he last two clauses of the first section," which
would "disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United
States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or from denying him the equal protection of the
laws." It is not certain that Howard shared Bingham's Barron-contrarian
view. But that is strongly suggested by Howard's comment, echoing
Bingham's theory, that without the proposed Amendment the guarantees he
mentioned "stand simply as a bill of rights in the Constitution, without power
on the part of Congress to give them full effect."' 178 While Howard, like
Bingham, acknowledged the Barron doctrine, he expressed no more
agreement with it than Bingham had. Quite obviously, he shared Bingham's
desire to overturn it.
As Howard noted, the prior lack of express congressional power to
enforce constitutional rights required "that additional power should be given
to Congress to that end. This is done by the fifth section.... " 179 Fairman
and Berger wildly misconstrued Howard as suggesting that Section 5 was to
be the only means of enforcing the Amendment, omitting any direct judicial
enforcement of Section 1.180 But Howard never hinted at any such rejection
of the long-established doctrine of judicial review. On the contrary, he made
perfectly clear that Section 5 would complement a fully self-executing
Section 1. He noted that Section 1 included "a general prohibition upon all
the States, as such, from abridging the privileges and immunities of the
178 Id.
179 Id.; see also id at 2768 (further discussing the importance of Section 5).
180 See FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 1294-95; BERGER,
FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 89-90 & nn.103-04; id. at 136; BERGER,
GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 245-52. But see CuRTIs, No STATE (1986), supra
note 10, at 128-29 (noting the bizarre, topsy-turvy misconstrual in this regard of the
speech by Rep. Giles W. Hotchkiss, R-N.Y., in Berger's 1977 book-as somehow
suggesting the exact opposite of what it obviously indicated-an error Berger republished
verbatim without any correction or response in 1997, even while providing extensive
supplemental comments on many other points). For Berger's sublimely uncomprehending
1981 response on this point (first raised in Curtis's 1980 article), see Berger, Nine-Lived
Cat (1981), supra note 7, at 459-60. See also CG (42:1) app. 83-84 (Mar. 31, 1871)
(Bingham explaining his revision of the Amendment to include the directly prohibitory
Section 1 and the grant of congressional power in Section 5); supra Part II (pp. 1539-40
& n. 100) (discussing Bingham's revision, partly prompted by Hotchkiss); supra note 113
(providing another example of Berger's obtuseness).
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citizens of the United States. That is its first clause, and I regard it as very
important."' 81 He continued a bit later (my emphases):
[S]ection one is a restriction upon the States, and does not, of itself, confer
any power upon Congress. The power which Congress has.., is derived,
not from that section, but from the fifth section, which gives it authority to
pass laws. .. appropriate to the attainment of the great object of the
amendment. I look upon the first section, taken in connection with the fifth,
as very important. It will, if adopted by the States,forever disable every one
of them from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and
privileges which pertain to citizens of the United States .... 182
Howard confirmed beyond any doubt, just a week later, that he and his
Republican colleagues understood the Amendment to authorize-indeed, to
require-direct judicial enforcement of its guarantees. They certainly did not
want to rely solely on enforcement by a Congress they feared might fall out
of Republican control. A key purpose of the Amendment, Howard noted (my
emphasis), was "to put ... the rights of citizens and freedmen under the civil
rights bill beyond the legislative power."'183
VI. HOWARD, THE PRESS, AND THE SCHOLARS
Much of Howard's speech, including all the key language on
nationalizing the Bill of Rights, was reprinted as front-page news the next
day in the New York Times, which quoted verbatim Howard's non-exhaustive
list of rights "guaranteed by the first eight amendments" and his ringing
statement about the "great object" of Section 1.184 At least four other major
papers apparently covered the relevant parts of Howard's speech: the
Philadelphia Inquirer, the Washington, D.C. National Intelligencer, the front
page of the New York Herald, and, with only slight ambiguity, the front page
of the Boston Daily Advertiser. 185 The close attention being paid is suggested
181 He continued: "It also prohibits each one of the States from depriving any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denying to any person ... the
equal protection of its laws." CG (39:1) 2765 (May 23, 1866); see also id. at 2766
(Howard's comment, quoted in the text above, about the direct prohibitory force of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
182 Id. at 2766 (emphases added).
183 Id. at 2896 (May 30, 1866) (emphasis added).
184 See Washington News, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1866, at 1 (subheadline noting
Howard's speech, but not providing any relevant details in the article); Thirty-Ninth
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1866, at 1 (providing a detailed transcript).
185 The speech also seems to have been mentioned, at least generally, in other
papers. See HALBROOK, ARMED (1984), supra note 10, at 117-18 (citing, inter alia, the
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by a New York Times editorial published two days earlier, which alerted
readers that the Senate debate on the Amendment was about to begin and
would, the Times predicted, be of higher quality than the House debate. 186
Anti-incorporationists have tried to dilute the impact of Howard's speech
in various ways. Like Bingham, he has been subjected by some to
tendentious, ad hominem denigration. Anti-incorporationists have also tended
not to mention the fact that Bingham himself was acknowledged during the
Senate debates as the primary House sponsor of the Amendment. While not
specifically mentioning Bingham's discussion of incorporation, senators
treated his views as important and worthy of attention and respect-in
marked contrast with how some anti-incorporationist scholars have treated
him. One senator referred generally to Bingham's "very able" March 9
speech on the Civil Rights Act, in which Bingham referred repeatedly to the
Bill of Rights and the need for the Amendment. 187
New York, Washington, and Philadelphia papers); HALBROOK, FREEDMEN (1998), supra
note 10, at 36 (same); see also AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 187
(noting the New York papers' coverage and that the Herald was the bestselling paper in
the nation); supra note 168 (discussing the newspapers of this era). Fairman himself
helpfully quoted the Boston paper's coverage, which did not quote verbatim Howard's
discussion of the Bill of Rights, but did paraphrase Howard as follows:
[T]he first section was intended to secure.., the privileges which are in their nature
fundamental, and which belong of right to all persons in a free government. There
was now no power in the Constitution to enforce its guarantees of those rights. They
stood simply as declarations, and the States were not restricted from violating them
.... The great object of the first section, fortified by the fifth, was to compel the
States to observe these guarantees ....
BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, May 24, 1866, at 1, quoted in Fairman, Original (1949),
supra note 7, at 69. About these obvious references to the Constitution's "guarantees" or
"declarations" of "rights," the Barron doctrine, and the need to overcome that doctrine,
Fairman opined that "it could not be said that [this] ... gave the public any understanding
that Senator Howard said that the [Fourteenth] Amendment included Amendments I to
VIII." Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 69.
186 Editorial, The Debate on Reconstruction, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1866, at 4
(focusing mainly on political issues).
187 See CG (39:1) 2896 (May 30, 1866) (comments by Sen. James R. Doolittle, R-
Wis. ("very able"), and Joint Committee chairman Sen. William P. Fessenden, R-Maine),
cited in, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 108 (1947) (appendix to opinion of
Black, J., dissenting); AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 369 n.22; see also
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1988), supra note 80, at 239 (Fessenden chairing the Joint
Committee). As Aynes has suggested, it thus seems likely that many (perhaps most or all)
senators were well aware of Bingham's (and thus the Amendment's) incorporationist
design, "even before... Howard's May 23 ... speech." Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra
note 10, at 73 n.88. After all, Fessenden, Howard, and other senators had, by that time,
served for months with Bingham on the Joint Committee. Neither Fairman nor Berger, to
2007) 1565
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Fairman took a subtle approach, depicting Howard as a sort of hearty but
fuzzy-minded politician from the Michigan backwoods, to be admired for his
progressivism on racial issues but probably not taken that seriously by his
colleagues. He suggested Howard "spoke inaccurately" and found legal
concepts "puzzling." Fairman puffed up with praise senators whose views he
thought were in tension with Howard's, while ignoring Howard's impressive
background. 188 He even suggested that "a key to understanding Howard's
speech" could be found in a mildly deprecatory remark at an 1871 memorial
service, a remark with no bearing whatsoever on his speech or the
incorporation issue. 189 Berger, again, was harsher, labeling Howard
"reckless," an "arch-radical," "purely partisan," and a man of "loose
utterances" whose views were "patently fallacious" and must be taken "with
a bushel of salts."'190
my knowledge, ever acknowledged this obvious likelihood, or mentioned any reference
to Bingham in the Senate debates.
188See FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 1294 ("spoke
inaccurately"); id at 1295 (asserting that Howard "found the content of 'privileges and
immunities' rather puzzling"); see generally id. at 1294-96. For example, Fairman
praised Sen. Luke P. Poland (R-Vt.) as a former state judge with good lawyering skills,
without noting Howard's comparable record. See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7,
at 60-62; FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 1296. As discussed below
in the text, contrary to Fairman's argument, Poland's views were probably not in any
tension with Howard's.
189 Chief Justice James V. Campbell of the Michigan Supreme Court, at a service
held at the court, suggested that, "[i]f [Howard] did not, as has been suggested,
possess.., an intellect.., to sever the gauzy veil that was not worth severing, he was
able to wield the ponderous battle ax of the Lion-Hearted, before which iron and steel
went down like wood." Death of Hon. Jacob M Howard, 20 Mich. 525, 530 (Apr. 7,
1871) [hereinafter Death of Howard (1871)], quoted in Fairman, Original (1949), supra
note 7, at 134 n.381. Campbell's eulogy, apparently referring to remarks by others not
published, also referred to "those apparent defects in [Howard's] intellectual character,
that have been spoken of." But Campbell's point was precisely to deny that any such
defects affected Howard's handling of legal matters. Indeed, Campbell said that
Howard's work "showed him to be a master in the law." Id, at 531. Campbell's comment
that "[s]uch faults as Mr. Howard had were the faults which belong very naturally to a
man of strong character," id. at 530, suggests he was perhaps referring to Howard's
ardent passion for justice. State Attorney General May's opening remarks noted that
Howard "loved his country ... with a zeal that amounted to a passion," id. at 526, and
Campbell commented that "[h]e was conscientiously determined in all things, to do that
which he believed to be right," id. at 535-36. If Campbell's comments are taken as
discrediting Howard's legal abilities, they seem in conflict with the weight of other
evidence (discussed in the text) depicting a gifted lawyer and politician who translated
French literature in his spare time-a hobby which, if not necessarily "gauzy,"
presumably required more intellectual finesse than a "battle ax."
190 BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 135 ("reckless"); id. at 136
("purely partisan," "loose utterances"); id. at 137 ("patently fallacious"); id. at 138
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The truth? Standard histories describe Howard as a former Attorney
General of Michigan who was viewed as one of the Senate's "better
constitutional lawyers."191 Fairman, while conceding the general
"admiration" of Howard expressed at the 1871 memorial, did not quote
comments remembering Howard "as a profound lawyer, erudite scholar and
accomplished statesman," "without a superior and with few peers in the
Senate," and as "a master in the law."' 192
Howard wrote the 1854 convention platform in Jackson, Michigan, that
some view as the founding of the Republican Party. 193 According to
Benedict, Howard was among the "more influential" radical Republicans:
"More moderate in temperament if not in principle, they had the confidence
of more conservative Republican Senators and thus had larger impact on
Reconstruction legislation than their more belligerent allies." 194 Howard was
"eloquent" though "ponderous," and "appealed to reason rather than . . .
emotions." He was erudite not only in law but in history, classics, and
English and French literature. He even published a two-volume translation of
("arch-radical"); BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 166 ("bushel of salts")
(duplicate quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 184. But see CURTIS, No STATE
(1986), supra note 10, at 87, 126-28 (disputing such views). Joseph James agreed with
Berger to the extent of calling Howard "more radical and purely partisan than... [Sen.
William P.] Fessenden [R-Maine]." JAMES, FRAMING (1956), supra note 78, at 135. But
see EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006), supra note 94, at 94 (describing Fessenden
himself as "a strong party man" who once said he would "vote for a dog if he were the
candidate of my party"). In any event, the fact that Howard was a partisan radical has
little if any bearing on the incorporation issue. See infra pp. 1573-78.
191 Silvana Siddali, Jacob Merritt Howard, I I ANB, supra note 1, at 304
[hereinafter Siddali, Howard (ANB)]; see also 5 DAB, supra note 1, at pt. 1, 278; ALLAN
G. BOGUE, THE EARNEST MEN: REPUBLICANS OF THE CIVIL WAR SENATE 39 (Comell
Univ. Press 1981); EARL M. MALTZ, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF
THE CONSTITUTION 70 (Carolina Academic Press 2003) [hereinafter MALTZ, FOURTEENTH
(2003)].
192 Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 134 n.381 ("admiration"); Death of
Howard (1871), supra note 189, at 525 (Attorney General May: "profound"); id. at 528
(Michigan State Bar resolution: "without"); id. at 531 (Campbell, the same speaker
selectively quoted by Fairman as deprecating Howard: "master").
193 BOGUE (1981), supra note 191, at 39; see also GOULD (2003), supra note 80, at
14 (noting the earlier claim of Ripon, Wisconsin, to the founding); HANS L. TREFOUSSE,
THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS: LINCOLN'S VANGUARD FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 77-78 (Knopf
1969).
194 BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974), supra note 72, at 38; see also CURTIS, No
STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 87.
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a French historical work, apparently in his spare time. 195 All in all, he was
not quite the rustic, marginalized buffoon some would have led us to think.
During the Senate debate on the Amendment, not a single senator
disputed Howard's incorporationist reading-just as not a single
representative disputed Bingham's incorporationist reading during the House
debates. 196 That has not deterred some scholars from straining to identify
some implicit contradiction or tension in this or that remark. The most
persistent such argument has focused on a speech by Senator Luke P. Poland,
Republican of Vermont, two weeks after Howard introduced the
Amendment. Poland commented during this speech that the Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause would only enforce the old Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV.197 Several scholars, taking for granted the
narrow, orthodox reading of the latter Clause as dealing only with interstate
comity, have argued that Poland may have disagreed with the portion of
Howard's May 23 speech that went beyond Article IV and Corfield and
expressly embraced the Bill of Rights. 198
195 5 DAB, supra note 1, at pt. 1, 278 (quotations); see also Siddali, Howard (ANB),
supra note 191; Death of Howard (1871), supra note 189, at 529 (Michigan State Bar
resolution noting that Howard's "intellectual tastes were refined and cultivated," and that
"[h]e was an excellent classical scholar," "conversant with the language and literature of
France," and "familiar with the best English writers,... poetry and history"); id. at 533-
34 (Campbell, whose deprecations Fairman selectively quoted, lavishly praising
Howard's scholarly abilities).
196 As discussed infra Part VII (p. 1583-84 & n.248), it appears that no one during
1866-68, in or out of Congress-with perhaps a handful of implicit and debatable
exceptions--ever contradicted or even directly questioned the Bingham-Howard reading.
197 See CG (39:1) 2961 (June 5, 1866); see generally id. at 2961-64 (Poland's entire
speech).
198 On the orthodox reading of the Article IV Clause, see, for example, Wildenthal,
Lost Compromise (2000), supra note 2, at 1086-89, and, generally, Bryan H. Wildenthal,
Note, State Parochialism, the Right to Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1557 (1989). Fairman premiered the Poland argument in
1949 and revived it in 1971. See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 60-62;
FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note 7, at 1296. My discussion in the text is
largely based on the refutations of the Poland argument in Crosskey, Fairman (1954),
supra note 9, at 81-83, CURTIs, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 127, Aynes, Bingham
(1993), supra note 10, at 81-82, and HALBROOK, FREEDMEN (1998), supra note 10, at
37-38. I have found revivals of Fairman's Poland argument by four different scholars-
by Berger in 1977, 1989, and 1997, by Lambert Gingras in 1996, by Bret Boyce in 1998,
and by Saul Cornell in 2006. All, like Fairman, assumed without explanation that Poland
embraced the orthodox reading of Article IV. Berger in 1989, and Cornell, at least
acknowledged the existence of contrary analyses. See BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989),
supra note 7, at 137-38 & nn.51-52 (briefly quoting and dismissing Curtis's analysis);
CORNELL (2006), supra note 52, at 172-73, 252 nn.9-10 (discussing Aynes's analysis);
id. at 252 n. 10 (stating without explanation, however, that Poland's reliance on Article IV
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The main problem with this argument is that Poland never explained how
he read Article IV. As alluded to several times in this Article, many
Republicans of this era embraced the unorthodox, Barron-contrarian view
that the Bill of Rights was properly understood to apply to the states even
before the Civil War-a view based largely on their unorthodox reading of
the Article IV Clause. These Republicans included Bingham, Hale, and
probably Howard, among others. 199 If they included Poland, which seems
more than likely, then his remark not only does not conflict with Howard's
view, it corroborates it.
It seems highly unlikely that Poland meant to dispute Howard's view for
several reasons. First of all, Poland denied at the outset of his speech that he
was going to say "anything new" about the Amendment, which he said had
been "so elaborately and ably discussed on former occasions ... that I do not
feel at liberty to attempt to argue [it] at length and in detail. '200 That
certainly sounds like a deferential nod to Howard's elaborate and able
presentation on May 23.
Poland also indicated he shared Howard's radical views favoring Black
voting rights.20 1 That was an issue quite separate from incorporation of the
Bill of Rights. Barron-contrarian views on Article IV and the Bill of Rights
were certainly not limited to radical Republicans. They were embraced, as
we have seen, by the moderately conservative Bingham and the very
conservative Hale. But it seems especially unlikely that a radical like Poland
dissented from such widely held Republican views. If he meant to dispute
Howard's explicit, emphatic view on nationalizing the Bill of Rights, he was
certainly cloaking it well.
Finally, Poland declared-in this very same speech, on the very same
page as his Article IV comment-that the Amendment would protect rights
guaranteed "in all the provisions of the Constitution" and would overcome
indicated he embraced a "more narrow interpretation of the ... Amendment"). Berger's
1977 book (republished in 1997), and Boyce, simply ignored the available contrary
analyses of Crosskey, Curtis, and Aynes. See BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note
7, at 58, 184; Boyce (1998), supra note 60, at 986-87. Gingras also ignored Crosskey,
Curtis, and Aynes, and flatly asserted, without any cited basis-Poland never said so-
that Poland's view of Article IV "correspond[ed] to [the orthodox] definition." Lambert
Gingras, Congressional Misunderstandings and the Ratifiers' Understanding: The Case
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 41, 53 (1996); see also id. at 52-
53.
199 See supra Part I (p. 1532); Part II (p. 1539 & n.99); Part III (pp. 1540-43 &
n.1 11; pp. 1552-56 & n.147); Part V (p. 1563); infra Part VII.B (pp. 1599-1600).
200 CG (39:1)2961 (June 5, 1866).
201 See id. at 2963-64. See also my discussion in the text below, infra pp. 1573-78,
on the (lack of) significance of Howard's radical views.
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"State laws... in direct violation of these principles." 20 2 These statements
did not explicitly embrace the Bill of Rights, and it was unclear to which
clause or clauses Poland referred. He seemed to be summing up his view of
Section 1 as a whole. But these comments would seem to weigh on the
incorporationist side of the balance. It is telling that the Poland argument-
the most perennial and popular among scholars seeking to show that the
Bingham-Howard view was not shared by their colleagues-falls apart so
decisively under scrutiny.
Fairman and Berger tried to minimize Howard's speech by stressing that
he was filling in for the ill chairman of the Joint Committee, Senator William
P. Fessenden, Republican of Maine. 20 3 But Howard was a member of that
committee, privy to its discussions, and his colleagues obviously entrusted
him with the task of speaking on their behalf. Fessenden was apparently
present throughout Howard's speech, made floor comments before and
afterward, and neither he nor any other senator ever expressed any
disagreement or concern on the issue of incorporation. 20 4
Howard's lengthy address showed thorough preparation and command of
the issues. His discussion of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the
Bill of Rights took up more than two full columns of fine-print text in the
Congressional Globe. Yet Berger dismissed it as a "remark, casually tucked
away in a long speech. '20 5
202 CG (39:1) 2961 (June 5, 1866) (quoted and discussed in HALBROOK, FREEDMEN
(1998), supra note 10, at 37-38). Both Fairman (who first made the Poland argument)
and Crosskey (who first refuted it) included these statements in quoting Poland's speech,
without devoting any attention to them-a case of hiding in plain sight? See Fairman,
Original (1949), supra note 7, at 61; Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 82.
Halbrook's discussion was selective. He did not mention Poland's Article IV comment or
any other scholar's analysis of the speech. But Berger, Gingras, Boyce, and Cornell
likewise never mentioned these Poland statements.
203 See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 54; FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION
(1971), supra note 7, at 1290-91; BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 135-36;
BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 166-67, 184. See also supra note 187
(Fessenden chairing the Joint Committee). For two echoes of this argument, see Boyce
(1998), supra note 60, at 984-85; Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 200. Howard's
own membership on the committee, which Thomas noted-and the fact that Fessenden
chose Howard as the spokesman, presumably with the support of other Republicans-are
surely more worthy of emphasis.
204 See CG (39:1) 2763 (May 23, 1866) (lengthy comments by Fessenden, before
Howard's speech, in favor of debating the Amendment that day); id. at 2769 (Fessenden
posing a brief question after Howard's speech); id. at 2770 (three more Fessenden
comments).
205 BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 167; see also CURTIS, No STATE
(1986), supra note 10, at 126-27 (pointing out the misleading nature of this same
statement in the 1977 edition of Berger's book).
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Fairman and Berger, quite ludicrously, even tried to exploit the pro
forma courtesy of Howard's modest self-introduction to cast doubt on
whether he could be trusted to speak for others.20 6 One dares to think his
colleagues were better judges of that. Fessenden's illness, by the way, was
not unusual and would not have caused any surprise or disruption. He
"complain[ed] continually of his physical infirmities. ' 20 7 A front-page New
York Times subheadline on May 24 put it all quite plainly: "Mr. Howard
Speaks on Behalf of the Committee. 20 8
Berger, nonetheless, stubbornly insisted that Howard "did not have
'charge of the amendment in the Senate.' Up to this point his participation
... had been negligible. '209 But even Fairman conceded that Howard's
speech "must be given very serious consideration, coming from the Senator
who had the measure in charge. '210 Benedict confirmed that "Howard, the
respected, radical member of the Reconstruction committee... managed the
amendment through the Senate when Fessenden pleaded illness."211 And
how could Berger or any modern scholar possibly know that Howard's prior
involvement was "negligible"? For the most part, as Berger himself noted
(quoting Joseph James), "Republican members of the Senate refrained from
defining their positions on the floor."212 As James explained, "[t]heir
206 See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 54; FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION
(1971), supra note 7, at 1291; BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 135; BERGER,
GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 167. Howard began by noting Fessenden's illness and
expressing hope that the Senate would eventually "have the benefit of a full and ample
statement of [Fessenden's] views. For myself, I can only promise to present to the Senate, in a
very succinct way, the views and the motives which influenced th[e] committee, so far as I
understand those views and motives .... CG (39:1) 2765 (May 23, 1866).
207 BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974), supra note 72, at 38.
208 Washington News, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1866, at 1.
209 BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 72, at 135 (emphasis in original)
(quoting CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 115); see also BERGER,
GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 166.
210 Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 58.
211 BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974), supra note 72, at 184; see also MALTZ,
FOURTEENTH (2003), supra note 191, at 70; G. Smith, Republican (1970), supra note 75,
at 850. Howard's leadership role was clearly recognized, for example, by Sen. Thomas A.
Hendricks (D-Ind.) who, in a colloquy with Howard about the Amendment (which
Hendricks opposed), referred to Howard first as "the chairman-I was going to say the
chairman of the caucus, but I will not say that," and then as "the distinguished Senator
who has this measure now in charge." CG (39:1) 3039 (June 8, 1866); see also infra note
256 (discussing Thomas's treatment of Hendricks and another opponent).
212 BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 137 (quoting JAMES, FRAMING
(1956), supra note 78, at 146).
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opinions and arguments found expression only in the party caucus. Their
actions in the Senate were mostly confined to voting." 213
We will never know what Howard and his colleagues said in private
party caucuses and crucial committee meetings.2 14 But the facts we do know,
2 13
.JAMES, FRAMING (1956), supra note 78, at 146; see also AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS
(1998), supra note 10, at 204, 372 n.78 (quoting JAMES, FRAMING (1956), supra note 78,
at 150); supra Part II (p. 1533) (discussing "speechmaking procedures in the Congress").
Thomas, in 2001, asserted that "Howard had not been a major figure in the drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 200 & n.230 (citing
JAMES, FRAMING (1956), supra note 78, at 135). The cited page in James's book, it
should be noted, described Fessenden, not Howard, as lacking extensive prior
involvement. James said it therefore "constitutes no real obstacle to a present-day
understanding of fundamental purposes that [Fessenden] entrusted his duties to Howard."
JAMES, FRAMING (1956), supra note 78, at 135. Thomas's point about "drafting" was fair
enough. It may well be accurate, though I do not think we can ever know for sure, given
the fragmentary surviving records. Thomas cited evidence that Howard-in private
committee proceedings not publicly revealed until years later-voted against some of
Bingham's draft language and supported some language that was stronger on racial
equality. See Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 200-01 & nn.232-35 (citing
KENDRICK (1914), supra note 72, at 90-91, 98, 106). Thomas generally concedes the
importance of Howard's role. See Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1642, 1646.
Yet he also suggests that Howard and Bingham may have been unrepresentative of other
Republicans on the incorporation issue. See id. at 1642-47; see also Wildenthal, Reply
(2007), supra note 5, at 1661-64 (responding to Thomas on this point).
Be all that as it may, I would contend this is all perfectly consistent with the
profound importance of Howard's public support for incorporation. As I will argue
elsewhere, there is no conflict between supporting equality as a primary goal and
favoring substantive nationalization of the Bill of Rights. They are mutually reinforcing.
See infra note 223; Part VII.A (p. 1588 & n.260). Howard loyally and actively supported,
in public, all the relevant language the committee ended up publicly proposing, while
noting his personal disagreement on certain issues not related to incorporation, as
discussed below in the text. It is pointless, and impossible in any event, to try to sort out
at this late date the full range of private motivations-and "off-stage politicking,"
Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 201-that doubtless lay behind the private
wrangling on the committee.
As stated in the Introduction, supra pp. 1527-29, I believe-and Thomas authorizes
me to state that he agrees on this point-that any proper analysis of the original
understanding must be based on contemporaneous public statements and actions. Thus,
for example, while I admire Maltz's exhaustive exploration of the background of the
Amendment in the Joint Committee (so typical of his rigorous and impartial scholarship),
see Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933 (1984), I question the value
and weight of such evidence to the extent that it remained contemporaneously secret and
not publicly aired-notwithstanding Maltz's conclusion that such evidence suggests the
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause "encompasses not only the entire Bill of
Rights, but other rights as well." Id. at 970.
214 The Joint Committee journal, published years after the fact, reveals the bare
outline of committee votes and proceedings, and other intriguing facts, but obviously falls
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plus common sense, suggest that Howard played an extensive and influential
role in the Amendment's passage. That is certainly suggested by his
proposal, a week after he introduced it, to add the sentence defining
citizenship.215 It is also suggested by the Michigan State Bar's memorial
resolution, upon Howard's death in 1871, declaring that his "name is
inseparably connected with the momentous legislation and constitutional
changes of the last ten years." 216
Berger argued that Howard's colleagues would have disregarded his
views on incorporation because he was a radical and an early supporter of
Black voting rights. Howard was indeed out in front on racial issues in
1866.217 But as Curtis has noted, "[t]he argument is a non sequitur." 218 The
two issues are quite separate, though it may be argued that incorporation was
one means-less controversial than most-to achieve a minimum degree of
equal rights. Berger should have understood this, since he himself
emphasized (correctly) that Bingham was notably less supportive of Black
suffrage. There is simply no evidence that anyone at the time, certainly not
any Republican, viewed incorporation-the brainchild of the moderately
conservative Bingham-as a radical idea.219
far short of revealing the full story. See generally KENDRICK (1914), supra note 72, at
37-129; see also supra note 213. Oh, to have been a fly on the wall in some of those
smoke-filled rooms in 1866!
215 See CG (39:1) 2890 (May 30, 1866).
216 Death of Howard (1871), supra note 189, at 528. This, too, Fairman omitted
from his selective use of this memorial service. The first two scholars to publish
significant studies of the Amendment's congressional history certainly appreciated
Howard's importance-and they wrote far more closely in time to the underlying events
than have the modem scholars who have denigrated Howard's role. See Royall (1878),
supra note 78, at 569-72 (discussing Bingham and Howard); WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE,
LECTURES ON THE FOURTEENTH ARTICLE OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 22-24, 60-61 (Little, Brown & Co. 1898) (facsimile reprint, Da Capo
1970) (discussing Howard without mentioning Bingham).
217 See BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 135-36; BERGER,
GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 166, 169, 184; Siddali, Howard (ANB), supra note
191; see also BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 55-66 (fallaciously arguing
that persistent Northern racism refuted the relevance of abolitionist ideology to
understanding the Fourteenth Amendment).
218 CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 126; see also MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS
(1990), supra note 10, at 114-15; Zuckert, Review (1991), supra note 97, at 160. Boyce
in 1998, and Thomas in 2001, offered arguments somewhat reminiscent of Berger's here.
See Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 200 (noting Howard's "radicalism"); see
also id. at 200-01; Boyce (1998), supra note 60, at 984-85.
219 See BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 131-35 (discussing
Bingham's views on Black suffrage); BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 77,
81, 85 n.2, 99, 101-02, 112-13, 255-57, 259 (same). In a forthcoming article, I will
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Berger's insistence on confusing such issues, and how far astray it led
him, is shown by his incessant touting of Senator Sherman as a conservative
whose views supposedly militated against any broad understanding of the
Amendment. 220 Sherman, actually more of a moderate overall, certainly was
more conservative than Howard on some issues. But as revealed in an 1872
Senate speech, Sherman was an equally expansive incorporationist, taking an
even broader view of the Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause
than Bingham. 22 1
During twenty years of writing on the incorporation issue, Berger never
mentioned Sherman's 1872 speech, even though Avins reprinted and
discussed it in a 1967 book, and quoted and discussed it prominently in a
1968 article. Berger relied heavily on the Avins book in two books and at
least five articles of his own. The Avins article was cited by Curtis on the
first page of his 1982 article responding to Berger. Curtis himself discussed
the Sherman speech in that 1982 article, which prompted Berger to write an
article in response-but not to address the Sherman speech. Curtis again
discussed it in his 1986 book, to which Berger responded in a 1989 book-
but again, without finding time to discuss or even mention the Sherman
speech. 222
discuss how incorporation may have been viewed as one means, notably less "radical"
than others, to promote a certain limited degree of equal rights. See infra note 223; Part
VII.A (p. 1588 & n.260); see also supra Part II (pp. 1533-35) (discussing Bingham's
moderately conservative overall views). The harshest contemporary comment on
incorporation of which I am aware-from a rabidly reactionary Democrat-was the
complaint of Samuel S. Nicholas. While he made it clear he disliked the idea, as he
disliked pretty much all Republican ideas, he never suggested he found it especially
"radical" or extreme in comparison to other Republican goals. He was much more
vituperative and longwinded about many others. See infra Part VII.B (pp. 1590-95).
220 See BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 40-41, 60, 65, 82, 86 n.88,
100, 108-09, 134, 144 n.4; BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 34, 256-57,
260.
221 Sherman asserted that the early "amendments to the Constitution do not defie
all the rights of American citizens [under the clause]. They define some of
them .... What are those rights? Sir, they are as innumerable as the sands of the sea."
CG (42:2) 843 (Feb. 6, 1872); see also id. at 843-44; CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra
note 10, at 164-65 (quoting and discussing this speech); BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974),
supra note 72, at 32 (identifying Sherman as a "centrist" Republican); Allan Burton
Spetter, John Sherman, 19 ANB, supra note 1, at 813 (generally describing him as a
moderate).
2 22 See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH
AMENDMENTS, at xxvii (Alfred Avins ed., Delaware Law School, 2d ed. 1974) (originally
published, Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government, 1967) [hereinafter
AviNs, DEBATES (1967)] (reader's guide discussing the 1872 Sherman speech); id. at 614
(reprinting the speech); Avins, Incorporation (1968), supra note 9, at 8, 15, 24 (quoting
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Fairman and Berger both cited an 1866 campaign speech by Sherman to
argue that he rejected incorporation.223 Berger certainly could not have
and discussing the speech); Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the
Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 311, 314 n.22 (1979) [hereinafter Berger, Light From the
Fifteenth (1979)] (there and throughout citing AVINS, DEBATES (1967), supra, which he
noted "is a compendious and convenient reprint of almost all of the relevant debates");
Curtis, Further Adventures (1982), supra note 10, at 89 & nn.1 & 3 (citing Avins,
Incorporation (1968), supra note 10, on the first page of an article responding to Berger,
Nine-Lived Cat (1981), supra note 7); Curtis, Further Adventures (1982), supra note 10,
at 116-17 (quoting and discussing the 1872 Sherman speech); Berger, Reply (1983),
supra note 141, at 1 & n.2 (responding to Curtis but ignoring the Sherman speech and the
1968 Avins article, while citing the 1967 Avins book and blaming it for one of Berger's
own miscitations of a congressional speech); CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at
164-65 (again quoting and discussing the 1872 Sherman speech); BERGER, FOURTEENTH
(1989), supra note 7, at 151 (there and throughout citing Avins's 1967 book but not his
1968 article, and again ignoring the Sherman speech, in a book devoted mostly to
responding to Curtis); Berger, Response to Zuckert (1991), supra note 44, at 5 n.24 (there
and throughout citing Avins's 1967 book but not his 1968 article, and omitting the
Sherman speech); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar's
Wishing Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 n.14 (1993) (same); Raoul Berger, The "Original
Intent"-as Perceived by Michael McConnell, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 242, 245 n.23 (1996)
(same); BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 493 (same).
223 Fairman, like Berger, never mentioned Sherman's 1872 speech, but Fairman was
consistent in that regard, since he felt that statements made after the adoption of the
Amendment have little relevance. See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 137.
That is a legitimate argument, though I tend to disagree. For my preliminary views on the
subject, see supra note 57.
Sherman's 1866 speech, made in Cincinnati at the height of the election campaign,
asserted that the Amendment
was an embodiment of the Civil Rights [Act], namely: that [all people] ... should
have equal rights before the law; that is all there is to it; that [all people] ... have
the right to go from county to county, and from State to State, to make contracts, to
sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with; that is the sum and substance of
the first clause.
CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, Sep. 29, 1866, at 1, quoted in Fairman, Original (1949), supra
note 7, at 77 & n.143; see also BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 41, 82;
BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 131, 170; FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION
(1971), supra note 7, at 1298. Even Curtis opined that this statement "seems inconsistent
with incorporation." CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 253 n.46.
But Sherman's 1866 speech, overall, is quite ambiguous on the incorporation issue.
First of all, Sherman never explicitly addressed that issue. Second, he could not seriously
have contended that the points he mentioned were truly "all there [was]" to Section 1,
which explicitly prohibits denying any person the protections of "due process of law,"
thus clearly going beyond (at least to that extent) a mere guarantee of equal rights,
freedom of movement, and to sue and make contracts. See infra Part VII.B (p. 1605 &
n.318) (noting that "due process of law" was widely understood during that era to
encompass most or all procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights). Third and most
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argued, with any consistency, that Sherman's 1872 speech came too late to
shed light on the original understanding. Berger relied on several 1876
congressional speeches in attempting to refute the incorporation theory. 224
Fairman and Berger, and other scholars, should have considered more
carefully a New York Times editorial published on May 25, 1866, two days
after Howard's speech. It carefully distinguished Howard's "clear and
cogent" exposition of the Privileges and Immunities Clause from his personal
views on Black suffrage and other issues. The Times made perfectly clear
that Howard "candidly" revealed issues on which his views departed from
those of the Joint Committee as a whole. No one at the time appears to have
even suggested that nationalizing the Bill of Rights was such an issue. The
Times indicated that Howard's presentation was generally understood to be
in scrupulous conformity with the views of Fessenden and the Joint
Committee. That suggests that Howard's views on incorporation faithfully
reflected those of the dominant Republican Party in Congress as a whole.
Indeed, the May 25 editorial, read together with Howard's speech, implies
that nationalizing the Bill of Rights-in contrast with issues like voting rights
for Blacks or former rebels-may have been viewed as uncontroversial, as
simply a "needful constitutional change." The Times said it "regretted," "[o]n
many grounds," that Fessenden's illness precluded his full participation, but
importantly, as Fairman himself proceeded to quote, Sherman wound up by declaring-
albeit only in regard to "the black race"-that "we are bound to protect them in all their
natural rights." Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 77 (my emphasis). That seems
like it might encompass and go well beyond the Bill of Rights, much in the spirit of
Sherman's 1872 speech. This was, after all, a political stump speech, not a careful legal
analysis. Concededly, Sherman framed the Amendment's primary goal as protecting
equal rights. But there is no conflict whatsoever between that goal and the incorporation
theory. On the contrary, as I will discuss in a forthcoming article dealing with the "equal
rights only" reading of the Amendment that some have advocated, the two are perfectly
consistent and mutually reinforcing. See infra Part VII.A (p. 1588 & n.260). There is a
surprisingly strong argument that the Civil Rights Act itself was widely understood to
substantively protect Bill of Rights guarantees. See, e.g., infra Part VII.B (pp. 1593-94 &
n.272) (discussing the Nicholas essay); CuRTIs, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 71-
83. Protecting a substantive set of rights for everyone is a simple, direct, and obvious way
to achieve a certain limited degree of equal rights. See, e.g., MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS
(1990), supra note 10, at 4, 157-58; Curtis, Blueprint (1990), supra note 142, at 834-35;
Curtis, Resurrecting (1996), supra note 10, at 55.
224 See Berger, Nine-Lived Cat (1981), supra note 7, at 464 (discussing the Blaine
Amendment debate, though misdating it to 1875); Berger, Reply (1983), supra note 141,
at 16-18 (same, misdating it to 1875 in text); id. at 17-18 nn.140, 152, 154 & 157
(correctly dating it to 1876 in footnotes). I discussed in Wildenthal, Lost Compromise
(2000), supra note 2, at 1125-30, 1134-35, why that debate, while certainly cutting
against the incorporation theory, does not deserve much weight. See also supra
Introduction (p. 1523 & n.43).
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that apparently had nothing to do with Howard, Section 1, or the
incorporation issue.2 25
It is worth quoting much of this editorial, which seems never to have
been discussed in depth in prior scholarship:
With reference to the amendment, as it passed the House of
Representatives, the statement of Mr. Howard, upon whom the opening task
devolved, is frank and satisfactory. His exposition of the considerations
which led the Committee to seek the protection, by a Constitutional
declaration, of the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several
States of the Union,' [sic; no opening quotation mark in original] was clear
and cogent. To this, the first section of the amendment, the Union party
throughout the country will yield a ready acquiescence, and the South could
offer no justifiable resistance. The second section [which proposed to
reduce representation in Congress for any state denying the vote to any law-
abiding adult men, and remained in the Amendment as ratified] is equally
unobjectionable in its aim and form. Mr. Howard candidly admits that while
his personal preferences are in favor of a qualified negro suffrage, the
question of suffrage pertains to "positive local law," as distinguished from
national enactment; and the change in the basis of representation, adapting
the number of representatives to the number of voters, therefore becomes
the best possible means of meeting the political emergency resulting from
emancipation.
Mr. Howard puts the matter in the practical light when he suggests that
it should be dealt with, not alone in regard to the abstract principles or
partisan predilections of Northern Senators, but in regard, also, to the
probable course of the Southern Legislatures, to whom the amendment must
be submitted. "The question is," as he alleges, "what will the Legislatures of
the various States do in the premises? What is likely to meet the
approbation of the various State Legislatures?" Starting with this
impression, the inexpediency of the third (disfranchising) section is
manifest. [The Senate later removed this section.] And Mr. Howard, albeit
on this occasion the representative of the Committee, unhesitatingly admits
his opposition to the clause. He had resisted it in Committee, and he
opposes it still. The Southern Legislatures would unquestionably refuse to
ratify an amendment of which wholesale disfranchisement is the most
prominent feature; and its adoption by the Senate would destroy the utility,
by destroying the practicability of the whole. As the locum tenens226 of Mr.
Fessenden, Mr. Howard had no alternative but to submit the amendment as
it came from the Committee. But his emphatic repudiation of the clause
225 Editorial, The Reconstruction Committee's Amendment in the Senate, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 1866, at 4 [hereinafter Editorial (May 25, 1866)].
226 A Latin legal term meaning "deputy," "substitute," or "representative" (literally,
"holding the place"). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (Bryan A. Garner ed., Thomson-
West, 8th ed. 2004).
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which Mr. Thaddeus Stevens pronounced the chief glory of the amendment
is nevertheless significant. It shows that those who really desire the
adoption of an amendment providing for needful constitutional changes as a
preliminary to the reestablishment of national harmony, are alive to the
mischief which is being wrought by the extreme Radicals. 227
Fairman quoted only the first half of the first above-quoted paragraph,
describing that as "the full context" and crowing: "Not a word about the Bill
of Rights! 228 But as Fairman conceded, the Times on May 24 had fully
reported Howard's discussion of the Bill of Rights-an "exposition" the
Times described on May 25 as "clear and cogent. ' 229 The May 25 editorial
was not a news article but an opinion piece, obviously focusing on issues the
Times viewed as especially controversial. Nationalizing the Bill of Rights, an
issue governed by Section 1 of the Amendment, was evidently not one of
those. The Times, as quoted above, thought "the first section" would obtain
"ready acquiescence" from Unionists "throughout the country," and that "the
South could offer no justifiable resistance" to it. Why should the Times have
used this occasion to regurgitate uncontroversial news fully reported the day
before, as Fairman seemed to demand? Fairman's treatment most certainly
did not provide fair or adequate context, especially in light of his tendentious
attempts to marginalize Howard.
Berger just ignored the May 25 editorial altogether-perhaps again
relying on Fairman, as so many have. Indeed, Berger generally ignored the
press coverage of the Bingham and Howard speeches. This provides yet
another example--especially egregious and telling--of Berger's repeated
perpetuation of serious factual mistakes, even after they were called to his
attention. It requires a little more background. Horace Flack, in his 1908
book favoring the incorporation theory, mistakenly said there was no
explicit, contemporary newspaper coverage of the idea that the Fourteenth
Amendment would apply the Bill of Rights to the states. 230 This was an
understandable mistake, given the severe difficulties involved, especially at
that time, in researching old newspapers. Flack did describe numerous
newspaper articles by which, overall, he argued, "the people were kept
227 Editorial (May 25, 1866), supra note 225, at 4; see also FLACK (1908), supra
note 78, at 142 (briefly citing this editorial, slightly misquoting it as describing Howard's
speech as "cogent and clear"); Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 79 & n. 146
(noting Flack's citation, and quoting a small portion); HALBROOK, ARMED (1984), supra
note 10, at 117-18 (quoting a small portion); HALBROOK, FREEDMEN (1998), supra note
10, at 36 (quoting the "clear and cogent" comment).
228 Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 79 n.146. That was the extent of
Fairman's discussion.
229 Id. at 68.
230 FLACK (1908), supra note 78, at 153; see also id. at 140-60.
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informed as to the objects and purposes of the Amendment," and from which
incorporation of the Bill of Rights "may be inferred... [as] the logical
result. ' 231 Fairman, to his credit, caught Flack's mistake and provided a
correction in his 1949 article. 232
Justice Black himself acknowledged and quoted Flack's erroneous
statement in this regard in his 1947 Adamson dissent, thereby undercutting
his own argument. 233 Ironically, Fairman savaged Black for exaggerating the
newspaper coverage Flack did discuss so as to make it sound more
supportive of Black's thesis. Black was indeed guilty of applying too much
"spin" on this point, though Fairman overstated the matter.234 But if Black-
a very busy judge, as Morrison noted 235-had taken the time to retrace and
supplement Flack's newspaper research, he would have found he had no
need to hype what Flack said. Black could safely have gone much further
than either he or Flack actually did in asserting contemporary newspaper
recognition of the incorporation theory.236
Enter Berger. In his 1977 book, he twice repeated Flack's mistaken claim
of no newspaper coverage-which, conveniently, supported Berger's anti-
incorporation thesis. In support of his first statement to this effect, Berger
cited the very pages of Fairman's article in which Fairman corrected Flack
on this point. Berger made no mention of Fairman's correction of Flack's
mistake. Indeed, his footnote citing Fairman made no mention of Flack at all.
He simply misrepresented Flack's claim as Fairman's and linked it to a
separate anti-incorporation comment by Fairman.237 Curtis, in his 1980
article, called Berger on this double mistake, noting that "[o]n this point
Berger miscites Fairman. ' '238
231 Id. at 142 (first quotation); id. at 153-54 (second quotation).
232 See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 68.
233 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 110 (1947) (appendix to opinion of Black,
J., dissenting).
234 See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 80 (focusing on whether Black
could properly have relied on Flack to assert that incorporationist speeches were
"published widely," while downplaying the ultimate reality that they were published
widely); see also id at 78-81.
235 See supra Part III (p. 1546) (quoting Morrison (1949), supra note 7, at 162).
236 See supra Part IV (discussing news coverage of Bingham's speeches); see also
supra pp. 1564-65, 1571, 1576-78 (same as to Howard's speech).
237 BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1977), supra note 7, at 148 n.66 (citing and quoting
Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 68-69, 137); see also BERGER, GOVERNMENT
(1977), supra note 7, at 151-52 & n.77 (quoting FLACK (1908), supra note 78, at 153,
and noting that Black cited Flack in this regard).
238 Curtis, Bill of Rights (1980), supra note 10, at 96 n.383.
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Berger's 1981 article, replying to Curtis, very grudgingly admitted only
the underlying mistake as to newspaper coverage. He first offered several
excuses, then a pompous disclaimer: "But no; scholarly integrity demands
exactitude in every detail, and I therefore freely confess error, for no scholar
worthy of the name would delude his fellows by mistaken testimony." He
rather spoiled the effect of that by then lobbing yet another of his many ad
hominem attacks on Curtis: "Would that activists would as freely confess
their errors." 239 But backing up to Berger's proffered then hastily disclaimed
excuse, it appears he did not "freely confess" all his errors. His primary
excuse was that he relied on Flack and Black.240 That would certainly sound
plausible to Berger's readers, at first blush. Flack and Black both supported
the incorporation theory, so why not trust what amounted to their "statements
against interest"? But only one of Berger's statements cited Flack and Black.
The first statement, as Curtis noted, miscited Fairman and no one else.
Berger had before him the very pages by Fairman correcting Flack's mistake.
Instead of following that correction, he compounded the mistake. He never
admitted that. And, of course, both mistakes went in favor of his overall
argument.
Taking the most charitable view, Berger in 1977 may indeed have relied
on Flack and Black. Perhaps he was simply inattentive and careless in his
citations and somehow forgot that Fairman did not support-indeed, had
refuted-this point. But if that can excuse Berger's original mistake, one
would expect him to fully own up to it when challenged. One would think
Berger, at the very least, would stand by his limited, disingenuous, and
extremely ungracious acknowledgment of Curtis's correction. Think again.
The Liberty Fund published the second edition of Berger's book in 1997,
reproducing the original text apparently unchanged, though newly typeset.
Berger added extensive new supplemental notes after most chapters,
providing whatever updates and additional commentary he chose to offer.
One would think a clear and important factual error would be corrected in the
original text, perhaps in brackets or a footnote, to avoid misleading readers
who might easily overlook a correction some pages later in a supplemental
note. At the very least, such an error should have been mentioned and
corrected somewhere in the fifteen-page supplement Berger provided after
that chapter. That supplement repeatedly referenced Curtis's responses to his
work, always to disparage or dismiss them-including two quotations of the
239 Berger, Nine-Lived Cat (1981), supra note 7, at 459. He never identified any
comparable error by Curtis, whom he disparaged as "[l]ike a hen which scratches and
scratches and at length finds a grain of corn." Id.; see also infra pp. 1582-83 & n.245.
240 See Berger, Nine-Lived Cat (1981), supra note 7, at 459.
1580 [Vol. 68:1509
NATIONALIZING THE BILL OF RIGHTS
very same 1980 Curtis article calling him on the error under discussion, and
one citation to his own 1981 article admitting (in part) that error. 24 1
But no. Berger in 1997 repeated verbatim both erroneous statements
from his 1977 book, without any correction whatsoever. The first statement
again falsely claimed that Fairman said "that no newspaper reported
Howard's [speech]. '242 The second statement again quoted Flack directly for
the mistaken underlying point.243 Nowhere in the 1997 edition did Berger
alert his readers to these repeated mistakes, much less that they had been
called to his attention seventeen years before as part of an extended debate
with Curtis that dominated the last two decades of his scholarship.
Sadly, that is not all. Berger added a third statement of this double
falsehood freshly written for the 1997 edition. He described it as a "fact" that
the Bingham and Howard speeches "caused hardly a ripple. Horace Flack
found no published statement that 'the first eight amendments were made
applicable to the States.' Howard's remark, Charles Fairman recounts,
'seems at the time to have sunk without leaving a trace in public discussion.'
This obliviousness is remarkable .... ,,244 Berger's sentence citing Fairman,
yet again, misleadingly cited the very same pages in Fairman's article
correcting the mistaken assertion by Flack that Berger-in the sentence just
before-once again served up to his unsuspecting readers. "This
obliviousness" was indeed "remarkable." I cringe at the need to delve into
such convoluted details. But Berger's scholarship here, as in other instances,
did not meet minimum acceptable standards.
241 See BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 176 & nn.10-11 (quoting
Curtis, Bill of Rights (1980), supra note 10); id. at 189 n.104 (citing Berger, Nine-Lived
Cat (1981), supra note 7); see generally id at 174-89.
242 Id. at 167 n.66 (citing and quoting Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 68-
69, 137).
243 Id. at 170 & n.77 (quoting FLACK (1908), supra note 78, at 153).
244 Id. at 175-76 & nn. 7-8 (quoting FLACK (1908), supra note 78, at 153; Fairman,
Original (1949), supra note 7, at 68-69). Berger noted in his preface to this 1997 revision
that it "was completed in my ninety-fifth year, so the gentle reader should cast upon it a
charitable eye, bearing in mind Dr. Johnson's remark about 'a dog's walking on his hind
legs. It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all."' Id. at xxii (citation
omitted). That shows charm and good humor. Berger's longevity and energy were indeed
remarkable, admirable, and enviable. He died in 2000 at the age of 99. The 1997 book
was apparently his last published work. Cf Martin, Berger Obituary (2000), supra note
19. But his extensive, articulate, and heavily researched 1997 supplemental notes seem
inconsistent with any age-related excuse. Nor would that explain why his errors usually
favored his arguments. Whether age aggravated the general rigidity of his thinking is a
question I would not try to answer. The issue is not Berger's subjective personal
blameworthiness (if any), but the objective (un)reliability of his scholarship.
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Ironically indeed, Berger dismissed Curtis and various other scholars as
unreliable "activists." 245 Berger justified such personally pejorative labeling
245 On Curtis, see, for instance, BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 176,
180, 185. Curtis was in good company. Berger similarly dismissed Dean Alfange, John
Hart Ely, Thomas Grey, Harold Hyman, Alfred Kelly, Stanley Kutler, Louis Lusky,
Nathaniel Nathanson, William Nelson, and Michael Perry (and probably others I missed),
while singling out Jacobus tenBroek as a "neoabolitionist" (is that a bad thing?). See id.
at 177 (Kelly, tenBroek); id. at 185 & n.76 (Hyman, Nelson); see also Berger, Nine-Lived
Cat (1981), supra note 7, at 453 n.147 (Kelly a "perfervid activist," though unclear why
he deserved that special honor); Berger, Light From the Fifteenth (1979), supra note 222,
at 311 (Lusky, Nathanson); id. at 312 (Kutler); id. at 345 (Alfange, Perry); id. at 359
(Grey); id. at 364-65 (Ely).
Berger's low point was his accusation that Robert Cottrol "read[s] constitutional
history through black-colored lenses." Raoul Berger, Cottrol's Failed Rescue Mission, 27
B.C. L. REV. 481, 481 (1986) (responding to Robert J. Cottrol, Static History and Brittle
Jurisprudence: Raoul Berger and the Problem of Constitutional Methodology, 26 B.C. L.
REV. 353 (1985) [hereinafter Cottrol, Static (1985)]). Berger may not have known that
Cottrol is African-American. Such a comment, regardless, is disturbingly ad hominem.
The context made clear that he used the term in a racial sense. He may have been stung
by Cottrol's criticism, but Cottrol never personally attacked Berger. The harshest
comment I could find focused strictly on Berger's work and was mixed with praise:
"Berger's often prodigious scholarship is marred by an all too facile consideration of the
materials he has developed." Cottrol, Static (1985), supra, at 386.
The point is not the color of Cottrol's skin, but the thinness of Berger's. Berger
could dish it out, but he could not take it. A telling illustration was Berger's complaint
that "Curtis cannot bring himself to state his opponent's case fairly and accurately."
BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 47 n.12. What was going on there? Well,
Curtis had criticized Berger's claim that Bingham's frequent references to "the bill of
rights" did not really mean the Bill of Rights. See CuRTIs, No STATE (1986), supra note
10, at 123; see also supra Part III (pp. 1550-51 & nn.138-39). But in fact, it was Berger
who could not be trusted to state his own view fairly or accurately. He reprinted only a
selective and misleading portion of his 1977 statement that Curtis, very reasonably, had
relied upon: "'As Fairman pointed out, the antecedent of [Bingham's] remark was
Article IV sec. 2, and the Fifth Amendment due process clause which Bingham equated
with equal protection.' So it was not Berger but Fairman who 'said."' BERGER,
FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 47 n.12 (quoting BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1977),
supra note 7, at 141) (emphasis added by Berger in 1989). First of all, would any rational
reader, based on that sentence alone, doubt that Berger had adopted Fairman's claim as
his own? In any event, Berger omitted in 1989 the very next sentence in his 1977 book,
which stated flatly: "There is no reason to believe that [Bingham's] subsequent references
to the Bill of Rights had broader compass." BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1977), supra note 7,
at 141. Apparently, Berger forgot that in 1981 he spent two pages defending this very
claim, emphatically presenting it as his own and quoting Curtis ascribing it to him with
nary a hint that Curtis misstated his views. See Berger, Nine-Lived Cat (1981), supra note
7, at 461-63 & nn.201-17. Berger's only mention of Fairman in that entire 1981 passage
was in a single footnote invoking him as additional supporting authority. See id. at 463
n.214 (quoting Curtis, Bill of Rights (1980), supra note 10, at 68). in 1997, Berger
republished verbatim, without further comment, his 1977 statement of this view, thus
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on the grounds that Curtis was "passionate[ly] concem[ed] for civil liberties"
and feared that Berger's writings might lead to a "rollback" of important
rights.2 46 The latter two statements are true. They are also true of me and
probably many other scholars. Indeed, it would be fair enough, though a
matter of opinion and debatable word choice, to call me and many other
scholars "activists," in the sense that we have (in various spheres) actively
pursued what we each conceive to be justice and liberty under law. But it will
be a sad day when concern for civil liberties disqualifies a legal scholar. Are
only those callously indifferent to the harmful potential of flawed scholarship
like Berger's allowed to critique it?
What was unfair about Berger's ad hominem attacks was the defamatory
sting that such concern or "activism," by itself, automatically renders a
scholar unreliable or even dishonest. Of course, by the same token, the
possible consequences of Berger's scholarship-and Berger's normative
views, if any--do not impeach, commend, or have any bearing on its merits
either. All scholarship should be judged strictly on its merits as such-its
factual accuracy, interpretive fairness, and whether it advances overall
understanding-or its lack of those qualities. Curtis, unlike Berger, has
adhered rigorously to that approach. 247 Berger's approach degraded the
scholarly discourse on the incorporation issue for twenty years.
The broader lesson of this sorry tale is how rigid and incapable Berger
proved to be when it came to learning from other scholars. It was not just
Curtis whom he contemptuously swatted aside. Nearly half a century after
Fairman launched the modem conventional scholarship on incorporation,
Berger could not even be shaken loose from a false rendition of what his own
anti-incorporationist ally had demonstrated.
VII. THE AMENDMENT AND THE STATES
Not a single member of either House of Congress, throughout all the
1866 debates, nor anyone during the ensuing ratification debates-with
perhaps a handful of implicit and debatable exceptions-ever contradicted or
echoing his 1981 view but apparently retracting his 1989 attempt to retract his 1977 and
1981 views. See BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 161. Who can keep
track?
246 Berger, Response to Zuckert (1991), supra note 44, at 3 & n. 13 (citing, inter alia,
Curtis, Bill of Rights (1980), supra note 10, at 46-47) (duplicate quotation marks
omitted).
247 Curtis's co-authored textbook on constitutional law twice cites Berger's work on
the incorporation issue, noting only (politely) that it has been "challenged." I MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, J. WILSON PARKER, DAVISON M. DOUGLAS & PAUL FINKELMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CONTEXT 700, 736 (2 vols., Carolina Academic Press, 2d ed.
2006).
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even directly questioned the incorporationist reading of the Amendment set
forth by Bingham and Howard. 248 As Justice Black suggested, one might
well conclude that others accepted and relied upon the reading propounded
by these two leading proponents.249 The best that anti-incorporationists have
248 See, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 91, 105 (summarizing the
congressional debates); AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 187 (same). On
the ratification debates, see the sources cited infra notes 262-63. The only significant
(but highly debatable) exception I am aware of is the 1866 Sherman campaign speech.
See supra note 223. Anti-incorporationist scholars have generally gone no further than to
point out the general silence on the issue. They have occasionally argued that a handful of
other statements show implicit conflicts. See, e.g., supra Part VI (pp. 1568-70)
(discussing Sen. Poland's speech); BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 184-
85 (citing Poland and three other examples from the 1866 Congress). Two of Berger's
other examples involved speakers said, like Sherman, to equate the Amendment and the
1866 Civil Rights Act. But those might better support an incorporationist view of the Act.
See supra note 223. Berger's fourth example, inexplicably, described as "incompatible
with incorporation" a sweeping statement by Rep. William Windom (R-Minn.)
"summariz[ing] the meaning of the Amendment as 'your life shall be spared, your liberty
shall be unabridged, your property shall be protected."' BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997),
supra note 7, at 185 (quoting AVINS, DEBATES (1967), supra note 222, at 238, which in
turn reprinted CG (39:1) 3169 (June 14, 1866)). Windom's point-which was, in fact,
highly consistent with incorporation-was that former rebels had no reason to complain
about the Amendment because it guaranteed their own rights as much as it did those of
the freed Blacks. Rather, Blacks could rightfully complain because it did not explicitly
guarantee their political rights. See CG (39:1) 3169-70.
Exasperatingly, even this basic historical fact-the essential lack of contemporary
contradiction of the incorporation theory-remains subject to widespread
misinformation. For example, a social studies textbook sponsored by the National
Archives notes the incorporationist statements by Bingham and Howard. But after
quoting Howard, this book states: "He was, however, alone in this assertion. Most
senators argued that the privileges and immunities clause did not bind the states to the
federal Bill of Rights." TEACHING WITH DOCUMENTS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO 1879
113 (2002) (Article 1.21, "Reconstruction, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Personal
Liberties, 1866 and 1874"). The first quoted sentence is literally true, but the implication
is misleading. There are ample grounds, as we have seen, to conclude that Howard was
far from "alone" in his view. The second sentence is simply false. Not a single senator-
nor anyone during 1866-68, to my knowledge-made any such argument. Most
legislators said nothing at all on the subject. I am pleased to report, however, that after I
alerted the National Archives to this error, its Office of Education and Volunteer
Programs responded very promptly and thoughtfully by correcting the authorized online
version of the textbook available (in relevant part) at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/
doc.php?doc=43. Unfortunately, an unauthorized and uncorrected version of the relevant
section-the textbook, as a government work, is not copyrighted-still appears as this
Article went to press at http://-wvw-.histoicaldocuments.com/14thAmendment.htm.
249 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164-65 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
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been able to do is to raise doubts about whether the Bingham-Howard view
should be given decisive weight in construing the Amendment as ratified. 250
They have generally made four arguments:
First, the Bingham-Howard view was not sufficiently echoed or
corroborated by others in the 1866 Congress.
Second, there were some statements in Congress that lend themselves to
a narrower "equal-rights-only" reading of the Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause, thus implying tension with the Bingham-Howard view.
Third, the Bingham-Howard view-and that of Congress as a whole, if
Congress agreed with them-was not sufficiently echoed or corroborated
outside Congress, and was implicitly contradicted in certain ways, during the
two-year battle in the states over ratification.
Fourth, to the extent that explicit, affirmative corroboration was lacking,
either inside or outside Congress, the default conclusion must go against
incorporation.
Lambert Gingras, in a thoughtful but flawed article, helped to clarify
these questions, and correctly suggested that each may yield a very different
answer.
251
A. "Silence" or Implicit Contradictions in the 1866 Congress?
On the first and second issues noted above, Gingras argued that while
Bingham himself was not necessarily "confused," he may have appeared so
to many of his colleagues. Gingras thus concluded that Congress as a whole
did not sufficiently understand or embrace the incorporation theory. George
Thomas made a similar argument in his valuable 2001 article. 252 But while
Gingras and Thomas raised some interesting questions, they did not succeed
in rebutting the powerful case constructed by Crosskey, Curtis, Amar, Aynes,
and others that the Bingham-Howard view was widely understood and
corroborated in Congress, both explicitly and implicitly.253
250 Some scholars have suggested that Bingham himself did not really mean what
we think of as the Bill of Rights when he repeatedly referred to "the bill of rights." But
see supra Part III (pp. 1550-51 & nn. 138-39).
251 See Gingras (1996), supra note 198, at 41-42, 61-63. Among the flaws in
Gingras's article were his failures to discuss or even cite Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra
note 10, or to deal in any depth with Crosskey's work. See id. at 45 n.30 (citing only
once, generally, to Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9); see also supra note 198
(Gingras echoing Fairman's misunderstanding of Sen. Poland's speech).
252 See Gingras (1996), supra note 198, at 43-63, 70; Thomas, When (2001), supra
note 31, at 184, 198-99; see generally id. at 180-216.
253 See, e.g., Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 10-84; CURTIS, No STATE
(1986), supra note 10, at 26-130; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 181-
97; Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 66-83.
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Thomas actually did a very good job of confirming how little
controversy, inside or outside Congress, seemed to surround Section 1 of the
Amendment-in stark contrast with the other sections dealing with touchy
matters like the political rights of Blacks and former rebels, representation in
Congress, and war debts.254 He also helpfully confirmed that Republican
proponents of the Amendment had many and far more pressing political
priorities on their minds-including those just listed-other than "nice
judicial questions about privileges or immunities, due process, or equal
protection."255
In this light, the taciturnity of Republicans in the face of Democratic
taunts is far less puzzling than Thomas painted it.256 As noted earlier,
254 See Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 184-85, 198-200, 204-05, 208-10.
255 Id. at 203; see also id. at 191-96, 200, 202-03, 209. As Thomas acknowledged,
Curtis had made the same basic point. See CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at
105, cited in Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 209; see also AMAR, BILL OF
RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 202-04.
256 Thomas makes too much of two senators-Democratic opponents of the
Amendment-who claimed to be confused about the meaning of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Thomas argued in 2001 that the Republican response was inadequate,
if incorporation were generally understood to be the goal, though he ultimately conceded
that Republicans might simply have dismissed such comments by opponents as "political
rhetoric." Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 198-99 & n.221 (quoting CG (39:1)
3039 (June 8, 1866) (Sen. Thomas A. Hendricks, D-Ind.); id. at 3041 (June 8, 1866) (Sen.
Reverdy Johnson, D-Md.)). Cf Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 60, 64 (also
relying on Hendricks and Johnson). Thomas, while now conceding "[i]t is understandable
that Howard did not wish to repeat his crystal clear presentation," continues to argue that
it is "a little strange that none of the other proponents used Howard's theory to rebut the
claim of lack of clarity." Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1646; see also id. at
1633 & n.25 (earlier citing Hendricks and Johnson). For reasons stated in the text, this
still seems to me like Monday-morning quarterbacking. Given that Howard's speech was
sufficiently clear, why should he or anyone else bother to belabor it with diehard
opponents? The apparent Republican strategy seems clear enough-let anointed
spokesmen present the party line, maintain discipline, and (as much as possible) avoid
getting dragged into pointless arguments with unpersuadable Democrats. After all, the
strategy worked-the Amendment passed.
For similar reasons, Thomas's argument about Sen. Edgar A. Cowan (R-Pa.)--"we
just do not know what [he] had in mind," id at 1643; see also id. at 1642-43, 1646-
seems beside the point. Cowan, though nominally a Republican, was a very conservative
supporter of President Johnson who also voted against the Amendment. See CG (39:1)
3042 (June 8, 1866) (Senate vote). Cowan was not only denied reelection to the Senate,
but his colleagues-in a strikingly unusual snub-refused to confirm his nomination by
Johnson to a diplomatic post. See Silvana Siddali, Edgar A. Cowan, 5 ANB, supra note 1,
at 605.
Boyce also trotted out Sens. Hendricks and Johnson to suggest the Senate
"remain[ed] confus[ed]." Boyce (1998), supra note 60, at 987; see also Bybee (1995),
supra note 14, at 1587-88. But opponents would obviously try any tactic to defeat the
1586 [Vol. 68:1509
NATIONALIZING THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Republicans generally "refrained from defining their positions on the floor";
they hashed things out in private party caucuses and generally "confined
[their public actions] to voting. '257 The alleged failure of floor leaders like
Howard to do a better job-as Thomas sees it with more than a century of
hindsight-in drafting or explaining the Amendment, responding to
questions, or referring back to earlier speeches, is simply not the mystery
Thomas claims. 258 Such arguments have the ring of anachronistic Monday-
morning quarterbacking-after a 140-year-long weekend.
The argument over the first issue noted above cannot logically be
reduced to a quibble over the burden of proof-whether "silence" in the 1866
Congress should be construed one way or the other, as if the issue were in
equipoise. The debates in the 1866 Congress were not "silent" on the
incorporation issue. There was "silence" on only one side of the
Amendment-and failing that, plant seeds of confusion to undermine its efficacy. The
claim of "confusion" or "lack of clarity" is a classic make-weight argument-an obvious
indicator that opponents feel uncomfortable attacking the merits. It is easily leveled
against almost any legal proposal, especially a constitutional amendment necessarily
phrased in broad terms.
I do not want to overstate my argument or be too dismissive of Sen. Johnson in
particular:
For one thing, Reverdy Johnson was not a Copperhead like [Rep. Andrew J.] Rogers
[D-N.J.] or a clown like [Rep. James] Brooks [D-N.Y.]. [Johnson's] objections
would carry more weight. For another, the Republicans in the Senate were not a
united group like those in the House. There was no Thaddeus Stevens to crack the
party whip above their heads. Unity in the caucus could not be achieved by force,
but only by persuasion.
Epps, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006), supra note 94, at 113; see also Fairman, Original
(1949), supra note 7, at 64 (noting Johnson's membership on the Joint Committee). But
still, I think my argument remains sound. The fact that Johnson was a more formidable
opponent than most may have given Republicans that much more reason to be wary of
getting drawn into profitless debate with him about the Amendment's clarity, or lack
thereof.
257 JAMES, FRAMING (1956), supra note 78, at 146; see also supra Part VI (pp.
1571-72). Thomas cited this work by James extensively, but overlooked this point. See
Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 181 & n.132, 192 & n.181, 193 & nn.190-93,
194 n.194, 195 n.197, 196 nn.206-07, 200 & nn.225, 227 & 230-31, 202 & n.243. Cf
Wallace Mendelson, A Note on the Cause and Cure of the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 J.
POL. 152, 154-55 (1981) (noting this Republican practice and citing bitter complaints
about it by Democrats-including Sen. Hendricks, discussed supra note 256).
258 Thomas suggested an alternative wording of Section 1 that he said would have
avoided any lingering doubts about incorporation-as indeed it might have-saying it
took him "about five minutes" to come up with it. Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31,
at 198; see also id. at 198-99; Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1629-30 (offering
a slightly revised version). I would say such revisions take many decades of 20/20
historical and jurisprudential hindsight.
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incorporation "debate": the nonexistent anti-incorporation side. Lack of
dispute, in a deliberative body, in the face of a view clearly and repeatedly
articulated within that very same body on a plainly important matter, is
inherently confirmatory of such a view. It is important to keep in mind the
basic facts: The incorporationist view was clearly presented at least four
separate times-three times in the House and once in the Senate-at crucial
points in the debates and by two influential floor leaders: the primary drafter
of the Amendment and the floor manager in the Senate.259
This Article does not attempt to discuss in detail the second issue noted
above, relating to the "equal rights only" reading of the Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause. That will require, as essential background,
an involved discussion of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. I
will revisit the relationship of that Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment in a
forthcoming article that will explore that reading, which is the most
interesting and substantial of several long-espoused theories said to
undermine the incorporation doctrine. The scholars who have offered the
most thoughtful arguments for variants of this reading are William Nelson,
John Harrison, and George Thomas. My own ultimate argument will hew
closely in many ways to their insights, to which I am deeply indebted, though
I differ on certain fundamental points-for example, I drop the "only"
element.260
The Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights Acts of 1866 provide very
intriguing evidence on this "equal rights only" issue. These crucial
Reconstruction statutes, debated and passed by Congress at the same time it
debated and proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, turn out to provide
surprisingly powerful support to the incorporation theory. They suggest that
even a narrow reading of "civil rights" was understood to include, at a
minimum, all Bill of Rights guarantees. One might even say the Freedmen's
Bureau Act provides the "smoking gun," since it expressly prohibited state or
259 This counts the extended three-day debate on February 26-28 (the introduction
of the original version of the Amendment in the House) as a single occasion. March 9
(during the Civil Rights Act debate in the House), May 10 (House passage of the near-
final version of the Amendment), and May 23 (the introduction of the near-final version
in the Senate) were the others. See supra Part III (pp. 1556-57) (quoting Justice Black's
view based on his years of Senate experience); see generally supra Parts II-III, V.
260See generally NELSON (1988), supra note 142, at 115-24; Harrison,
Reconstructing (1992), supra note 89; Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 180-216;
see also supra notes 99, 223. My forthcoming article will also draw upon Maltz's insights
on "limited absolute equality," a baseline principle embraced by even conservative
Reconstruction Republicans. See MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS (1990), supra note 10, at 4, 157-
58. Protecting a substantive set of rights for everyone is a simple, direct, and obvious way
to achieve a certain limited degree of equal rights. See, e.g., id.; Curtis, Blueprint (1990),
supra note 142, at 834-35; Curtis, Resurrecting (1996), supra note 10, at 55.
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local authorities subject to its reach from denying to anyone, including
Blacks newly freed from slavery, the Second Amendment's "constitutional
right to bear arms." 26 1
B. "Silence " or Implicit Contradictions During Ratification?
On the third issue noted above-the evidence outside Congress during
ratification-the picture is mixed. Some scholars, notably Crosskey, Curtis,
Amar, Aynes, and Halbrook, have pointed to evidence that the
incorporationist understanding was shared to some extent out in the country
during 1866-68.262 Other scholars, notably Fairman, Berger, Thomas, and
James Bond, have argued strenuously to the contrary. Neither group of
scholars has ever identified anyone during the ratification debates-with
perhaps a handful of implicit and debatable exceptions-who ever
contradicted the incorporationist reading of the Amendment espoused by
Bingham and Howard. The latter scholars have generally based their
conclusions on what they have viewed as the deafening silence on the issue,
and on certain facts they have viewed as implicitly contradicting the
theory.263
Evidence on this issue may be found in various sources: the ratification
debates in the state legislatures; the 1866 congressional election campaigns,
fought mainly over the Amendment; published commentary during these
early years; and debates in Congress and state conventions over new state
261 14 Stat. 173, 176 (§ 14) (July 16, 1866); see also CURTIS, No STATE (1986),
supra note 10, at 72.
262 See, e.g., Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 84-88, 100-11; CURTIS,
No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 131-56; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note
10, at 197-206, 373 n.92; Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 78-91; HALBROOK,
ARMED (1984), supra note 10, at 115-42; HALBROOK, FREEDMEN (1998), supra note 10,
at 71-106.
263 See, e.g., Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 68-132, 137-38; Fairman,
Reply (1954), supra note 136, at 154-55; FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION (1971), supra note
7, at 1298-1300; BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 37-42, 82-87; BERGER,
GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 170-71; James E. Bond, Ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in North Carolina, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 99-101, 112-13
(1984) [hereinafter Bond, Ratification (1984)]; James E. Bond, The Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18
AKRON L. REV. 435 (1985) [hereinafter Bond, Original (1985)]; JAMES E. BOND, No
EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 45, 57-58, 111, 180-82, 220-21, 234-38, 252-62 (Praeger, 1997)
[hereinafter BOND, No EASY WALK (1997)]; Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at
184-85, 204-10. The only significant (but highly debatable) exception to the general lack
of contradiction of the incorporation theory during ratification, that I am aware of, is the
1866 Sherman speech. See supra notes 223, 248.
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constitutions in the reconstructed Southern states and over readmission of
those states to representation in Congress. As both sides of the scholarly
debate have lamented, however, much of the relevant evidence has been
lost.264
I will discuss the evidence and arguments relating to this third issue more
fully in forthcoming articles, but it is useful to begin the discussion here. The
anti-incorporationist ace-in-the-hole, some have suggested, is that there were
some conflicts between contemporary state laws and the strictures of the Bill
of Rights. Yet no one seemed to take note of such conflicts or view them as
grounds for objecting to the Amendment. That makes it implausible, some
have argued, that total incorporation of the Bill of Rights could have been
widely understood or accepted as one effect of the Amendment. On the other
hand, there was broad congruence and overlap between the Bill of Rights and
the rights guaranteed by the various state constitutions. For politicians and
voters casually considering the general concept, incorporation may have
seemed an untroubling and even welcome idea-at worst redundant,
providing "double security" as sought by Madison back in 1789.265
The newspaper coverage of the Bingham and Howard speeches provides
substantial evidence that the national body politic, during 1866-68, was
placed on fair notice about the incorporationist design of the Amendment.
That was certainly true of at least one Democratic commentator outside
Washington, D.C.: Samuel Smith Nicholas, a Kentucky jurist who published
frequently on law and politics during the Civil War and Reconstruction. In an
essay possibly written in 1866 and printed in an 1867 book, Nicholas
indicated his understanding that the Thirty-Ninth Congress was seeking to
enforce the Bill of Rights against the states.
Nicholas seems to be almost invisible to most modern scholars. He and
his views have never previously received substantial discussion in any
scholarship on the incorporation issue. But he was apparently better known
in his day, serving as a Kentucky appeals court judge, legislator, and reviser
of the state code. The modem historian Harold Hyman described him as an
"important Democratic party theoretician and self-styled conservative
essayist. ' 266 Nicholas published four volumes of essays on legal and political
264 See, e.g., Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 82; CuRTIs, No STATE
(1986), supra note 10, at 145; BOND, No EASY WALK (1997), supra note 263, at 8.
265 See supra Part I. I discussed this general problem, what I would now call the
"state law variance" issue, in Wildenthal, Road to Twining (2000), supra note 3, at 1475-
80. See also supra note 43, and my discussion infra pp. 1606-47.
266 HYMAN, MORE PERFECT (1973), supra note 95, at 143. After working as a
merchant in Baltimore and New Orleans, Nicholas moved to Louisville and became a
lawyer. There is no mention of him in standard modem biographical dictionaries, but a
brief entry appears in an 1876 collection. See CHARLES LANMAN, BIOGRAPHICAL ANNALS
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topics between 1863 and his death in 1869. He was a Unionist, but
sympathetic to the South-an avowed White supremacist, defender of
slavery, and opponent of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Nicholas did, however, condemn the Dred Scott decision. He remained
bitterly opposed to the Republican Party and Reconstruction. 267 He assailed
President Lincoln for allegedly trampling on Bill of Rights guarantees during
the Civil War.268
Hyman did not refer to Nicholas's discussion of nationalizing the Bill of
Rights. The only such mention I have found is buried in a footnote towards
the end of a lengthy law review article by Robert Kaczorowski, briefly
stating that Nicholas believed "Congress was empowered to enforce the Bill
of Rights" against the states.269 In fact, Nicholas opposed any such power in
OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DURING ITS FIRST CENTURY 311
(Anglim [Washington, D.C.] 1876) (facsimile reprint, Gale 1976).
2 6 7 See S.S. NICHOLAS, CONSERVATIVE ESSAYS, LEGAL AND POLITICAL, SECOND
SERIES vii (Lippincott [Philadelphia] 1865) [hereinafter 2 NICHOLAS, ESSAYS (1865)]
(describing himself, in dedicating his book to the great British liberal philosopher John
Stuart Mill-whose views, rather implausibly, Nicholas likened to his own-as having
written on politics for "the last twenty-five years"); id. at 13-14 (ch. 1, an address drafted
for, but apparently not delivered at, the 1864 Democratic National Convention, and
apparently published in part in Oct. 1864); id. at 28-32 (same, a subsection headed "The
Negro Question," strongly opposing the Thirteenth Amendment); id. at 46-52 (ch. 2,
"The Irrepressible Conflict," an essay published in July 1864); id. at 153-54 (ch. 14,
"Amendment of the Constitution. Letter to a Member of the Kentucky Legislature,"
published Feb. 11, 1865); id. at 197-232 (ch. 20, "The Dred Scott Case-Reviewed
March, 1857," discussing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)); S.S.
NICHOLAS, CONSERVATIVE ESSAYS, LEGAL AND POLITICAL, VOLUME THREE 22, 24, 27
(Bradley & Gilbert [Louisville, Ky.] 1867) [hereinafter 3 NICHOLAS, ESSAYS (1867)] (ch.
2, "Report of Joint Congressional Committee," an essay published June 14, 1866, the day
after Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, attacking it as a "sham" and a
power grab, and criticizing "the New England party in Congress"-not the rebellious
South-for "reckless violation of the Constitution, and ... insane effort to destroy [its]
very foundation"). The second (1865) volume is available in the University of
Michigan's "Making of America" digital library at http://name.umdl.umich.edu/
ABJ5498. The University of Michigan Library's Scholarly Publishing Office also
reprints that volume. I was fortunate enough to find and purchase a rare original copy of
the third (1867) volume. All four volumes-published in 1863, 1865, 1867, and 1869-
are available on microfilm in 19TH-CENTURY LEGAL TREATISES (Research Publications
1992).
268 2 NICHOLAS, ESSAYS (1865), supra note 267, at ix-x (dedication); id. at 19-23
(ch. 1, draft address to the 1864 Democratic Convention, subsections headed "The
Constitution" and "Martial Law").
269 Kaczorowski, Revolutionary (1986), supra note 95, at 932 n.349 (citing 3
NICHOLAS, ESSAYS (1867), supra note 267, at 47-52, and JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 145-52 (Houghton,
Osgood, 1868)); see also KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS (1985), supra note 97, at 22 n. 15. 1 am
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the cited essay, entitled "The Civil Rights Act." It was possibly published
some time during 1866, after Congress passed the Act on April 9, overriding
President Johnson's veto. Nicholas referred to the veto and override, and
generally argued that Congress lacked constitutional power to adopt the Act.
This essay was published (or republished) in an 1867 book.2 70
The essay offered a standard assertion of the Barron doctrine: "The bill
of rights, or what are termed the guaranties [sic] of liberty, contained in the
Federal Constitution, have none of them any sort of application to or bearing
upon the State governments, but are solely prohibitions or restrictions upon
the Federal Government." More interestingly, however-and vindicating
Kaczorowski's citation, without which I would never have heard of
Nicholas-he then said:
The recent attempt in Congress to treat them as guaranties against the State
governments, with an accompanying incidental power to enforce the
guaranties, is a surprising evidence of stolid ignorance of Constitutional
law, or of a shameless effort to impose upon the ignorant. The protection of
the civil and political rights of the inhabitants of every State, within its own
bounds, were amply cared for by its people in their State constitution. The
Federal Government was looked to or depended upon for no such purpose,
except in the solitary and specified instance where a rightful State
not aware of any prior reference to Nicholas by Fairman, Morrison, Crosskey, Avins,
Berger, Curtis, Amar, Aynes, Maltz, Lash, Halbrook, Bybee, Gingras, Boyce, Thomas, or
any other modem scholar of the incorporation debate, though Aynes cited (only as to
Pomeroy) the same Kaczorowski footnote. Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 91
n.223. I will discuss Pomeroy and revisit Nicholas in a forthcoming article on the 1867-
73 period.
270 The essay (Chapter 4) is undated, but obviously postdates final passage of the
Act. See 3 NICHOLAS, ESSAYS (1867), supra note 267, at 53 (referring to the veto and
override); see generally id. at 47-54; see also supra Part III (p. 1552 & n. 143). Chapter 4
follows essays on the Fourteenth Amendment (ch. 2, "Report of Joint Congressional
Committee," June 14, 1866) and the "Freedmen's Bureau Bill" (ch. 3, Feb. 1, 1866) and
precedes an essay published in 1865, which is then followed by two more published in
1866. Chapter 4's possible reference to the Fourteenth Amendment in its final or near-
final form, as I discuss in the text, suggests it may have been written around or after May
or June of 1866. Of the twelve essays collected as chapters in the 1867 volume, at least
nine seem to have been previously published elsewhere. Chapters 4 and 12 are undated,
but it appears that Chapters 1-3, 6-7, and 11 were published in 1866, Chapter 5 in 1865,
Chapter 8 in 1867 (possibly published for the first time in the book; it is a Kentucky
Senate Resolution dated Jan. 1867), and Chapters 9-10 in 1867 (apparently first
published separately from the book, in March and May 1867). See 3 NICHOLAS, ESSAYS
(1867), supra note 267, at 3, 5, 22, 36, 47, 55, 69, 75, 82, 103, 119, 126, 139. From all
this, I would infer that Chapter 4 was probably first published during 1866, most likely
no earlier than May 1866 and quite likely before the fall elections. Nicholas would
certainly have wanted to influence those elections. I have not located any other record of
precisely when, where, or how widely the essay was published.
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government might chance to be overthrown by some power above the
control of its people, as evinced in the clause guaranteeing to each State a
republican form of government. With that single exception, the people felt
themselves amply competent to protect their liberty, and all civil or political
rights within the bounds of their respective States, and would have
indignantly spurned anything which even looked like a leaning upon the
Federal Government for protection. They manifested abundant jealousy of
everything which had even a tendency to afford the Federal Government a
pretext for intermeddling with the domestic State affairs, as between them
and their State governments. To soothe that jealousy, to quiet that fear of
Federal encroachment, the first ten amendments of the Constitution were
made, and among which it was expressly declared that "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 27 1
The essay's title and general subject, at first glance, would suggest that
Nicholas, in writing of the "recent attempt in Congress," referred to the Civil
Rights Act. But the above language better fits a discussion of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It occurs in the midst of a lengthy paragraph discussing
constitutional grants of federal power and limits on state power. It would
have been perfectly normal to discuss both Act and Amendment in the same
essay, given their close relationship. The Amendment-in the forms debated
in May 1866 and proposed by Congress in June 1866--did indeed seek to
guarantee certain rights, in Section 1, "with an accompanying incidental
power to enforce [them]" in Section 5. The Civil Rights Act also guaranteed
and enforced certain rights, but not with a separate "accompanying" power to
enforce them. The Act did both at once. It was an exercise of Congress's
enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment. It may have required
power that Congress only gained later upon ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment-Bingham, Nicholas, and others certainly thought so. Nicholas
may have written this essay after the Amendment passed Congress in June
1866, or perhaps while it was still being debated in Congress.
If Nicholas referred to the Amendment, his essay indicates a crystal-clear
understanding of the Bingham-Howard incorporationist design. If Nicholas
referred to the Civil Rights Act, he seemed to read it as also seeking to
substantively nationalize the Bill of Rights-a surprisingly well-supported
theory, as other scholars have discussed and as I will pursue in a forthcoming
article. 272 In any event, the essay strongly suggests that well-informed
271 3 NICHOLAS, ESSAYS (1867), supra note 267, at 48-49 (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. X) (emphases added by Nicholas).
272 See supra note 223; Part VII.A (p. 1588 & n.260). As Thomas perceptively
notes, Nicholas's reference to Congress proceeding in "stolid ignorance of Constitutional
law" may be read to suggest that he referred to the Act, but may also simply reflect his
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Democrats during 1866-67--even far from Washington, D.C.-were fully
aware that Republicans in Congress intended, one way or another, to apply
the Bill of Rights to the states. It matters not a whit whether Nicholas
referred to the Act or the Amendment. Everyone agrees the Amendment was
designed, at least in part, to constitutionalize the Act.273
Nicholas's writings also suggest that the Republican goal of
nationalizing the Bill of Rights, while not supported by most Democrats, was
very far from the Democrats' foremost concerns. The above-quoted language
was Nicholas's only mention of the issue that I have found so far. His
language suggests he found the goal merely meddlesome and unnecessary.
This brief reference was in the midst of a series of essays hammering
vehemently ad nauseum on other issues that clearly engaged far stronger
passions, such as opposition to citizenship and voting rights for Blacks,
support for granting amnesty to former Confederates, and restoring White-
dominated Southern state governments. 274
Indeed, Nicholas's comment, in the above-quoted passage, that the
Republican plan was "a shameless effort to impose upon the ignorant"
suggests-intriguingly-that he recognized that nationalizing the Bill of
Rights might be a politically popular idea. He, and possibly other Democrats,
may have seen it as a cleverly appealing diversion from more divisive and
controversial Republican policies expressly aimed at racial and sectional
issues. In an essay first published on June 14, 1866, the day after Congress
evident anger over Republican departures-whether in the Act or the Amendment, or
both-from what he viewed as proper "foundational constitutional principles." Thomas,
Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1648. Even if Nicholas was referring to the Amendment in
this particular quoted passage, the very beginning of the essay indicates he understood the
Act to also guarantee substantive rights, not just equality. He asserted that the Act
"attempts to define and even enlarge the civil rights of all persons residing within the
several States, in contravention of the constitutions and laws of those States." 3
NICHOLAS, ESSAYS (1867), supra note 267, at 47 (first two emphases in original; the third
emphasis is mine). By the way, as the foregoing language indicates, Nicholas viewed the
Act, despite its enactment over Johnson's veto, as a mere "attempt." Thus, one could not
cite his use of "attempt" in his later discussion (quoted in the text) to argue that he must
then have referred to the Amendment, which of course remained a mere "attempt" until
ratified in 1868. Nicholas may have viewed the Act as an "attempt" because he hoped it
would eventually be struck down as unconstitutional in the event the Amendment was not
ratified. All in all, I remain in doubt whether he meant to refer to the Act or the
Amendment in the quoted passage. But, as noted in the text, that makes no difference.
273 The Amendment did so in two ways: by removing any doubts about Congress's
power to pass the Act, and by writing the Act's essential protections into the Constitution.
See, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 71-83; BERGER, GOVERNMENT
(1997), supra note 7, at 161-70. The Nicholas essay certainly proves that the
incorporation theory was understood outside the East Coast during 1866-67. Cf Thomas,
Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1634 & n.30.
274 See, e.g., 3 NICHOLAS, ESSAYS (1867), supra note 267, at 5-68, 82-118, 126-38.
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sent the Fourteenth Amendment to the states for ratification, Nicholas-now
clearly commenting on the Amendment itself-stated:
The first section is uncalled for, and comparatively inoperative except
as to the citizenizing of the negro, and except for the after clause [Section 5]
giving Congress the power to enforce the article by appropriate legislation,
or, in other words, to harass the States by Congressional intrusion within
what should be exclusive State jurisdiction, according to the original theory
of the Constitution. The other matters are already well provided for in the
State constitutions, where they appropriately belong, and need no aid from
the Federal Government. 275
As we have seen, Bingham's incorporationist speeches of February 28
and March 9, 1866, were apparently widely distributed in pamphlet form
during that year-the former under a subtitle that could hardly have been
more direct and emphatic. In light of that, the newspaper coverage, and the
Nicholas essay, it is abundantly clear that Gingras erred in denying "any
significant evidence" that the incorporationist design "was known and
understood in the states."276
While the Bingham-Howard view was reported, however, there does not
seem to have been much published commentary focusing on the issue. The
New York Times, for example, gave prominent front-page coverage to
Congress's final passage and submission of the Amendment to the states,
quoting it in full and reprinting part of the eloquent closing speech by
Thaddeus Stevens. But there was no mention of incorporation. The focus was
on unrelated political issues. 277 The Times followed up the next day with an
editorial praising Stevens for acquiescing in the Amendment despite its
failure to fulfill his hopes regarding Black voting rights and
disenfranchisement of former rebels. Noting that the Amendment would be
"most keenly discussed" in the South, the Times asserted that its terms were
"not unreasonable" and briefly summarized Section 1 as "simply protect[ing]
the civil rights of all classes." The Times predicted-accurately, as it turned
out-that any serious objections would focus on the other sections.278 "Civil
275 Id. at 22, 31-32 (ch. 2, "Report of Joint Congressional Committee").
276 Gingras (1996), supra note 198, at 66; see also id at 71; Thomas, When (2001),
supra note 31, at 204 (making a similar argument that the ratifying states lacked
sufficient notice and thus could not have knowingly "ceded" their "sovereignty" in regard
to incorporation); id. at 154-55, 208-10. Thomas now recants this argument to some
extent. See Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1632 & n.21; see generally id at
1631-33. For my discussion of Bingham's pamphlets, see supra Part IV (p. 1558).
277 See Washington News, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1866, at 1; Thirty-Ninth Congress,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1866, at 1.
278 Editorial (June 15, 1866), supra note 169, at 4.
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rights" may have been widely understood to encompass, at a minimum,
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.279
There was a lot more vague commentary along these lines during the
ratification struggle-all of it, to my knowledge, at least consistent with the
incorporation theory, and some pointing in favor of it. Harper's Weekly
stated in December 1866 that the Amendment would empower the United
States "to declare who are its citizens, and to define and defend their civil
rights," so that "no other power whatever shall presume to deprive its citizens
of civil rights." 280 Harper's added a month later that the Amendment, by
contrast with mere repealable legislation, was essential because "[t]he
fundamental rights of all the people of the United States can not be safely or
wisely left to the passion or party-spirit of any State or section of the Union.
A citizen has a right to be equally safe every where in the country. ... "281
The Atlantic Monthly briefly summarized the Amendment in September
1866, declaring that Section 1 "simply ordains.., that the civil rights of all
persons shall be maintained. '282
The issue of nationalizing freedom of speech deserves special attention.
A great deal of commentary in Congress and across the country, leading up
to the Civil War and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, focused
on longstanding grievances over the brutal repression of free speech by slave
states.
The abolitionist orator and former slave Frederick Douglass, writing in
the Atlantic Monthly in January 1867, condemned the "principle of slavery"
as follows:
Freedom of speech and of the press it slowly but successfully banished
from the South, dictated its own code of honor and manners to the nation,
brandished the bludgeon and the bowie-knife over Congressional debate,
sapped the foundations of loyalty, dried up the springs of patriotism, blotted
out the testimonies of the fathers against oppression, padlocked the pulpit,
expelled liberty from its literature, invented nonsensical theories about
279 See, e.g., CG (39:2) 117 (Dec. 13, 1866) (Rep. Hamilton Ward, R-N.Y.), quoted
and discussed in HALBROOK, FREEDMEN (1998), supra note 10, at 60: "We have a good
civil rights bill in the Constitution as it stands. The freedom of the press, of speech, and
protection to life, liberty, and property are secured thereby .. " See also, e.g., supra p.
1592 (quoting the Nicholas essay, equating Bill of Rights guarantees with "the civil and
political rights of the inhabitants of every State"); note 223 (discussing the Civil Rights
Act of 1866); CuRTIs, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 71-83 (same).
280 The Amendment at the South, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 1, 1866, at 754.
281 The Amendment Essential, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Jan. 5, 1867, at 2.
282 E.P. Whipple, The Johnson Party, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1866, at 374, 378.
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master-races and slave-races of men, and in due season produced a
Rebellion fierce, foul, and bloody.283
Bingham, as a freshman member of Congress in 1856, angrily denounced
as unconstitutional a Kansas territorial law punishing antislavery speech.
2 84
Indeed, the catchy slogan of John C. Fr6mont's 1856 Republican presidential
campaign was "Free Speech, Free Press, Free Men, Free Labor, Free
Territory, and Frdmont. ' '28 5
Radical Ohio Republican James M. Ashley, while leading the fight for
the Thirteenth Amendment in the House of Representatives in January 1865,
declared that slavery had not only "forced this terrible civil war upon us," but
had "trampled upon the national Constitution," "silenced every free pulpit
within its control," and "made free speech and a free press impossible."28 6
By the end of the Civil War, such sentiments had spread well beyond radical
visionaries. Representative Green Clay Smith of Kentucky, a conservative
Unionist who would become a strong ally of President Johnson, echoed them
strongly. Smith also spoke in favor of the Thirteenth Amendment, even
though he represented what was then still a slave state and confessed that his
earlier views might have been different. But he now agreed that the
"glorious" goal of the Civil War was not just freedom from slavery, but the
freedom of speech that slave states had denied to antislavery advocates.
Protect that, he proclaimed, and "the war has not been in vain," but would
achieve "the great principle of the freedom of man." 287
During the crucial election campaign of 1866, Carl Schurz-the
important German-American Republican activist, later Senator from
Missouri and Secretary of the Interior-framed the issue as restoring "a
Union based upon universal liberty, impartial justice and equal rights ... a
Union on every square foot of which free thought may shine out in free
utterance." President Johnson, Schurz charged, would restore "a Union in a
part of which the rules of speech will be prescribed by the terrorism of the
283 Frederick Douglass, An Appeal to Congress for Impartial Suffrage, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Jan. 1867, at 112, 117.
284 CG (34:1) app. 124 (Mar. 6, 1856).
285 See CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 32; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS
(1998), supra note 10, at 235, 379 n.9.
286 CG (38:2) 138 (Jan. 6, 1865); see also BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974), supra
note 72, at 27 (Ashley a "consistent radical"); Michael Vorenberg, James Mitchell
Ashley, 1 ANB, supra note 1, at 680.
287 CG (38:2) 237 (Jan. 12, 1865); see also BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974), supra
note 72, at 186 (Smith a Unionist supporter of Johnson, though voting for the Fourteenth
Amendment); BDC, supra note 1, at 1930 (Johnson appointing him Governor of Montana
Territory).
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mob, and free thought silenced by the policeman's club and the knife of the
assassin . "..."288
Harper's Weekly in May 1867 reported a Southern speaking tour by
Senator and future Vice-President Henry Wilson-a supporter of Bingham's
incorporation doctrine 289-noting that "attempt[ing] to express his views"
would have endangered his life before the Civil War. "[H]e could not have
safely claimed the most fundamental right of every man in a free
government .... When slavery struck at the tongue it instinctively aimed at
the strongest weapon of liberty .... Perfect liberty of speech is the cardinal
security of free institutions .... -2 90
Even Fairman-the greatest scholarly critic of the incorporation doctrine
generally-conceded the powerful evidence supporting incorporation of free
speech rights.291 Exhaustive studies by Curtis and others have confirmed that
conclusion with overwhelming force.292 Berger, by contrast, remained
288 EPPs, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006), supra note 94, at 251; see also id. at 12, 34-
38, 65-73, 84-85, 88, 250-51, 259-61 (generally discussing Schurz); Hans L. Trefousse,
Carl Schurz, 19 ANB, supra note 1, at 447 (same); Epps, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006),
supra note 94, at 81 (noting the threat of postwar Southern hostility to free speech).
289 See CG (42:1) app. 256 (Apr. 13, 1871) (Sen. Wilson, R-Mass.) ("I concur
entirely in the construction put upon that provision of the fourteenth amendment by Mr.
Bingham, of Ohio, by whom it was drawn."). Wilson apparently referred to CG (42:1)
app. 81-86 (Mar. 31, 1871), when Bingham restated at length his incorporationist views.
See also Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 81. Wilson served as Vice-President
under President Ulysses S. Grant from 1873 to Wilson's death in 1875. Richard H.
Abbott, Henry Wilson, 23 ANB, supra note 1, at 579.
290 A Sign of the Times, HARPER'S WEEKLY, May 4, 1867, at 274.
291 See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 75-77, 96-97, 116-20, 134-35,
139. Thomas also now seems to concede there is evidence that free speech rights, at least,
were incorporated. See Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1638, 1643, 1646.
292 See generally, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 26-41, 131-53,
217; CuRTIS, FREE SPEECH (2000), supra note 10; CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-
THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH (Harper & Row, rev. ed. 1964) (originally
published, Duke Univ. Press 1940); RUSSEL B. NYE, FETIERED FREEDOM: CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860 (Michigan State College Press
1949); see also, e.g., Avins, Incorporation (1968), supra note 9, at 17-22; Farber &
Muench (1984), supra note 95, at 252-53; MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS (1990), supra note 10,
at 117; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 159-62, 184, 231-57. See also,
generally, the following additional works by Michael Kent Curtis: The 1859 Crisis Over
Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on
the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1113 (1993); The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and
Petition in 1835-3 7, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 785 (1995); Resurrecting (1996), supra note 10;
The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition Mob: Free Speech, Mobs,
Republican Government, and the Privileges of American Citizens, 44 UCLA L. REv.
1109 (1997); Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the Civil War, 7 WM. &
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astonishingly oblivious to such evidence. He asserted in 1977-and restated
in 1997 with no qualification, despite Curtis having repeatedly pointed out
his profound error in this regard-that there was "no inkling that [between
1789 and the end of the Civil War] the North had become dissatisfied with
the protection [Bill of Rights guarantees] were given by the States." 293
There is some evidence that Bingham, at least, tried to campaign on the
general theme of nationalizing the Bill of Rights. We have seen the
pamphlets of his speeches distributed during 1866.294 During a congressional
debate in January 1867, he reasserted with crystal clarity that the pending
Amendment would reverse the Barron doctrine and apply to the states what
he described at one point as the "personal rights... of the first ten articles of
amendment," and a bit later as "all the limitations for personal protection of
every article and section of the Constitution."295 No one during this debate,
MARY BILL RTs. J. 105 (1998); Historical Linguistics (2000), supra note 10; Teaching
Free Speech from an Incomplete Fossil Record, 34 AKRON L. REV. 231 (2000).
293 See BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1977), supra note 7, at 212; Curtis, Bill of Rights
(1980), supra note 10, at 50-54 (pointing out Berger's error); Curtis, Further Adventures
(1982), supra note 10, at 91 (same); CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 26-41,
131-53, 217 (exhaustively reviewing the evidence); BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997),
supra note 7, at 212 (repeating this error without qualification or acknowledgment,
despite providing detailed supplemental notes on many other points).
Bybee acknowledged some of the evidence of Civil War-era Republican concerns
over state violations of free speech and related rights. See Bybee (1995), supra note 14, at
1578-79. But he nevertheless took the remarkably counterfactual position-at war with
the overwhelming weight of historical evidence, and, despite his claims, not supported by
constitutional text-that First Amendment rights were generally the least likely or
eligible of all Bill of Rights guarantees to be applied to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id at 1577-1616. Bybee's textual argument was based on his notion
that the First Amendment, unlike the rest of the Bill of Rights, does not really guarantee
any "rights," "liberties," or "privileges" of the people, individually or collectively, but is
merely a "disability" limiting the power of the federal government. See id. at 1552-57,
1564. But why, one might ask, is it not both, like the rest of the Bill of Rights? Cf supra
note 176 (noting Bybee's anachronistic reliance in this regard on Hohfeldian
hairsplitting). As he conceded, see Bybee (1995), supra note 14, at 1581, Bingham and
other Reconstruction Republicans-showing more common sense-repeatedly
recognized that the First Amendment does, in fact, guarantee personal rights, citing its
express language. For example, it guards against "abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Needless to say, in any
proper analysis of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the understanding of
Bingham and his colleagues carries more weight than that of Bybee or Hohfeld.
294 See supra Part IV (p. 1558); p. 1595.
295 CG (39:2) 811 (Jan. 28, 1867); see generally id. at 810-12; see also supra note
111 (discussing this debate); infra Part VIII (p. 1618-19) (same). But see Boyce (1998),
supra note 60, at 1006-07 (erroneously claiming that Bingham never clearly stated,
during 1866-68, the goal of incorporating the first eight amendments). For additional
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on a proposed anti-whipping bill-the participants included Hale, Bingham's
nemesis in February 1866 296-even hinted at any disagreement with
Bingham's stated view of what the Amendment would accomplish when
ratified. The only dispute-reflecting the Barron-contrarian views held by
many Republicans-was whether Congress already, before ratification, had
the power to enforce against the states the Eighth Amendment's ban on
"cruel and unusual punishments." 297
Overall, however, the evidence from the ratification struggle seems
vague and scattered when it comes to supporting any strong public awareness
of nationalizing the entire Bill of Rights. It was not widely framed in those
terms as a prominent issue. Republican proponents, apart from Bingham, did
not seem to tout it in any systematic or explicit way. At the same time, there
does not appear to be any record of Democratic opponents using
incorporation of the Bill of Rights as an explicit argument not to ratify the
Amendment. What we mostly have is silence-except for the congressional
debates, the news coverage of them, and some additional commentary
outside Congress, such as the Nicholas essay. To that extent, the scholars
skeptical of the incorporationist understanding have a fair point.298
The fourth issue noted above-to the extent there is silence outside
Congress, which default presumption should govem-is basically
interpretive rather than empirical. It is an issue on which reasonable people
may-and probably always will-disagree. In a sense, this issue, unlike that
regarding Congress's understanding, does indeed devolve into a classic
lawyer's quibble over who has the burden of proof.
Silence during the ratification struggle could, in theory, cut either way.
Nationalizing the entire Bill of Rights may not have been widely discussed in
those terms on the campaign trail because it was simply an uncontroversial
"no-brainer" on which almost everyone agreed, even Democrats. Or was it
such a political loser that even most Republicans shied away from reminding
anyone what Bingham and Howard had plainly said? But if so, why did
Democrats not exploit such a weakness? The "no-brainer" hypothesis seems
more plausible, though the truth may lie somewhere in between.
scholarly discussions of these Bingham comments, see AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998),
supra note 10, at 183; HALBROOK, FREEDMEN (1998), supra note 10, at 62-64; Aynes,
Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 70 n.72. I have not, however, found any evidence of
coverage of this debate in the New York Times, the only newspaper I have been able to
research. Thus, Bingham's statements may have received little attention outside
Congress.
296 See supra Part III (pp. 1540-42 & n. 111).
297 See generally CG (39:2) 810-12 (Jan. 28, 1867); see also supra Part VI (p. 1569
& n. 199) (discussing Republican Barron-contrarian views).
298 See, e.g., Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 184-85, 204-10.
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Thomas, in 2001, pointed out the fact-mysterious to him-that
"opponents of the Amendment did not adopt the incorporation theory and use
it against the Amendment. '299 But he drew the opposite conclusion I would
from this "dog that didn't bark."'300 Thomas used it to support his argument
that the states must have lacked the awareness or fair notice necessary to
knowingly yield to the doctrine in ratifying the Amendment. 30 1 But (forgive
me), if indeed the dog failed to bark, it was equally true that the cat was out
of the bag. Bingham and Howard said what they said, in full sight and
hearing of their colleagues, including all those Democrats ready to fan out
across the country. Indeed, Bingham apparently beat them to the punch by
circulating his key speeches around the country. They were on the front page
of the New York Times.302
Thomas, in 2001, ultimately fell prey to the circular "logic" of Fairman,
Berger, and other modem anti-incorporationists. They generally assumed as a
premise that incorporation must or would have been viewed at the time as a
"controversial" and "radical" idea. Some-outdoing any known Democratic
opponent in the 1860s--even called it a "menace" and a "Trojan horse." 30 3
Then they argued, in circular and counterfactual fashion, to the conclusion
that most people simply could not have been aware of it. Otherwise, they
were at a loss to explain the actual lack of controversy. It had to be
controversial, but there was no controversy, so nobody knew about it.
30 4
299 Id. at 199-200.
300 See id. at 199 & n.223 (citing the classic Sherlock Holmes story, Silver Blaze).
301 See id. at 199-204; see also id. at 154-55,208-10.
302 See supra Part V (pp. 1557-58); Part VI (p. 1564).
303 Modem anti-incorporationist writings (though not Thomas's) have frequently
featured such anachronistically overwrought arguments. See, e.g., Fairman, Original
(1949), supra note 7, at 137 (likening incorporation to "bring[ing] a wooden horse into
the Constitution" and a "fraud on the nation"); Fairman, Reply (1954), supra note 136, at
155 (claiming it would have been viewed as a "menace" from which Democrats would
"have made political capital"); BOND, No EASY WALK (1997), supra note 263, at 252
(claiming that "[h]ad the amendment's opponents suspected that... [it] was a Trojan
horse for the Bill of Rights, they would have attacked it venomously"-but not,
apparently, as "venomously" as have the modem anti-incorporationists!); see also
BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 49-55, 77-78; BERGER, GOVERNMENT
(1997), supra note 7, at 171, 176, 179-80. Cf supra Part VI (p. 1573) (noting the lack of
evidence that anyone in 1866-68 viewed incorporation as a "radical" idea); note 219
(discussing the notably less hostile views on incorporation of the rabidly reactionary
1860s Democrat Samuel S. Nicholas); pp. 1590-95 (same).
304 See, e.g., Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 82-83 (arguing that
"surely-if the Amendment was really supposed to incorporate the Bill of Rights-one
would expect to find a marked reaction," and that "if we found.., complete inaction, it
would be very hard to believe the ... Amendment was understood to have that effect"),
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A more logical approach, in accordance with Occam's Razor-seeking
the simplest and most direct explanation of known facts-would view the
lack of controversy as evidence that, well, incorporating the Bill of Rights
was not that controversial. If it had been, Democrats would have seized upon
it as a negative campaign slogan. But they did not. We have seen in the
Nicholas essay what one fervent and well-informed Democrat said about
incorporation. He made vociferous arguments on many other issues. But the
harshest he chose to get about incorporation, when he briefly mentioned it,
was essentially to complain that it was unnecessary--an effort to trick the
ignorant and perhaps, at worst, a "pretext" for federal "intermeddling" in
state affairs. 305
Of course, I am simplifying a bit here. The lack of controversy may also
indicate that incorporation, for various reasons, simply never loomed large in
the public mind. While the Nicholas essay is intriguing, it is far from clear
how many people read it or shared his understanding, just as it is fair to ask
how many Americans were closely following the Bingham and Howard
speeches in Congress.30 6 Sometimes, the more attention an idea gets, the
quoted in AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 198. But see AMAR, BILL OF
RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 198-204 (discussing the fallacy of Fairman's
argument). Thomas tried to take an evenhanded approach to the "controversy" issue. He
recognized that Fairman simply "assum[ed]" that incorporation was "controversial,"
while asserting, as if to balance things out, that Crosskey and Amar made "the opposite
assumption" that it was "noncontroversial." See Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at
204. But these were not competing "assumptions." Fairman and the other modem anti-
incorporationists have offered no historical evidence to support their view-or to support
the existence of any actual controversy focusing expressly on incorporation of the Bill of
Rights. (Indeed, they have emphasized the actual lack of controversy.) Thus, their view
that incorporation, if known, would have been controversial, is indeed merely an
assumption. But for incorporationist scholars like Crosskey, Curtis, Amar, Aynes, me,
and others, the view that incorporation was not controversial is not an "assumption" at
all. It is based on undisputed historical facts-that incorporation was publicly proposed,
and discussed at least to some extent, yet did not become a political football or stir up
dispute. I would qualify the latter statement by noting that it did not stir up dispute as the
idea was framed by Bingham and Howard-as nationalizing the protection and
enforcement of the Bill of Rights. As discussed below in the text, there was in fact
controversy and dispute-framed in classically federalist terms without mentioning the
Bill of Rights-about the extent to which the Amendment might lead to undue federal
interference with state laws and judicial systems.
305 See supra pp. 1592-93. For useful discussions of Occam's Razor, see, for
example, Alan Baker, Simplicity, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2004), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/
simplicity; "Occam's Razor," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam'sRazor
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
306 Not many, I would tend to think. But see EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006),
supra note 94, at 89-90:
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more controversy it generates, the controversy in turn generates more
attention, and so forth. For whatever reasons, such a feedback loop never got
started with the notion of nationalizing the Bill of Rights. And why should it
have? In the context of all the profound and tumultuous changes of
Reconstruction, it may have seemed like motherhood and apple pie. As Amar
asked, cutting to the heart of the matter: "Who wants to campaign against the
Bill of Rights?" 30 7
There are, of course, some rather obvious likely reasons why
incorporation did not get much attention. As we have seen, the political plate
for both Republicans and Democrats was already full to overflowing with
issues that (for them) were far more pressing and contentious-especially
Black voting rights, and whether and how to restore full political rights to
rebel states and individuals. Thomas made the very sound point that the
general issue of fair and equal treatment for Blacks-and Unionists of any
race-tended to dominate the discussion. 30 8 Possibly, the Republican
tendency noted earlier in Congress-to hash out issues in private party
caucuses, then just shut up and vote-may also have prevailed in the state
ratification debates. 309
Most people, even lawyers, may simply not have foreseen or thought
carefully about the substantial legal changes that we now see as the
Americans in the mid-nineteenth century devoured political news. In a culture
that had no mass entertainment and no professional sports, politicians were among
the most recognizable public figures. Newspapers across the country devoted many
columns to summaries or transcriptions of their speeches, which ordinary people
read and debated among themselves in homes that had no radio or television. In such
an environment, the daily Congressional Globe (the Congress's official record of its
debates) was the equivalent not only of today's C-SPAN but even to some extent of
ESPN. Just as members of Congress today tailor their speeches for the audiences
watching on TV, members of the Thirty-ninth Congress often delivered long
addresses aimed as much at public opinion as at persuading their colleagues.
307 AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 205.
308 See Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 203 (arguing that "Howard's and
Bingham's comments [were] lost in a sea of concern about ensuring that States treat
blacks and Union loyalists fairly"); see generally id. at 180-216. As I suggested earlier,
however, that focus on equal rights is perfectly consistent with an incorporationist
understanding of the Amendment. See supra note 223; Part VII.A (p. 1588 & n.260).
309 See supra Part VI (pp. 1571-72); Part VII.A (pp. 1586-87); AMAR, BILL OF
RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 204, 372 n.79 (citing CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra
note 10, at 6, 223 n.53, which in turn cited Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at
104). The cited page by Crosskey does not, however, assert or support this point,
plausible though it may be. Crosskey simply noted the general paucity of the surviving
records of the ratification debates.
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inevitable consequences of nationalizing the Bill of Rights. 310 But there is
nothing new or remarkable about that. Many changes in the law bring
unforeseen consequences and may trigger "buyer's remorse. ' 311 That does
not vitiate their legal force or meaning.
There is one final twist to this mystery of the missing controversy:
Maybe the dog did bark. One point Thomas discussed was that Secretary of
the Interior Orville H. Browning published widely, in the fall of 1866, a letter
denouncing the proposed Amendment. 312 The Browning letter predicted the
Amendment, especially the Due Process Clause, would "subordinate the
State judiciaries to Federal supervision and control" and "annihilate the[ir]
independence.., in the administration of State laws." Indeed, he said, "all
State laws ... will be equally open to criticism, interpretation and
adjudication by the Federal tribunals, whose judgments and decrees will be
supreme and will override the decisions of the State Courts ....- 313
Browning specifically noted that the Amendment would authorize federal
court claims by state criminal defendants.314 As Joseph James observed, this
letter was "especially significant because it had the specific approval of
President Johnson and his chief advisers from both North and South.... In
view of modem developments, [Browning's] words were almost
prophetic." 315
310 See supra note 43; p. 1590 & n.265; infra pp. 1606-07.
311 See, e.g., EPPs, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006), supra note 94, at 252 (noting the
"buyer's remorse" that some Northern states felt after initially ratifying the Amendment).
312 Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 207-08; see also BOND, No EASY
WALK (1997), supra note 263, at 4, 126, 194-95; CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note
10, at 151-52; JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
74-77 (Mercer Univ. Press 1984) [hereinafter JAMES, RATIFICATION (1984)]; Fairman,
Original (1949), supra note 7, at 78, 99.
313 The letter was published in numerous papers. The quotations in the text are taken
from the Cincinnati Commercial of October 26, 1866, as quoted in JAMES, RATIFICATION
(1984), supra note 312, at 75; see also Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 207-08
& n.268.
314 See Thomas, When (2001), supra note 3 1, at 208 (quoting Browning's discussion
of a hypothetical state murder prosecution, in which federal courts might interfere just as
the death penalty was about to be imposed). Bond suggested that if incorporation had
"been understood at the time, the critic[s] surely would have reinforced [their]
argument[s] with some pointed illustrations, which the incorporation doctrine would have
readily provided." BOND, No EASY WALK (1997), supra note 263, at 237. Browning's
letter shows that critics did in fact provide pointed illustrations, as forceful and appealing
as-and very similar to-any that one can imagine deriving from the incorporation
theory. And they had no need to explicitly invoke the Bill of Rights to do so.
315 JAMES, RATIFICATION (1984), supra note 312, at 77; see also CURTIS, No STATE
(1986), supra note 10, at 152.
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To be sure, Browning never referred specifically to incorporation of the
entire Bill of Rights. He "focused on the due process clause," 316 the one Bill
of Rights guarantee expressly incorporated into the Amendment. Some anti-
incorporationists, naturally, have emphasized this point.317 But is it really so
significant? And does it even cut the way they think? "Due process of law"-
also phrased as "the law of the land"-was widely understood during that era
to encompass, at a minimum, most or all of the criminal and civil procedural
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.318 There is little reason to think the thrust of
316 CuRTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 152.
317 See, e.g., BOND, No EASY WALK (1997), supra note 263, at 195; Thomas, When
(2001), supra note 31, at 207-08. But Thomas now seems to agree that the Browning
letter may weigh in favor of an incorporationist understanding of the Amendment. See
Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1648-49, 1656. Fairman quoted the Browning
letter without suggesting that it weighed especially strongly against an incorporationist
understanding. See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 78. He did note it was "a
major feature in the electoral canvass of 1866." Id. at 99. Fairman made the latter
comment while discussing Browning's later stance, in 1870, during an Illinois debate on
whether to abolish that state's grand jury guarantee. Browning strongly favored keeping
the grand jury, without ever suggesting that it might already be guaranteed by the
Amendment. Fairman's point-well taken, as far as it went-was that this, together with
similar omissions by others, points against a prevailing incorporationist understanding in
1870. See id. at 98-100; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 198-99
(discussing Fairman's analysis). Indeed, while there is ample pro-incorporation evidence
from the 1867-73 period (mostly overlooked by Fairman), there is also evidence (much
of it referenced by Fairman) suggesting widespread oblivion of any such theory during
that time. I will discuss all that in forthcoming articles. As suggested in AMAR, BILL OF
RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 372 n.71, one might argue that Browning's personal
failure to invoke the Amendment in 1870 deserves little weight. A diehard opponent,
having failed to defeat the Amendment, might want to minimize its scope. But that is
insignificant on the overall issue. Plenty of other people also failed to invoke
incorporation when one would think they would have. Would Browning have knowingly
passed up such tempting support for his 1870 argument? I doubt it. On that point I agree
with Fairman. The broader issue is whether such silence, overall, refutes the
incorporation theory. For Amar's persuasive argument why it does not, see id. at 197-
206, 373 n.92.
318 See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 277 (1856); AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 173, 199-202; CURTIS,
No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 166, 174; Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at
6-7; Curtis, Historical Linguistics (2000), supra note 10, at 1083-84; Dripps (1996),
supra note 29, at 1566-67; Wildenthal, Road to Twining (2000), supra note 3, at 1471-
72. See, in particular, AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 200-01, 371
nn.57-58 & 65, citing Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857) (opinion of
Lemuel Shaw, C.J.). In Jones, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court construed the
"law of the land" clause in the Massachusetts Constitution to have the same meaning as
"due process of law," and held that the clause implicitly required grand jury indictment
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Browning's objection would have changed if he had explicitly attacked
incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights. One can easily imagine tactical
reasons not to so frame the issue. What would that have accomplished? It
would simply have aligned him against the motherhood-and-apple-pie
symbolism of the Bill of Rights. One can imagine Bingham thinking: "Bring
it on!"
Like modem rightwing critics of "judicial activism," Browning may have
preferred not to campaign openly against the Bill of Rights-though it must
be conceded that he may well not have been aware of the incorporation
theory. Like modem critics, he and other opponents of the Fourteenth
Amendment may have preferred to campaign against allegedly excessive
federal power-against "government by [federal] judiciary," especially as
invoked by accused criminals.319
Thomas argued, in 2001, that "[i]f Browning had thought incorporation
was a theory to be taken seriously.., he would surely have raised that as an
even more draconian invasion of [state authority] ."320 But if Browning and
other opponents did not take incorporation seriously, they were not paying
much attention to the congressional debates on the Amendment they were
fighting. Browning's "prophetic" letter, taken by itself, could be read to
suggest he understood and took very seriously indeed the overall
incorporationist design of the Amendment. 321 In any event, given the
prevailing understanding of the Due Process Clause that was undeniably part
of the Amendment, there was little reason to think total incorporation would
have been much more "draconian."
For example, opponents (in theory) could have invoked the prospect that
the Amendment would enforce the right to grand jury indictment against the
minority of states not guaranteeing that right during 1866-68. But they had
no need to invoke total incorporation of the Bill of Rights to make that
for "infamous" crimes--even though the state constitution, unlike the federal Fifth
Amendment, did not specify any such right to grand jury. See Jones, 74 Mass. at 340-47.
319 See BERGER, GoVERNMENT (1977), supra note 7 (quoting Berger's title). As
noted in the text, I do not claim Browning actually made a conscious choice in this
regard. Given his later failure to invoke the incorporation theory when it seems he should
have, see supra note 317, he personally may well have been unaware of it. My point is
that his letter, as written, served most or all of the likely needs of anyone who may have
desired to use the incorporation doctrine or its likely impact as grounds to attack the
Amendment.
320Thomas, When (2001), supra note 31, at 208; see also supra note 314
(discussing Bond's similar argument). But see supra note 317 (noting Thomas's
reconsideration on Browning).
321 But see supra notes 317, 319 (and my concession in the text).
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argument. It was already directly available and strongly supportable under
the Amendment's Due Process Clause. 322
There does not seem to be any evidence that anyone raised the grand jury
issue during ratification, though general arguments along the lines of
Browning's letter might be thought to implicitly encompass it along with
other concerns. But Browning himself would not have thought the grand jury
issue was a strong or even desirable argument to make against the
Amendment. He made clear just a few years later that he greatly valued the
grand jury and fervently opposed the idea of states abandoning it.323 Modem
anti-incorporationists, from Justice Frankfurter in 1947 to Merkel in 2006,
have anachronistically touted the grand jury as a killer argument against
incorporation. 324 But Browning's example teaches us that for every
American who might have been swayed against the Amendment by such a
hypothetical argument, there may well have been one or two or more who
would have viewed it as an added reason to support the Amendment.325
322 See the sources cited supra note 318. The Supreme Court did not reject the
argument that the Due Process Clause encompassed grand jury indictment until almost
twenty years later, and even then over a powerful dissent. See Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516 (1884); id. at 538 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wildenthal, Road to Twining (2000),
supra note 3, at 1469-75; see also id. at 1476-78 & n.104 (noting that nearly two-thirds
of the 37 states in 1866-68 already guaranteed grand jury indictment, and that apart from
the grand jury issue there appeared to be congruence, for the most part, between the
federal Bill of Rights and state constitutional guarantees). I actually understated in 2000
the extent of state constitutional grand jury rights in 1866-68. Surveying only the facial
language of state constitutions, and overlooking Jones despite Amar's citation of it, see
supra note 318, I mistakenly listed Massachusetts as a state that did not guarantee the
right. This was, I would note, a mistake that went against my overall argument.
323 See supra note 317.
324 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64-65 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 82-84, 115-16, 134, 137-38;
Merkel, Cultural (2006), supra note 40, at 691 & n.90 (citing Fairman); see also supra
note 43; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 200 (noting "Fairman's
anachronistic hostility to grand juries").
325 Some simply may not have cared, or may have overlooked the issue. Fairman
touted the fact-as if it supported his view-that Michigan, Senator Howard's home
state, abolished the grand jury before the Civil War when Howard was state attorney
general. See Fairman, Original (1949), supra note 7, at 115-16, 134. But see Wildenthal,
Road to Twining (2000), supra note 3, at 1479-80 (pointing out that this actually tends to
refute the significance of the grand jury issue). Howard did not mention the grand jury in
his otherwise fairly extensive-though avowedly non-exhaustive-recitation of Bill of
Rights guarantees that the Amendment would apply to the states. Some might argue that
suggests he intended (without explanation) to exempt the grand jury. But he also failed to
mention several other specific guarantees, while generally embracing all
"rights... secured by the first eight amendments." See supra Part V (p. 1561). I tend to
think he either overlooked the issue, did not think it was important, or both. One might
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Browning's stated concern was not with the precise metes and bounds of
the Due Process Clause, but with federal courts having the power to interpret
and apply it in state cases. Many other opponents of the Amendment, in
many states, picked up and echoed this classic federalist concern about
interference with state laws and judicial systems. 326 Recall that Nicholas-
who we know was fully aware of the Republican goal of incorporation-
chose to frame his objections by claiming that the rights protected by Section
1 "need no aid from the Federal Government." Just like Browning, Nicholas
argued that the Amendment's overall effect would be "to harass the States
... within what should be exclusive State jurisdiction." 327 All of this
confirms Amar's perceptive observation: "[O]ne would expect that
opposition.., would find expression in the idiom of federalism... [a]nd this
is exactly the kind of rhetoric that one does find during ratification." 328
If one were to argue that Browning and other opponents should have
invoked the prospect of federal protection of substantive Bill of Rights
liberties other than criminal procedural guarantees, the answer is obvious.
We have seen the centrality of Republican concerns over free speech-a
point Thomas now acknowledges. 329 Campaigning to allow states to continue
suppressing speech or other basic liberties, without federal protection, would
have been a distinctly losing argument in 1866. It would only have inflamed
Republican supporters of the Amendment.
Campaigning explicitly against nationalizing the Bill of Rights would
have been, as Amar and I have suggested-and as I think the linguist George
Lakoff would agree-a classic "framing" mistake.330 The Democrats of
speculate that he wanted to reverse the abandonment of the grand jury by Michigan and
other states, but I am not aware of any evidence of that, and I tend to doubt it. I intend to
research the issue further in connection with a forthcoming biographical article on
Howard.
326 See JAMES, RATIFICATION (1984), supra note 312, at 106, 151, 189, cited in
CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 152, 254-55 nn.109-11; BOND, No EASY
WALK (1997), supra note 263, at 22, 39, 56-57, 87, 102, 126, 150, 173-74, 194-95, 216-
17, 236-38; Bond, Ratification (1984), supra note 263, at 98-99; Bond, Original (1985),
supra note 263, at 458-60.
327 See supra p. 1595.
328 AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 205.
329 See Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra note 5, at 1638, 1643, 1646; see also supra
pp. 1596-99.
3 3 0 See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! KNOW YOUR
VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (Chelsea Green 2004). This book summarized for a
popular audience, especially political liberals with whom Lakoff allies himself, ideas that
he developed earlier in a lengthy academic work. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL
POLITICS: How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (Univ. Chicago Press, 2d ed.
2002). Lakoff's liberal politics are irrelevant to the value of his concept of "framing"
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1866-68 were too smart and politically savvy to make that mistake. If there
is a puzzle here, it is really, as Maltz suggested, that Republicans did not
follow Bingham's cue and emphasize more strongly the need to nationalize
the Bill of Rights. Perhaps they were too caught up with the other issues
mentioned earlier. The "bloody shirt" was perhaps a more potent rallying cry
for some. But the Bill of Rights was the "better angel" of Reconstruction-
the issue with the greatest potential to unite all Americans across divides of
race and section.331
C. Weighing the "Sounds of Silence"332
Let us proceed, in any event, on the stipulation that there was,
essentially, silence out in the country on the incorporation issue, during
ratification. Focus again on the fourth issue noted earlier: Which default
presumption should then govern? One view is that a constitutional
amendment, in the absence of irrefutably plain text, can only properly be
interpreted a certain way if there is affirmative evidence that both Congress
and the ratifying states understood and embraced that meaning. This view is
sometimes applied with great specificity to individual provisions and issues.
issues. Indeed, a central theme of his work is that liberals need to better emulate the
highly skilled use of framing employed by conservatives. An example of framing leaps
readily to mind from America's experiences with controversial foreign wars, whether in
Vietnam forty years ago or Iraq today. Opponents of such military interventions typically
try to frame the issue as whether to persist in fighting an unwise or unjust war that is
killing American soldiers and many other people. But when opponents seek to cut
funding for such wars, supporters of maintaining or even escalating them often seek to
reframe the issue as whether to "support our troops"--suggesting that funding cuts would
somehow endanger them. Opponents in turn may try to reframe the debate back in their
favor, by pointing out the obvious fact that continuing to fund and conduct the war may
pose a far greater danger to the troops (and others). Which side wins a debate is often
dependent on which frame takes hold in people's minds.
331 See MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS (1990), supra note 10, at 117 (discussing the
"puzzling anomaly" of the Republican failure to campaign more systematically on the
basis of nationalizing the Bill of Rights, a puzzle that led Maltz, while generally
supporting the incorporation theory, to classify it as "not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt"). "Waving the bloody shirt" refers to the tactic, familiar during that era, of
exploitatively invoking the deaths of Union soldiers during the Civil War. See, e.g.,
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1988), supra note 80, at 487 n.46. President Lincoln's First
Inaugural Address appealed famously to "the better angels of our nature." See, e.g.,
JAMES A. RAWLEY, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND A NATION WORTH FIGHTING FOR 43 (Univ.
Neb. Press 2003) (originally published, Harlan Davidson 1996).
332 1 borrow part of Amar's section heading here. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS
(1998), supra note 10, at 197. I assume Amar was inspired by the Simon & Garfunkel
song. I also embrace the gist of Amar's argument, see supra notes 317-18, and seek to
build upon it here.
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Under this view, the mere fact that voters and politicians generally endorsed
an amendment would not support reading one of its provisions a certain way,
unless there was specific, affirmative evidence that they embraced that
particular reading of that particular provision.
Not surprisingly, anti-incorporationists have tended to adopt this general
view of the Fourteenth Amendment, or treat it as an implicit assumption. So
have some scholars outside the context of the incorporation debate. It is a
perfectly legitimate, though highly debatable, philosophy. It raises
fundamental theoretical issues about original intent or understanding in
relation to text, whose intent or understanding matters, and how specific that
intent or understanding must be. It also highlights another issue: How good is
the textual, as opposed to the historical, argument for the incorporation
doctrine?
David Kyvig and Richard Aynes have suggested that in construing the
Fourteenth Amendment what matters is the intent of the congressional
framers, not the state ratifiers. That conflicts to some extent with the view
taken by some other scholars. Gingras, for example, argued that "in the case
of a constitutional provision, the ratifiers' understanding is what counts
most."
333
The Supreme Court in Maxwell v. Dow, a 1900 case rejecting the
incorporation doctrine, offered a rare comment of its own on this subject.
While not clearly defining the relative weight of congressional as compared
to ratifier understandings, the Court stated, as to congressional history, that
"[i]n the case of a constitutional amendment it is of less materiality than in
that of an ordinary bill or resolution. A constitutional amendment must be
agreed to, not only by Senators and Representatives, but it must be ratified
by... three fourths of the States .... 334
Kyvig, in his study of constitutional amendments throughout American
history, noted an interesting feature of Republican strategy on the Fourteenth
Amendment. They deliberately framed and presented it as a package deal-
all or nothing, take it or leave it as a whole.335 Sections 1 and 5, as we have
333 Gingras (1996), supra note 198, at 42 (citing two other scholars); see also id. at
71. Aynes has remarked to me that he does not necessarily disagree with Gingras's view
as a general matter. With regard to amendments not presented in omnibus, multi-part
form like the Fourteenth, Aynes suggested he might well agree with Gingras and others
who would give more weight to the ratifiers' understanding. I myself, however, would
not. While I think the argument for privileging the congressional understanding is
especially strong in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, I think the basic logic behind
doing so applies to any constitutional amendment, for reasons discussed below in the
text.
334 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).
335 See DAVID E. KYvIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995 166-67 (Univ. Press Kan. 1996).
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seen, focused on guaranteeing and enforcing basic rights. But Sections 2, 3,
and 4 received a lot more attention and aroused much more controversy.
They dealt with vital political issues. Section 2 concerned whether the
apportionment of House seats to Southern states would reflect a full counting
of the freed slaves. Each slave had been treated as three-fifths of a White
person for apportionment purposes. But since most states still denied Blacks
the vote, the Unionist states with small Black populations faced the bitterly
ironic threat that emancipation might actually strengthen the political
influence of White-supremacist states, recently in rebellion, with large Black
populations. Section 3 concerned the exclusion of rebels from political
office, and Section 4 dealt with the Union and Confederate debts. Combining
these disparate elements into a single Amendment was a "depart[ure]...
from earlier amending practice," a "political tactic ... [d]esigned to enlist the
broadest possible coalition of support,... [and] increas[e] the likelihood of
congressional adoption and state ratification.. ,,336 It aroused a lot of
criticism. But, as history records, it worked.337
Kyvig suggested that this approach "shifted critical decisionmaking from
the ratifiers to the initial adopters" in Congress.338 Aynes elaborated that "it
is possible.., the framers knew, or at least feared, that one or more of the
separate sections ... would not command the necessary support from state
legislatures. This knowledge led them to link the provisions together to gain
a result that the legislatures themselves may not have intended." Aynes
suggested that might explain "why states would vote to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment and then not conform their state constitution[s] to comply with
its provisions." Perhaps some states "did not want to ratify the whole
package but did so as the lesser of two evils"-the greater evil being
complete rejection of the Amendment and the devastating impact that would
have had on basic Republican priorities. Perhaps "the framers of the
amendment intended to produce consequences that the ratifiers did not
intend. '339 Aynes concluded, provocatively, that "[w]hile the full picture
336 Id. at 166; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 2-4.
337 See KYvIG (1996), supra note 335, at 169-76; see also CURTIS, No STATE
(1986), supra note 10, at 185 (noting that the "Amendment... was a compromise that
contained a number of independent provisions," and that the state ratification debates
"involved weighing pros and cons" affecting Republican political imperatives); AMAR,
BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 202-04 (offering a similar observation);
Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at 111- 12 (same).
338 KYVIG (1996), supra note 335, at 167.
339 Aynes, Unintended (2000), supra note 10, at 131 (emphases in original); see also
id. at 123-32; Aynes, Unintended (2006), supra note 10, at 320 (restating the quoted
language almost verbatim, in an article revising and updating his 2000 chapter); id. at
309-21.
2007] 1611
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
should include the view[s] of both the framers and the ratifiers,. . . the work
of the .framers... should trump any contrary views held by individual
ratifiers." 340
That is, of course, a convenient conclusion for an incorporationist like
Aynes--or me-given that the evidence for incorporation is far stronger in
Congress than in the state ratification debates. And it raises troubling
theoretical issues. Conceding that this was the chosen tactic of the 1866
Congress, and that it "worked" in a brute-force sense, should it properly
govern our interpretation of the Amendment? Was this a legitimate tactic?
Did it spawn a legitimate interpretive rule, as Kyvig and Aynes suggested?
That, in turn, opens up the perennial question whether any of the three
Reconstruction Amendments were properly ratified at all, given the arguable
coercion of ratifying Southern states and the questionable legal status of their
legislatures. That fascinating issue is beyond the scope of this Article, though
I find convincing John Harrison's conclusion that the Reconstruction
Amendments were indeed lawfully added to the Constitution.341
My best answer to the dilemma is that, at some point, we simply have to
decide whether an amendment is to be honored as written. Conceding that
Congress broke some eggs to make the Fourteenth Amendment omelette, it is
part of the Constitution. Unless one rejects it altogether as an illegitimate
usurpation, it should be enforced with full regard for how it was understood
by those who wrote it. In the end, I agree with Kyvig and Aynes that we
properly may-indeed, must-privilege the understanding of the Congress
that proposes an amendment over silence, or even contrary views, on the part
of ratifying state legislatures.
That is only proper, to be sure, if Congress's understanding is clearly,
publicly, and candidly conveyed to the country, and reasonably reflected in
the text of such an amendment, so that the states are at least on fair notice.
Only then can such an understanding fairly be deemed part of the original
public meaning. An amendment cannot properly be given a meaning the
ratifying states could not have known about. But it can, I think, be given a
meaning that some or perhaps even most ratifying states did not specifically
340 Aynes, Unintended (2000), supra note 10, at 131-32; accord Aynes, Unintended
(2006), supra note 10, at 321.
341 See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U.
CHI. L. REv. 375 (2001). For a contrary view, contending that the lawfulness of the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be justified within the formal constitutional framework,
see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99-119 (Harv. Univ. Press
1998). For a view supporting Harrison's, from a constitutional theorist of conservative
Democratic bent who lived through the Reconstruction era, see FRANCIS WHARTON,
COMMENTARIES ON LAW 693-96 (§ 593) (Kay & Brother 1884) (facsimile reprint, Gaunt
2001). See also AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION (2005), supra note 10, at 364-80
(generally agreeing with Harrison).
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endorse, or may not have clearly understood or even thought much about.
We need not require proof of specific, affirmative confirmation at the state
level. We need only require proof of fair public notice and legal
ratification. 342
Ratification is a simple yes-or-no decision. If a state legislature feels
strongly enough that a proposed amendment is unacceptable, because of
disagreement or uncertainty over its meaning or for any other reason, the
only proper and effective way to express that position is by simply refusing
to ratify. A state cannot ratify with qualifications or reservations like a nation
ratifying an international treaty. This view is confirmed by that taken in 1865
by Samuel S. Nicholas, who-opposing ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment-declared it well understood, "as every lawyer knows, that the
[state] legislature has no power to make a conditional ratification. All it can
do is to say yes or no." A conditional ratification "would only enable the
abolition Congress to consider the condition as mere surplusage, and treat the
ratification as unconditional, which they would certainly do." 343
Thus, if the states have been put on fair notice of Congress's
understanding of an amendment and ultimately choose to ratify it-for
whatever reasons-it should be interpreted in light of a fair reading of its text
342 Thomas expresses agreement with this metric. See Thomas, Riddle (2007), supra
note 5, at 1632-33. He also suggests that I "flinch" in applying it. See id. at 1634. Not
surprisingly, I disagree. See Wildenthal, Reply (2007), supra note 5, at 1664-66.
Somewhat relatedly, Kurt Lash suggests-in one of several very helpful comments in
reviewing this Article, see supra note 64-that by privileging the congressional
understanding in this manner, I may have returned, in effect, to the old "framers' intent"
approach to originalism. As discussed in the Introduction, supra pp. 1527-29, I agree
with the general modem rejection of that approach and its replacement by a focus on
original public meaning. I concede I may be skating close to the line of a subtle
distinction here. There is some tension and overlap. This Article certainly devotes a lot of
attention to the views of key framers like Bingham and Howard. But as I seek to
emphasize in the text, I do not and would not privilege the intentions alone of the
congressional framers above the original public understanding of what the Fourteenth
Amendment meant. Rather, I argue that the publicly expressed views and intentions of
the framers are exceptionally valuable evidence of the overall original understanding-
the best evidence we have, more valuable and more authoritative than the views (or
silence) of state ratifiers. Of course, as Lash also suggests, there is some risk of focusing
more on congressional as compared to ratifier understandings, simply because we have
more evidence about the former. This is analogous to the risk, acknowledged supra note
168, of focusing more on the New York Times as compared to other historical
newspapers, due to ease of modem access. Lash and others may well have more to say
about all this. I certainly do not pretend to have resolved all the issues.
343 2 NICHOLAS, ESSAYS (1865), supra note 267, at 153 (ch. 14, "Amendment of the
Constitution. Letter to a Member of the Kentucky Legislature," pub. Feb. 11, 1865); see
also supra Part VII.B (pp. 1590-95) (discussing the later Nicholas essay bearing on
incorporation).
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and Congress's publicly expressed understanding of its meaning. These
factors should override any contrary, possibly self-serving, views expressed
at the state level. They should certainly override mere silence-and nothing
more than silence, essentially, has been shown during ratification in
opposition to the incorporationist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Practical considerations support this view. Ratification is a collective
process, requiring approval by at least three-fourths of the states. What if one
state conditioned its ratification on rejecting or modifying part of Congress's
understanding-or even part of the explicit text? One might argue that should
bind Congress, and courts construing the amendment, if that state happened
to provide the decisive ratification, right on the cusp of three-fourths
approval. But why should that particular state be so privileged? What if one,
several, or all of the other states conditioned their ratifications on accepting
Congress's understanding-or on imposing some other condition? Once one
state ratifies conditionally, are all later ratifications deemed to incorporate
that state's condition? Only if the other states are on notice of it? Even if they
are on notice, could they not properly choose to reject the other state's view
and rely instead on Congress's understanding or the plain text? Do they have
to expressly say so? Could a decisive state's condition be undone by an
additional state providing an alternative decisive ratification?
None of this is meant to suggest that evidence from the state ratification
debates, or otherwise outside the proposing Congress, is irrelevant. The issue
is the proper hierarchy or weight of evidence. My point is simply that
understandings at the state level, or uncertainties in that regard, are not
authoritative. They cannot properly be used to refute an understanding
otherwise well supported by the text and the congressional evidence. But
evidence of understandings outside the proposing Congress-even evidence
postdating ratification344-may certainly have some relevant weight. Such
evidence may tend to undermine a given reading of an amendment. It may
suggest a lower likelihood that the proposing Congress itself entertained--or
clearly conveyed to the country-such a reading. Or it may bolster a given
reading. It may tend to corroborate the purported textual or congressional
basis for such a reading.
I would not quarrel with the basic approach suggested by the anti-
incorporationist Maxwell Court:
The safe way is to read [a constitutional amendment's] language in
connection with the known condition of affairs out of which the occasion
for its adoption may have arisen, and then to construe it, if there be therein
any doubtful expressions, in a way so far as is reasonably possible, to
forward the known purpose or object for which the amendment was
344 For my suggestions on how to weigh the significance of post-ratification
evidence, see supra note 57.
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adopted. This rule could not, of course, be so used as to limit the force and
effect of an amendment in a manner which the plain and unambiguous
language used therein would not justify or permit.345
In the final analysis, the plain text and the proposing Congress's publicly
expressed understanding must surely have priority over state ratification
evidence. And understandings expressed in ratifying state legislatures should
not necessarily rank next in the hierarchy. Other evidence from outside
Congress, depending on its context and intrinsic character, might deserve
greater weight. For example, the reporting of a prestigious, nationally known
newspaper allied with the governing party in Congress, like the New York
Times during Reconstruction, might deserve greater weight than potentially
idiosyncratic views in some state legislatures.
Of course, a myriad of factors affect the absolute and relative value of
any historical evidence bearing on constitutional interpretation. The
foregoing merely sketches some of my views. Readers will ultimately have
to evaluate for themselves the evidence discussed throughout this Article,
along with my interpretations and arguments.
VIII. TEXT AND BEYOND
As many scholars have noted, the greater difficulty, from the standpoint
of the original understanding, is not supporting incorporation of the Bill of
Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, but limiting incorporation to the Bill of
Rights. Scholars as diverse as John Hart Ely and Earl Maltz have argued that
it is virtually impossible to limit the Amendment's Privileges and Immunities
Clause to rights expressly guaranteed in the constitutional text.346 Some have
argued that the Amendment embraces a wide and uncertain range of natural
or common law rights.34 7 Justices Stephen J. Field and Joseph P. Bradley,
345 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).
34 6 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 28 (Harv. Univ. Press 1980); MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS (1990), supra note 10, at
113.
347 See generally, e.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 47-67, 207-30 (Hein 1997); RANDY E. BARNETr,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 60-68 (Princeton
Univ. Press 2004); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS,
NAMED AND UNNAMED 1-85 (Yale Univ. Press 1999) (originally published, Putnam
1997); BOND, No EASY WALK (1997), supra note 263, at 255-57; Trisha Olson, The
Natural Law Foundations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 48 ARK. L. REV. 347 (1995); Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon,
Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause to Redress the Balance Among States,
Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 1 (1998); Douglas G.
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dissenting in the Slaughter-House Cases of 1873, are probably the most
famous judicial exponents of that view.348 Harrison, among others, has
argued that the Privileges and Immunities Clause refers to various state-law
rights of state citizenship, though he argued that the Clause protects only
equal enjoyment of such rights. 349
There is certainly some support for broader readings in the congressional
history. Howard's May 1866 speech is the most famous example. He
sweepingly suggested-before "add[ing]" the Bill of Rights to the mix-that
constitutional privileges and immunities "cannot be fully defined in their
entire extent and precise nature." 350 A broad natural-rights reading is also
consistent with the antislavery legal theories that deeply influenced
Reconstruction Republicans. Such theories emphasized the primacy of
"natural" or "God-given" principles of justice over laws and constitutions
written by mere humans. They drew upon a long tradition of natural-rights
thinking in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 351 William Royall argued in
1878 that
[n]inety-nine out of every hundred educated men, upon reading [the
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause] over, would at first say
that it forbade a state to make or enforce a law which abridged any privilege
or immunity whatever of one who was a citizen of the United States; and it
Smith, Natural Law, Article IV, and Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 AM.
U. L. REv. 351 (1997) [hereinafter D. Smith, Natural Law (1997)]; Douglas G. Smith,
Fundamental Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Nineteenth Century
Understanding of "Higher" Law, 3 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 225 (1999) [hereinafter D.
Smith, Fundamental Rights (1999)].
348 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873) (Field, J., joined by Chase, C.J. and Swayne
and Bradley, JJ., dissenting); id. at 111, 124 (Bradley, J., joined by Swayne, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 124 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
349 See generally Harrison, Reconstructing (1992), supra note 89; see also CURRIE,
SUPREME CouRT: FIRST HUNDRED (1985), supra note 70, at 347-50 (suggesting such a
reading); supra Part VII.A (p. 1588 & n.260) (discussing my forthcoming article dealing
with this issue).
350 CG (39:1) 2765 (May 23, 1866); see also, e.g., Curtis, Resurrecting (1996),
supra note 10, at 68-69.
351 On antislavery theories, see generally, for example, NYE (1949), supra note 292,
at 177-96; Olson (1995), supra note 347; D. Smith, Natural Law (1997), supra note 347;
D. Smith, Fundamental Rights (1999), supra note 347; and sources cited supra note 95.
A classic study of natural-rights theories in Anglo-American jurisprudence-though not
discussing the antislavery movement-is Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law"
Background ofAmerican Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928).
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is only by an effort of ingenuity that any other sense can be discovered that
it can be forced to bear. 352
But there is also some support for a narrower reading of the Clause, one
tied to textually guaranteed rights. Ely, Maltz, Aynes, and others have gone
too far in suggesting a complete lack of evidence for such a textualist
reading. One scholar recently went so far as to make the categorical-but
demonstrably mistaken-assertion that "[t]here is no contemporaneous
historical support whatsoever for the proposition that the privileges and
immunities clause was intended to apply only to rights expressly
protected... in the original Constitution and not to any other rights deemed
fundamental." 35
3
Bingham himself, despite his own grounding in natural-rights antislavery
ideology, provides the best foil to Howard in this regard. While Bingham's
language was often broad and flowery, he was fairly explicit and consistent
in linking his conception of "privileges" and "immunities" strictly to textual
constitutional guarantees. We have seen his repeated invocations of the Bill
of Rights, a classic textual expression of fundamental rights. And not unlike
the textualist approach taken years later by Justice Black, Bingham arguably
viewed the Bill of Rights as a ceiling as well as a floor.
In Bingham's very first speech introducing the original version of
Section 1, in February 1866, he directed "the attention of the House to the
fact that the amendment proposed stands in the very words of the
Constitution." Referring to his Barron-contrarian view, he reiterated that the
Amendment would not impose on the states "any obligation which is not
now enjoined upon them by the very letter of the Constitution." 354 In his
lengthy and crucial remarks two days later, he described the proposal as
designed "to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today. It
'hath that extent-no more."' 355
352 Royall (1878), supra note 78, at 563.
353 David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTrNGS L.J.
333, 368 (2003) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 368-70 & n.210 (citing some of the
same Bingham speeches quoted in the text, and acknowledging but dismissing his 1871
speech); see also infra note 376. Aynes likewise asserted that "Bingham, the 39th
Congress, the ratifying legislatures, and antislavery theorists never suggested that the
privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens were confined to the rights recognized in the
first eight amendments." Aynes, Bingham (1993), supra note 10, at 104; see also William
J. Rich, Lessons of Charleston Harbor: The Rise, Fall and Revival of Pro-Slavery
Federalism, 36 McGEORGE L. REv. 569, 601 (2005) (quoting Aynes's assertion with
approval).
354 CG (39:1) 1034 (Feb. 26, 1866).
355 Id. at 1088 (Feb. 28, 1866) (apparently quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
OTHELLO act 1, sc. 3); see also id at 1089 (describing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7
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Upon House passage of the near-final Amendment in May 1866-with
the Privileges and Immunities Clause in its final form-the example
Bingham chose to explain its necessity was state punishment "[c]ontrary to
the express letter of [the] Constitution. ' 356 He reiterated that the goal of
Section 1 was simply to stop "unconstitutional State enactments .... That is
the extent that it hath, no more ... -357 And in January 1867, as we have
seen, Bingham stated that the Amendment would reverse the Barron doctrine
so as to prohibit the states from violating what he described at one point as
the "personal rights ... of the first ten articles of amendment" and a bit later
Pet.) 243 (1833), as "exactly what" he wanted to overturn with the Amendment); id. at
1090 (referring to "the existing amendments" as being what Barron rendered inapplicable
to the states); supra Part III (p. 1541).
Boyce argued that Bingham, in referring to the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing that
"all shall be protected alike in life, liberty, and property," and in repeatedly referring to
"equal protection" or equal rights generally, was "thus including in the 'bill of rights' an
extratextual right of equal protection." Boyce (1998), supra note 60, at 981 n.366 (citing
CG (39:1) 1089 (Feb. 28, 1866)). But when Bingham talked about "all alike" enjoying
protection of life, liberty, and property, he was plainly referring to the Fifth
Amendment's explicit textual guarantee that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." A substantive guarantee extending to all
persons obviously ensures that "all alike" are equally protected to that extent. See supra
note 260; MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS (1990), supra note 10, at 4, 157-58; Curtis, Blueprint
(1990), supra note 142, at 834-35; Curtis, Resurrecting (1996), supra note 10, at 55.
Furthermore, Bingham strongly suggested that he regarded this concept of equal
protection or equal rights as necessarily implied-as indeed it is-by all textual
guarantees of constitutional rights, liberties, privileges, or immunities. For example,
Bingham declared: "What does the word immunity in your Constitution mean?
Exemption from unequal burdens." Later on the same page, he referred to "the equal right
of all citizens of the United States in every State to all privileges and immunities of
citizens." CG (39:1) 1089 (Feb. 28, 1866). At most, Bingham was drawing a limited and
direct inference or implication from plain text-as even the most rigorous textualists
would concede is often necessary. This explains very easily why Bingham said-as
quoted in the text above-that his proposal "stands in the very words of the
Constitution," despite the fact, as Fairman meticulously noted, that it was "not literally
true" that the "equal protection" language was already there. Fairman, Original (1949),
supra note 7, at 24; see also BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 129
(denouncing what Berger thought was Bingham's "glaring inexactitude" in this regard);
BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 160 (lambasting Bingham's alleged
"sloppiness" in this regard); id. at 182 (reiterating this criticism).
Some might interject at this point that such statements by Bingham support an
"equal rights only" reading of the Amendment. I agree that they support a general focus
on equal rights, but would disagree with the "only" aspect, for reasons I have suggested
and which I will pursue in a forthcoming article. See supra note 223; Part VII.A (p. 1588
& note 260).
356 CG (39:1) 2542 (May 10, 1866); see also supra Part III (p. 1554).
357 CG (39:1) 2543 (May 10, 1866).
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as "all the limitations for personal protection of every article and section of
the Constitution." 358
In 1871, explaining in retrospect his development and understanding of
the Amendment, Bingham analogized Section 1 to the express textual limits
on state power in Article I, Section 10.359 He explained that "the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished from
citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight amendments," which
he then quoted verbatim. One might think his qualifier "chiefly" suggested a
supratextual scope. Kurt Lash has so argued. But in context, Bingham
seemed to refer to the other textual rights just mentioned, which were
guaranteed in the original Constitution before it was amended to add the Bill
of Rights. Bingham seemed to confirm the latter reading later on the same
page, referring to "all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, as guarantied [sic] by the amended Constitution and expressly
enumerated in the Constitution." He then asked: "Do gentlemen say that by
so legislating we would strike down the rights of the State? God forbid. '360
Congress was then debating the Ku Klux Act of 1871,361 which Bingham
supported, to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. He thus
used the textually limited scope of the Fourteenth Amendment precisely in
order to defend it against the perennial charge that it unduly invades state
prerogatives.
What, indeed, can the plain text of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
and Immunities Clause tell us? Is it really so hopelessly vague and open-
ended, as so many have so long contended? In a law school paper written in
1988, I reinvented the wheel by coming up with a simple, four-step syllogism
capturing the logic of incorporating the Bill of Rights-and only the Bill of
Rights and other textual constitutional guarantees-via that Clause: (1) It
undeniably restricts state power with regard to some class of rights (hint:
read the Clause). (2) It had to accomplish something; therefore, the rights
protected must have been ones the states were previously free to violate as
far as the Constitution was concerned (hint: see Barron). (3) The words
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" indicate that those
rights were already guaranteed in some sense to U.S. citizens (hint: see the
358 CG (39:2) 811 (Jan. 28, 1867); see also supra note 111; Part VII.B (pp. 1599-
1600).
359 CG (42:1) app. 83-84 (Mar. 31, 1871).
360 Id. at app. 84. But see Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The
Original Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 459, 468 &
n.36 (2001) (citing Bingham's use of "chiefly" to support the argument that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause was understood to encompass nontextual liberties outside the Bill
of Rights).
361 17 Stat. 13 (Apr. 20, 1871).
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Bill of Rights). (4) Ergo, the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States" that "[n]o State shall ... abridge" must be those that
simultaneously meet criteria (2) and (3). It should not take Holmesian
abilities--either those of Oliver Wendell, Jr., or Sherlock-to fill in that
blank.
Justice John Marshall Harlan the elder suggested this textual logic in
1900, as did Justice Black in 1968--over the dissent of Harlan's grandson.362
Amar offered a beautifully detailed demonstration of it in his 1992 article
and 1998 book, as did Curtis in articles published in 1996 and 1998.363 All of
us in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, however, were beaten to the
punch by Charles Pence's marvelously laconic 1891 article. Pence noted that
"[t]he language employed" in the Clause "is apt and proper to effect th[e]
purpose" of incorporating the Bill of Rights. "There were no other privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States ... which stood in need of such
protection," he pointed out. "The only privileges or immunities within its
view are such as are recognized and allowed by the constitution. Its only
effect is to make them what they should rightfully be-the secure possession
of every citizen." 364
IX. THE DUAL-CITIZENSHIP THEORY
The foregoing textual logic is, of course, a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, it supports total incorporation of the Bill of Rights as a minimum
floor meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. But on the other
hand, it suggests the Clause's meaning may be subject to a textual ceiling,
defined by the scope of constitutionally specified rights belonging to
"citizens of the United States." In this sense, it relies on the concept of dual
citizenship-federal vs. state-also implied by the immediately preceding
Citizenship Clause. To be sure, undue weight should not be placed on the
Citizenship Clause. It was added belatedly by the Senate, after the Privileges
and Immunities Clause was drafted and passed by the House, mainly to erase
any doubts about the citizenship of the freed slaves. But that still leaves the
362 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 606, 612 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
overruled by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); see also Duncan, 391 U.S. at
165-66 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 174-75 n.9 (Harlan, J., joined
by Stewart, J., dissenting).
363 See Amar, Bill of Rights (1992), supra hote 10, at 1218-26; AMAR, BILL OF
RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10, at 163-74; Curtis, Resurrecting (1996), supra note 10, at
19-26; Michael Kent Curtis, Two Textual Adventures: Thoughts on Reading Jeffrey
Rosen's Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1269, 1271-73 (1998).
364 Charles R. Pence, The Construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 AM. L.
REv. 536, 550 (1891); see also id. at 540; AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), supra note 10,
at 375 n.1 17 (praising Pence's analysis).
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express qualification regarding U.S. citizenship set forth in the Privileges and
Immunities Clause itself.365
The Slaughter-House Court relied heavily-to its great infamy-on dual-
citizenship analysis to limit the scope of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.366 A remarkably wide spectrum of scholars has condemned that
reading. Even Berger, in his 1977 and 1997 books, criticized the Court's
reasoning, asserting that "[t]he notion that by conferring dual citizenship the
framers were separating said rights of a citizen of the United States from
those of a State citizen not only is without historical warrant but actually
does violence to their intention. '367
Chester Antieau, a scholar at the opposite extreme from Berger and a
much harsher critic of Slaughter-House, favored a very broad natural-rights
reading of the Amendment. Antieau conceded the apparent limiting effect on
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the words "of citizens of the United
States." But he argued that this phrasing was an unintended "tragedy." It was
"inconceivable," Antieau felt, "that Bingham and the other proponents of the
Amendment would have willingly denied federal protection of such rights to
the millions of legal aliens ... in the United States .... 368 Berger, though
taking a far narrower view of the Amendment than Antieau, also dismissed
its distinction between "citizens" and "persons" as "not carefully considered"
and "rais[ing] a number of perplexing problems. '369
With regard to dual citizenship, I am wary of differing with Berger on a
rare point where he seemed to take a more expansive view of the
Amendment--especially where he is supported by many other scholars with
whom I tend to agree more, such as Curtis and Aynes. 370 Berger, Curtis,
Aynes, Antieau, Harrison, and many others have certainly been correct in
criticizing the Slaughter-House Court's undue reliance on the Citizenship
365 See supra note 1; Part II (p.1532 & n.73).
366 See, e.g., Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000), supra note 2, at 1096-99.
367 BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1977), supra note 7, at 46; see also id. at 37-51. Accord
BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 65; see also id. at 57-69.
368 ANTIEAU (1997), supra note 347, at 49; see also, e.g., id at 56-61 (arguing that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects a broad range of natural rights); id at 62
(condemning Slaughter-House for its limited, dual-citizenship reading of the clause).
369 BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1977), supra note 7, at 215 (emphasis in original); see
also id. at 215-20. Accord BERGER, GOVERNMENT (1997), supra note 7, at 240; see also
id. at 240-44.
370 See, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 175 (excoriating the
Slaughter-House dual-citizenship analysis); Aynes, Constricting (1994), supra note 10, at
634-52 (same); Aynes, Unintended (2006), supra note 10, at 297-300 (same); Harrison,
Reconstructing (1992), supra note 89, at 1414-15 (also criticizing that analysis, though
less harshly).
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Clause. But the fact is, some sort of dual-citizenship analysis not only makes
perfect textual sense, it does have some-though admittedly not consistent-
support in the congressional history. 371 Antieau's and Berger's views stated
above are, in any event, flatly contradicted by that history. Bingham and his
colleagues considered very carefully the precise language of the Amendment,
including the use of "citizen" or "person" in different clauses. They used
"person" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses-but not the
Privileges and Immunities Clause-precisely to include aliens.372
Bingham drew a sharp distinction between the rights of national and state
citizenship in his 1871 speech during the Ku Klux Act debate, referring to
"the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as
contradistinguished from citizens of a State. ' 373 A few days later, Bingham
engaged in a colloquy with his fellow Ohio Republican, Representative, and
future President James A. Garfield. Bingham objected to Garfield's
suggestion that the "substance" of the Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause was the same as the old Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Bingham pointed out the different wording of the two
clauses, quoting the Amendment's reference to "privileges or immunities of
371 See Avins, Incorporation (1968), supra note 9, at 16 (arguing that the Slaughter-
House Court "arrived at the right conclusion via the wrong route," and that the
Citizenship Clause should not be relied upon to interpret the Privileges and Immunities
Clause); see also id. at 12-17 (discussing some of the congressional history, which
contains some statements cutting against the dual-citizenship theory). By the "right
conclusion," Avins apparently meant the Court's holding that the Amendment "protected
only the privileges of national citizenship." Id. at 16. Avins did not take a clear position
on whether the Slaughter-House Court thereby meant to reject incorporation of the Bill of
Rights. Avins himself supported incorporation. Id. at 26. In fact, the Slaughter-House
majority opinion was at worst ambiguous on the incorporation issue, which was
irrelevant to the decision. At best, it was arguably supportive. The notion that the Court
rejected the incorporation theory in Slaughter-House is a surprisingly persistent myth.
See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000), supra note 2, at 1063-67, 1094-1125; see
generally Wildenthal, How I Learned (2001), supra note 2. I would not now contend that
the Slaughter-House majority affirmatively embraced the incorporation theory, a point I
now think I argued too enthusiastically in the foregoing articles. But it still remains clear,
in any event, that the Slaughter-House Court did not affirmatively reject that theory
either.
372 Antieau, in support of his reading, cited only a handful of vague statements
outside Congress by Bingham and Thaddeus Stevens, which did not clearly distinguish
between the different clauses of the Amendment. See ANTIEAU (1997), supra note 347, at
50. For support of my point in the text, see, for example, AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS (1998),
supra note 10, at 169-73; CURTIs, No STATE (1986), supra note 10, at 107; MALTZ, CIVIL
RIGHTS (1990), supra note 10, at 96-102; Crosskey, Fairman (1954), supra note 9, at
76-77; Wildenthal, Lost Compromise (2000), supra note 2, at 1113 & n.272. See also
supra Part V (p. 1563) (quoting Howard's explicit distinction in this regard).
373 CG (42:1) app. 84 (Mar. 31, 1871).
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citizens of the United States." He argued that Article IV, in contrast with the
Amendment, was "always interpreted... to mean only privileges and
immunities of citizens of the States, not of the United States. '374
Bingham had not turned more conservative in the five years since he
drafted the Amendment. He was a strong supporter of the boldly far-reaching
1871 Act, which even some Republicans (including Garfield) feared might
overrun constitutional limits. 375 In any event, his earlier views of the
Amendment were perfectly consistent, and indeed corroborate this point. In
May 1866, for example, with the Amendment's Privileges and Immunities
Clause in its final form, Bingham indicated that voting rights would remain
generally governed by state law and were not covered by the Clause. He
noted, however: "The franchise of a Federal elective office is... clearly one
of the privileges of a citizen of the United States. . . ." Why? It was
"provided for and guarantied [sic] in your Constitution." A moment later,
Bingham similarly noted "this exception, that as the right in the people of
each State to a republican government and to choose their Representatives in
Congress is of [sic] the guarantees of the Constitution, by this amendment a
remedy might be given.... " 376 Likewise, Bingham stated in January 1867:
"I deny ... that the citizens of the United States are entitled as such to the
privilege of voting in any State. That is the privilege of the citizens of an
organized State, and.., nobody else .... ,,377
374 Id. at app. 152 (Apr. 4, 1871); see also Avins, Incorporation (1968), supra note
9, at 12-13 (quoting and discussing this comment); CG (42:1) app. 84 (Mar. 31, 1871)
(Bingham) ("Is it not clear that other and different privileges and immunities than those
to which a citizen of a State was entitled are secured by the provision of the [F]ourteenth
[Amendment] ... ?"); Curtis, Resurrecting (1996), supra note 10, at 70 (quoting
Bingham's March 31 statement). Whether Bingham's 1871 statements indicate some
shift in his views on Article IV, as compared to 1866 or earlier, is an interesting question
that I will discuss in my forthcoming article mentioned supra Part VII.A (p. 1588 &
n.260). But as discussed in the text, his reading of the Amendment that he himself drafted
did not change.
375 See FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1988), supra note 80, at 454-56.
376 CG (39:1) 2542 (May 10, 1866). But see Bogen (2003), supra note 353, at 369
n.210 (erroneously stating that Bingham "did not articulate this distinction"--which
Bogen conceded he stated in 1871--"between the privileges of citizens of a state and of
the United States during the adoption debates"). See also supra Part VIII (p. 1617 &
n.353).
377 CG (39:2) 454 (Jan. 14, 1867); see also Avins, Incorporation (1968), supra note
9, at 17 n.82 (quoting and discussing this comment). Avins, having discussed this and one
of the other Bingham statements I discuss here, see supra note 374, correctly concluded
that "there was a clear dichotomy in Bingham's speeches between the privileges of
national citizenship and the privileges of state citizenship, and it was only the latter [sic;
Avins clearly meant to say the 'former'] that he intended to protect." Id. at 17; see also
id. at 12-17.
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As Maltz noted, this distinction between rights of national and state
citizenship was also expressed by other congressional Republicans at the
time. They included two of Bingham's Ohio colleagues who also played
influential roles in Reconstruction civil rights legislation: William Lawrence,
who later echoed Bingham's incorporationist views, and Samuel
Shellabarger. 378 Even Harrison conceded, in a footnote, that Bingham
"sometimes spoke as if the... Clause protected rights of national citizenship
as opposed to rights of state citizenship. '379 Harrison nevertheless claimed
that Bingham "agreed that [Fourteenth Amendment] privileges and
immunities ... included rights defined by state law."'380 But the speeches
Harrison cited dealt only with the Article IV Clause. None were from the
1866 debates on the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor did Harrison address
Bingham's 1867 or 1871 statements. In the latter of those, as noted, Bingham
expressly distinguished the Article lV and Fourteenth Amendment Clauses
on this very point.
Howard's speech in May 1866, though often viewed as supporting an
extremely broad, supratextual reading of the Clause, likewise indicated the
dual-citizenship limitation. He said the Clause "relates to the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States as such, and as distinguished from
all other persons not citizens of the United States."' 381 While that also
suggested a contrast with foreign citizens, Howard went on to echo
Bingham's exclusion of voting rights. And he did so even more categorically,
despite his own stronger personal support for Black suffrage. Howard
declared that Section 1 "does not give.., the right of voting. The right of
suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by
the Constitution." Why not? Because "[i]t has always been regarded... as
the result of positive local law . ... ,382 In other words, it was, at most, a
privilege of state, not national, citizenship.
Oddly enough, Berger's 1989 book contradicted his own above-quoted
view on dual citizenship expressed in 1977 and 1997. Berger in 1989 noted
378 See Earl M. Maltz, Brown v. Board of Education, in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.
& SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 207,
208-09, 214 nn.9-10 (New York Univ. Press 1998) (quoting CG (39:1) 1836 (Apr. 7,
1866) (Rep. Lawrence); id. at app. 293 (July 25, 1866) (Rep. Shellabarger)); Christine
Doyle, William Lawrence, 13 ANB, supra note 1, at 289; William A. Kinnison, Samuel
Shellabarger, 19 ANB, supra note 1, at 787; BDC, supra note 1, at 1426, 1899. On
Lawrence's incorporationist statements, made in 1871 and 1874, see Wildenthal, Lost
Compromise (2000), supra note 2, at 1123, 1145 n.432.
379 Harrison, Reconstructing (1992), supra note 89, at 1418 n. 134.
380 Id. at 1418; see also id. at 1418-19.
381 CG (39:1) 2765 (May 23, 1866).
382 Id. at 2766; see also MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS (1990), supra note 10, at 99-100;
MALTZ, FOURTEENTH (2003), supra note 191, at 70-71.
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with approval the distinction between national and state citizenship adopted
in Slaughter-House in 1873 and United States v. Cruikshank in 1876. He
suggested that distinction was supported by the congressional history.383
Odder still, Berger in 1989 criticized Bingham because, claimed Berger,
"[t]hat distinction eluded Bingham. ' '384 Berger's derision of Bingham was
apparently so great that he could not even grasp when he and Bingham were
in agreement.
CONCLUSION
The dual-citizenship theory, by itself, does not tell us precisely which
national citizenship rights the Reconstruction Republicans meant to protect.
There is no doubt they generally desired to greatly augment the national
protection of American citizens. But at the same time, as scholars have
demonstrated, most were also adamant about preserving the basic features of
the traditional federal system with its separate spheres of state power and
state citizenship. 385 There is, of course, disagreement on this issue. Some
scholars have argued that the Reconstruction Amendments heralded a more
"revolutionary" conception of national citizenship rights and Congress's
power to enforce and even create such rights.386 As Michael Zuckert and
383 See BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 96-98; The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
384 BERGER, FOURTEENTH (1989), supra note 7, at 96 n.27. This was not the only
case in which Berger lost track of his own argument. See supra note 245.
385 See, e.g., MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS (1990), supra note 10, at 39-40, 106-09;
BRANDWEIN (1999), supra note 116, at 4-8, 57-58, 135-36; see generally, e.g., HYMAN,
MORE PERFECT (1973), supra note 95, at 433-90; BENEDICT, COMPROMISE (1974), supra
note 72; Benedict, Preserving (1974), supra note 95.
386 See generally, e.g., Kaczorowski, Revolutionary (1986), supra note 95;
Kaczorowski, To Begin (1987), supra note 95. Several scholars have recently studied
Congress's power to create and enforce rights of national citizenship. See REBECCA E.
ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION
OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (New York Univ. Press 2006); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging,
Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the Limits of Federalism,
62 U. PITr. L. REV. 281 (2000); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil
Rights and John Bingham's Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717 (2003);
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Juriscentrism and the Original Meaning of Section Five, 13 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 485 (2004); see also, e.g., James W. Fox, Jr., Citizenship,
Poverty, and Federalism: 178 7-1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 421 (1999); James W. Fox, Jr.,
Re-Readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities, and Section
Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67 (2002); James W. Fox, Jr., Democratic
Citizenship and Congressional Reconstruction: Defining and Implementing the Privileges
and Immunities of Citizenship, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 453 (2004); William J.
Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities " Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional
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Pamela Brandwein have perceptively suggested, We can find truth in both
views if only we escape the simplistic way the question is usually posed and
seek a more nuanced understanding of Republican goals. 387
In any event, the evidence regarding the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as discussed in this Article, seems sufficient to
support the inference that it nationalized the Bill of Rights. The incorporation
theory enjoys especially strong support in certain key respects, notably as to
freedom of speech. The 1866 congressional debates strongly and explicitly
support the theory. But it appears to have been far less discussed-and
possibly far less well understood--outside Congress during 1866-67. This
Article concedes the uneven and incomplete nature of the surviving evidence
from 1866-67, and that more work is required-especially to explore the
early understanding of the Amendment during the years after 1867.
The evidence from 1866-67 seems sufficient to have provided a
legitimate basis for judges, politicians, lawyers, scholars, commentators, and
the American people generally, to read the Amendment in the ensuing years
as nationalizing the Bill of Rights. But did they, in fact, so read it? If so, to
what extent? If not, why not? I will try to answer those questions in
forthcoming articles.
Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153 (2002). For a helpful historical background study, see
Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
681 (1997).
387 See Michael P. Zuckert, Completing the Constitution: The Fourteenth
Amendment and Constitutional Rights, 22 PuBLIUs: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM, No. 2,
at 69, 71-72 (1992); BRANDWEIN (1999), supra note 116, at 57-58.
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